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Abstract
In the classical weighted matching problem the optimizer is given a graph with edge
weights and their goal is to find a matching which maximizes the sum of the weights of edges
in the matching. It is typically assumed in this process that the optimizer has unilateral
control over the decision to take each edge. Where cooperative game theory intersects
combinatorial optimization this assumption is subverted. In a cooperative matching game
each vertex of the graph is controlled by a distinct player, and an edge can only be taken
into a matching with the cooperation of the players at each of its vertices. One can think
of the weight of an edge as representing the value the players of that edge generate by
collaborating in partnership. In this setting the question is more than simply can we find
an optimal matching, as in the classic matching problem, but also how should the players
share the total value of the matching amongst themselves.
The players should share the value they generate in a way that fairly respects the con-
tributions of each player, and which encourages as well as possible the stable participation
of every player in the network. Cooperative game theory formulates such fair distributions
of wealth as solution concepts. One classical and beautiful solution concept is the nucleo-
lus. Intuitively the nucleolus distributes value so that the worst off groups of players are as
satisfied as possible, and subject to that the second worst off groups, and so on. Here we
think of satisfaction as the difference between how much value the players were distributed
versus how much they could have generated on their own had they seceded from the grand
coalition.
This thesis studies the nucleolus of matching games, and their generalization to b-
matching games where each player can take on multiple partnerships simultaneously, from
a computational perspective. We study when the nucleolus of a b-matching game can be
computed efficiently and when it is intractable to do so.
Chapter 2 describes an algorithm for computing the nucleolus of any weighted cooper-
ative matching game in polynomial time. Chapter 3 studies the computational complexity
of b-matching games. We show that computing the nucleolus of such games is NP-hard
even when every vertex has b-value 3, the graph is unweighted, bipartite, and of maximum
degree 7. Finally, in Chapter 4 we show that when the problem of determining the worst
off coalition under a given allocation in a cooperative game can be formulated as a dy-
namic program then the nucleolus of the game can be computed in time which is only a
polynomial factor larger than the time it takes to solve said dynamic program. We apply
this result to show that nucleolus of b-matching games can be computed in polynomial
time on graphs of bounded treewidth.
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Imagine a network of players that form partnerships to generate value. For example, a tennis
league pairing players to play exhibition matches [7], or people making trades in an exchange net-
work [76]. These situations can be modelled by cooperative matching games. Cooperative game
theory studies how value generated by players working in cooperation will be shared amongst the
players. This thesis looks at matching games and one classical solution concept for describing how
players in matching games will share value, the nucleolus, from the perspective of combinatorial
optimization. That is, we seek to design algorithms for computing the nucleolus of matching
games using tools from graph theory and linear programming. We also seek to prove certain
difficult cases are computationally hard.
Section 1.1 will discuss the preliminaries needed in combinatorial optimization for this thesis,
including graph theory, algorithms and complexity, and linear programming. This section can
be safely skipped for someone familiar with the foundations of this field. Section 1.2 will then
introduce concepts from cooperative game theory relevant to this thesis, including explaining
what matching games are and what the nucleolus of a game is. In particular Section 1.2.2 will
discuss various types of cooperative games which arise from combinatorial optimization problems
and survey the landscape of computational complexity results for computing solution concepts
for such games. As is the focus of this thesis, we will pay special attention to complexity results
around computing the nucleolus of matching games. Section 1.3 will briefly discuss connections
between matching games and related areas of research. Section 1.4 will discuss the contributions
of this thesis and outline the chapters to follow.
1
1.1 Combinatorial Optimization
We define an instance of a mathematical optimization problem instance to be a pair (f,X )
where X ⊆ Rn is called the feasible region and f : X → R is called the objective function1. We
often write such an optimization problem instance as
max f(x)
s.t. x ∈ X
or more compactly as max{f(x) : x ∈ X}.
An element x ∈ X is called a feasible solution. A condition all feasible solutions must satisfy
is called a constraint . If a feasible solution x ∈ X satisfies f(x) ≥ f(y) for all y ∈ X then x
is called an optimal solution. If an optimization problem instance has a feasible solution but
no optimal solution then we call the problem instance is unbounded. If X = ∅ then we say the
problem instance is infeasible. To solve a problem instance means to find an optimal solution if
one exists or otherwise report that the problem is infeasible or unbounded, whichever is the case.
If X = Rn then we say the problem instance is unconstrained, otherwise we say it is constrained.
If X ⊆ Zn then we say the problem instance is a discrete optimization problem instance or
integer optimization problem instance. If X ⊆ {0, 1}n we say the problem instance is a binary
optimization problem instance.
Oftentimes the feasible region will exhibit additional combinatorial structure such as when
we have a binary optimization problem instance where X is encoding the set of spanning trees
in a graph or the set of matchings in a graph. In this case we say the problem instance is
a combinatorial optimization problem instance. To give us a shared language to discuss such
problems, which are of central interest to this thesis, the next section describes introductory
terminology in graph theory.
1.1.1 Graph Theory
In this thesis the sort of games we are interested in can often be represented by graphs. The
language of graph theory is ideal for describing relationships between players in a network. This
section will establish common definitions and notation from graph theory. A reader familiar with
the subject can safely skip what follows. For a reader interested in going deeper we recomment
Diestel [21].
1We chose feasible regions in Rn as we do not need anything more general for this thesis. As a disclaimer,
more general spaces are studied in the broad optimization literature.
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An undirected2, simple graph is an ordered pair G = (V,E) where V is a nonempty finite set
called the vertices or nodes of G and E ⊆ {{x, y} : x, y ∈ V and x 6= y} is a finite set called the
edges or arcs of G. We often use xy ∈ E as a shorthand for {x, y} ∈ E. When V,E are not
explicitly labelled it can be handy to use V (G) to denote the vertices of G and E(G) to denote
the edges of G.
If e = xy is an edge then we say x is adjacent to y. We also say y is a neighbour of x, and
x and y are incident with e, x and y are endpoints of e, and e is incident with x and y or e is
an edge between x and y. If e, f ∈ E are two distinct edges which share a common node then we
say e and f are incident.
The graph G′ = (V ′, E′) is called a subgraph of G if V ′ ⊆ V (G) and E′ ⊆ E(G). If G′ is a
subgraph of G then we write G′ ⊆ G and can say G contains G′. For any S ⊆ V (G) we use E(S)
to denote the set of edges between vertices of S. Formally E(S) = {uv ∈ E : u, v ∈ S}. For
S ⊆ V (G), the subgraph of G induced by S is denoted G[S] and is defined to be the subgraph
satisfying V (G[S]) = S and E(G[S]) = E(S). That is, the vertices of G[S] are S and the subgraph
contains every edge of G between vertices of S. The union of two graphs G1 and G2 is denoted
G1∪G2 and is defined to be the graph with vertex set V (G1)∪V (G2) and edge set E(G1)∪E(G2).
Some important operations to obtain subgraphs from a graph G = (V,E) are contraction and
deletion. For S ⊆ V , the graph obtained from deleting S is denoted G\S and is defined to be
the graph (V \S,E\E(S)). Similarly for F ⊆ E, the graph obtained from deleting F is denoted
G\F and is defined to be the graph (V,E\F ). When deleting a singleton {a}, G − a is used as
a shorthand for G\{a}. For an edge e = uv ∈ E, the graph obtained from G by contracting e is
denoted G/e and is defined to be the graph obtained from G by merging u and v into a single
vertex w. The neighbours of w in G/e are N(u) ∪N(v)\{u, v}.
For a node v ∈ V we use N(v) := {u ∈ V : uv ∈ E} to denote the set of neighbours of v. We
can use N(U) :=
⋃
v∈U N(v) to denote the neighbours of a set of vertices U . Similarly we use
δ(v) := {e ∈ E : v ∈ E} to denote the set of edges incident with v. We can use δ(U) :=
⋃
v∈U δ(v)
to denote the edges incident with a set of vertices U . The degree of v is equivalently the number
of neighbours of v and the number of edges incident with v. We use d(v) to denote the degree of
v, i.e. d(v) = |N(v)| = |δ(v)|. If d(v) = 0 then v is called an isolated node.
We will now discuss some important special cases of graphs. A complete graph satisfies that
edge possible edge is in E, i.e. for all u 6= v ∈ V , uv ∈ E. The complete graph on n nodes is
denoted Kn. A k-partite graph is one where V = V1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Vk can be partitioned in k classes such
that for all i ∈ [k], E(Vi) = ∅. Here [k] is shorthand for {1, . . . , k}. When k = 2 we call the
graph bipartite.
A walk is a graph P = (V,E) where the vertices can be ordered v0, v1, . . . , vn and the edges
can be ordered e1, . . . , en such that for all i in [n], ei = vi−1vi. In a walk, the sequence e1, . . . , en
2As opposed to a directed graph, where E ⊆ V × V \{(v, v) : V ∈ V }.
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is not permitted to repeat at edge, but may repeat vertices. A path is a walk which does not
repeat vertices. We say P starts at v0 and ends at vn. Also v0 and vn are endpoints of P , and P
is called a path between v0 and vn. We refer to P as a v0vn-path. The length of P is n.
A circuit is a graph C = (V,E) where the vertices can be ordered v0, v1, . . . , vn with v0 = vn
and the edges can be ordered e1, . . . , en such that for all i in [n], ei = vi−1vi. In a circuit, the
sequence e1, . . . , en is not permitted to repeat an edge, but may repeat vertices. A cycle is a
circuit which does not repeat vertices except for v0 and vn. The length of C is n. We denote the
cycle on n vertices by Cn.
A graph G is called connected if it contains a path between every pair of vertices in V (G),
otherwise it is disconnected. A connected component , or sometimes just component, of G is a
maximal connected subgraph of G. A component is called even (odd respectively) if it has an
even (odd respectively) number of nodes.
We say G is k-connected if the smallest size of a set of vertices whose deletion disconnects
G is k. Notice that being 1-connected is equivalent to being connected. Similarly we say G is
k-edge-connected if the smallest size of a set of edges whose deletion disconnects G is k. Being
k-connected is a stronger condition than being k-edge-connected.
A forest is a graph with no cycles. A graph with no cycles is called acyclic. A connected
forest is called a tree. A tree with at most vertex of degree greater than 1 is called a star . The
k-star is the star graph with at most one vertex of degree k, and that vertex is called the center
of the star. The only star with without a uniquely defined center is the 1-star in which either
vertex could be thought of as the center. A subgraph G′ of G is said to span V (G′). If T is a
subgraph of G which spans V (G) then T is called a spanning tree.
We will often want to label the edges or vertices of a graph with some numbers. A weighted
graph associates with a graph G a weight function w : E → R on its edges. In this case we say
G is w-weighted . Similarly a degree-bounded graph associates with G a degree-bound function
b : V → R on its vertices. In this case we say G is b-valued . When we have a function f : S → R
where S is a finite set, for any S′ ⊆ S we use f(S′) :=
∑
s∈S′ f(s) to compactly write the sum of
f values on elements in S′. This notation is used often with functions of the edges or vertices of
a graph.
A matching in a graph G is a set of edges M ⊆ E(G) such that every node of G is incident with
at most one edge of M , i.e. for all v ∈ V (G), |M ∩ δ(v)| ≤ 1. We use V (M) to denote the set of
vertices incident with an edge in M . Formally we write V (M) := {v ∈ V (G) : ∃e ∈M,v ∈ e}. If a
node v is in V (M) we say that v is M -covered , otherwise we say v is M -exposed . If V (M) = V (G)
the we say M is a perfect matching.
Example: We are now ready to state our favourite example of a combinatorial optimization
problem instance: instances of the matching problem. Recall that an optimization problem
instance is determined by its feasible region X and its objective function f : X → R.
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In a (weighted) matching problem instance we are given a w-weighted graph G = (V,E). The
feasible region is the set characteristic vectors of matching in G. In general on a ground set T ,
for S ⊆ T we use χ(S) to denote the characteristic vector of S. The entries of χ(S) are indexed
by the elements of T and for each t ∈ T , χ(S)t is equal to the number of times3 t appears in
S. So then X = {χ(M) : M is a matching in G}. From the definition of a matching this can be
equivalently written as X = {x ∈ {0, 1}E : x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V }. The objective function is
determined by f(χ(M)) = wTχ(M) = w(M) =
∑
e∈E we.
Oftentimes in combinatorial optimization we will discuss sets and their characteristic vectors
interchangeably, with the intent always clear from context. Combinatorial optimization problem
instances are often written with only references to the sets in question, as in this equivalent
formulation of the matching problem instance on w-weighted graph G:
max w(M)
s.t. |M ∩ δ(v)| ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V
M ⊆ E.
Suppose we wanted to find an optimal solution to a matching problem instance. What strategy
would we use to do this? How long would that strategy take find a solution? The next section
gives us language for formalizing such questions.
1.1.2 Algorithms and Complexity
We aim to give a high level overview of algorithms and complexity concepts in this section
useful for this thesis. For a more formal treatment see Hopcroft and Ulman [43] or Garey and
Johnson [35].
A problem is a relation R ⊆ I × S where I is a set of problem instances and S is a set of
problem solutions. That is (I, S) is in R if and only if S is a solution to problem instance I.
Example: Let I be a set of mathematical optimization problem instances. Let S be the
union of all optimal solutions to instances in I. Then we can form a mathematical optimization
problem R ⊆ I × S where ((f,X ), x) ∈ R if and only if x is an optimal solution to (f,X ).
Let I be the set of optimization problem instances (f,X ) such that (f,X ) is a matching
problem instance for some w-weighted graph G. Then the associated mathematical optimization
problem R is called the (weighted) matching problem.
3We express the definition of χ(S)t this way so that we may generalize to multisets.
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Example: A decision problem is a problem R ⊆ I × S where S ⊆ {0, 1}. We can think
of decision problem instances as asking a Yes-No question, with answer Yes corresponding to 1
and answer No corresponding to 0.
For every mathematical optimization problem R ⊆ I×S we can associate a decision problem
R′ ⊆ (I × Q)× {0, 1} where for every (f,X ) in I and for every k ∈ Q, R′ relates ((f,X ), k) with
1 if there exists x ∈ X such that f(x) ≥ k, otherwise it relates the instance with 0.
We call this associated decision problem the decision version of the mathematical optimization
problem. Notice that by using binary search
An algorithm for a problem R ⊆ I × S is a list of instructions which takes an instance I ∈ I
as input and outputs a solution4 S ∈ S such that (I, S) is in R. We are interested in measuring
the efficiency of an algorithm. To do this we will consider the classic paradigm of worst-case time
complexity.
The the runtime of an algorithm on a problem instance is the number of elementary operations
it takes produce a solution to that instance. The term elementary operations depends on the
model of computation in question. Fortunately for most reasonable models of computation, the
runtimes only vary by a polynomial factor as the set of elementary operations changes [35, p. 11].
Intuitively one can think of a physical computer and the operations on one which essentially take
constant time: assignment, addition, subtraction, multiplication, and comparision for instance.
We are interested in knowing the worst-case runtime as the size of instances grow. This will
give us as sense of the asymptotic time complexity. By asymptotic complexity we mean we are
only interested in a rough measure that captures the order of growth of the runtime on sufficiently
large instances. To formalize this notion we use the Big-Oh notation. A function f : N → R is
O(g) if there exists non-negative constants c and n0 such that for all n ≥ n0, f(n) ≤ cg(n).
Now we need to explain what the size of an instance means. Computers store information in
binary. The number of bits needed to encode an instance will define the size of the instance. This
means encoding the number n will take O(log(n)) bits, and encoding a graph with n vertices will
take roughly O(n2) bits to specify the edges (in an adjacency matrix for instance).
There are multiple possible choices of encoding schemes. We did not need to to choose binary.
Since the number of digits needed to represent n in base b is O(logb(n)), the choice of numerical
base only impacts our encoding size by a constant factor. There also multiple ways to encode
combinatorial structures like graphs. Graphs can be encoded as adjacency matrices or adjacency
lists for example. Each method has its pros and cons, but fortunately they are all polynomially
related in the number of vertices. For our purposes it suffices to say that a graph G with n
vertices and m edges can be encoded with O(n+m) bits.
4We limit ourselves to algorithms which are always correct as opposed to randomized algorithms or
approximation algorithms which have different criteria.
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We say an algorithm A which solves R ⊆ I × S has time complexity r : N → R if for every
n ∈ N the maximum runtime of A on instances of size n is r(n). If the runtime is bounded by
a polynomial, i.e. if there exists a constant d such that r(n) = O(nd), then we say that A is a
polynomial time algorithm and that R can be solved in polynomial time.
Sometimes confused for polynomial time algorithms, pseudopolynomial time algorithms solve
problems in a runtime which is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the instance and the value
of the numbers the instance encodes. For example the Knapsack problem: given an instance
determined by a vector a ∈ Rm and b ∈ R, solve
max{wTx : aTx ≤ b, x ∈ {0, 1}m}.
There is a classic algorithm using the dynamic programming technique which solves this problem
in time O(mb). Since the encoding size of b is log(b) this is not a polynomial time algorithm, but
rather a pseudopolynomial time algorithm.
The class P is the set of decision problems which can be solved in polynomial time. Due
to Edmonds [23] the decision version of the matching problem is in P. The class NP is the
set of decision problems which can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing machine. For our
purposes these are decision problems whose Yes instances have a certificate which can be checked
in polynomial time. Formally a problem R is in NP if for every instance I of R there is an
algorithm A such that if I is a Yes instance then there exists a witness W such that A run on
input (I,W ) returns Yes in polynomial time (in terms of the size of I), and if I is a No instance
then for every witness W the algorithm A run on (I,W ) returns No. Note that P ⊆ NP since
there is a polynomial algorithm for every problem in P that does not need the help of a witness
certificate. The biggest open question in computer science is whether or not P = NP.
There are many decision problems which are in NP but for which no polynomial time algorithm
is known. For example the Hamiltonian Cycle problem, where each instance is a graph G
and the instance is a Yes instance if and only if G contains a cycle of length |V (G)|. It is easy
to provide witness for Yes instances of Hamiltonian Cycle. If a graph G has a Hamiltonian
Cycle, then the witness is simply the vertices of the graph in the order they appear on the cycle.
An algorithm can easily check this in polynomial time by verifying their is an edge between each
subsequent pair of vertices and that every vertex appears exactly once. Notice that it is much
more difficult to conceive of a witness which can be checked in polynomial time for No instances
of Hamiltonian Cycle. Problems where that can be done are said to be in the class coNP.
The Hamiltonian Cycle problem is a classic example of an NP-complete problem. A
problem is NP-hard if there exists a polynomial time reduction to that problem for every problem
in NP. A problem is NP-complete if it is both in NP and NP-hard. A polynomial time reduction
from a problem R to a problem R′ is an algorithm, A, which given access to an oracle algorithm
A′ for R′, can solve every instance of R in polynomial time. Notice that giving a polynomial time
algorithm for an NP-complete problem would immediately yield a polynomial time algorithm for
every problem in NP and thus prove that P = NP.
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Despite an ever growing list of problems which are NP-hard and much attention from the
research community no polynomial time algorithm for an NP-hard problem has ever been found.
For this reason, amongst others, it is widely believed in computer science that P 6= NP and
showing a problem is in NP is commonly taken as evidence that no efficient algorithm can be
found. That said, as scientists and mathematicians we must keep a healthy skepticism of this
fact until a proof is found or it is determined that no proof can be found.
1.1.3 Linear Programming and Polyhedra
Linear programming is will be a ubiquitous tool in this thesis. This section will cover the basics
relevant for this thesis. For anyone intereted in learning more about linear programming, and
geometric methods in general, particularly with applications to combinatorial optimization we
recommend Grotschel, Lovasz, and Schrijver [40] and Lau, Ravi, and Singh [57].
A linear optimization problem or linear program is a mathematical optimization problem
(f,X ) where f(x) = cTx for some c ∈ Rn and X is a polyhedron. A polyhedron is the solution
set of a system of linear inequalities. That is, a polyhedron is a set of form {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b} for
some matrix A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm. If a polyhedron is bounded, by which we mean that there
exists a positive constant which upper bounds the 2-norm of every point in the polyhedron, then
we call the polyhedron a polytope.
Let x1, . . . , xm ∈ Rn be a set of points in Rn, and consider a vector λ ∈ Rm. We use 1 to
denote the vector of all ones, with the dimension being clear from context. When 1Tλ = 1 we
say that the linear combination λTx is an affine combination. If, in addition, λ ≥ 0 then we say
λTx is a convex combination.
For any X ⊆ Rm, the dimension of X is the cardinality of the largest affinely independent
subset of X minus 1. We denote by aff(X) (conv(X) respectively) the set of affine (convex
respectively) combinations of vectors in X. If X = conv(X) then we say that X is a convex
set or that X is convex. It is not hard to see that polyhedra are convex. If x is a point in a
convex set P such that the only way to write x as a convex combination of points in P is the
trivial combination x = 1 · x then we call x an extreme point of P . When a linear program has
an optimal solution and an extreme point then it always has an optimal solution which is an
extreme point of its feasible region.
Theorem 1.1.1 Consider a linear program max{cTx : x ∈ P} where P is a polyhedron. Suppose
this linear program has an optimal solution and that P has an extreme point. Then there exists
an optimal solution x∗ ∈ P such that x∗ is an extreme point of P .
For a ∈ Rn and β ∈ R, the polyhedron {x ∈ Rn : aTx ≤ β} is called a halfspace and the
polyhedron {x ∈ Rn : aTx = β} is called a hyperplane. Often we will compactly write a halfspace
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as aTx ≤ β and a hyperplane as aTx = β. By definition every polyhedron is the intersection of
finitely many halfspaces.
Consider a polyhedron P = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b}. An inequality cTx ≤ β is called valid for P if
cTx ≤ β holds for all x in P . Note that if we let ai denote the i-th row of A then every inequality
aTi x ≤ bi is valid. A face of P is a set F ⊆ P such that there exists a valid inequality zTx ≤ β
for P such that F = {x ∈ P : zTx = β}. In this case the inequality zTx ≤ β is said to induce or
define the face F .
Observe that if F = {x ∈ P : cTx = β} is a face of P and F ′ = {x ∈ F : dTx = γ} is a
face of F then F ′ is a face of P . If a face is a singleton, i.e. F = {v} for some v ∈ Rn, then v is
called a vertex of P . Polyehdra with vertices are called pointed. Whereas vertices are the smallest
non-empty faces of a polyehdron, facets are what we call the largest faces of a polyhedron not
equal to the polyhedron itself. That is, a facet F is an inclusionwise maximal face of P such that
∅ ⊂ F ⊂ P . The notion of vertex and extreme point are equivalent
Theorem 1.1.2 Consider a polyhedron P . Then x ∈ P is an extreme point of P if and only if
x is a vertex of P .
The following result provides an algebraic characterization of the extreme points of a polyhe-
dron written in symmetric form: P = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0}.
Lemma 1.1.3 [57] Let P = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0} be a polyhedron. Let x ∈ P and let Ā
be the matrix consisting of rows of A which x satisfies at equality. That is, if aTx ≤ bi is in an
equality of Ax ≤ b and aT is a row of Ā then aTx = bi. Then x is an extreme point of P if and
only if the columns of Ā which correspond to non-zero entries of x are linearly independent.
In contrast to extreme points, which lie on the boundary of a polyhedron we will also be
interested in points which lie inside the polyhedron. A point x is said to lie in the relative
interior of P if the containment minimal face of P containing x if P itself.
We are interested in polyhedra which have a finite encoding length for the purposes of dis-
cussing algorithms and complexity. We say a polyehdron P is rational if there exists A ∈ Qm×n
and b ∈ Qm such that P = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b}. A rational polyhedron is said to have facet
complexity φ if there exists A ∈ Qm×n and b ∈ Qm such that each inequality aTi x ≤ bi can be
encoded using at most φ bits, where ai is the i-th row of A. It turns out the facet complexity
bounds the encoding size of a vertex.
Theorem 1.1.4 [40] Let P ⊆ Rn be a rational polyhedron. Let x ∈ P be a vertex of P . Then
the encoding size of x is bounded by O(n2φ) where φ is the facet comlexity of P .
We say an inequality cTx ≤ β is a separating hyperplane for polyhedron P ⊆ Rn and point
x ∈ Rn if cTx ≤ β is valid for P and cTx > β. The separation problem take a polyhedron P and a
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point x in P as input and outputs Yes if x is in P and otherwise outputs a separating hyperplane
between P and x.
The celebrated Ellipsoid Method of Khachiyan [46] says that solving a linear program reduces
to solving its associated separation problem. This provided the first known polynomial time
algorithm for linear programming.
Theorem 1.1.5 [46][40] There exists a polynomial f(n, φ) in variables n and φ such that for any
polyhedron P ⊆ Rn with facet complexity φ and for any c ∈ Rn, the linear optimization problem





where T is the time complexity of solving the separation problem on P with points x such that∑n
i=1 log(xi) = O(f(n, φ)).
Moreover, if (cTx, P ) has an optimal solution the algorithm finds one contained in a minimal
face of P . In particular, if P is pointed then the algorithm returns a vertex optimal solution when
one exists.
Many interesting variant problems on polyhedra have algorithms based on the ellispoid which
are presented in Grotschel, Lovasz, Schrijver [40]. One such variant of interest to us is the problem
of finding a relative interior point in a polyhedron.
Theorem 1.1.6 [40, Theorem 6.5.5] There exists a polynomial f(n, φ) in variables n and φ such
that for any non-empty polyhedron P ⊆ Rn with facet complexity φ a relative interior point of P





where T is the time complexity of solving the separation problem on P with points x such that∑n
i=1 log(xi) = O(f(n, φ)).
Duality and Integrality








ai,jxi ≤ bj ∀j ∈ [m]
x ≥ 0.
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ai,jyj ≥ ci ∀i ∈ [n]
y ≥ 0.
Theorem 1.1.7 [40, Theorem 6.5.14] There exists a polynomial f(n, φ) in variables n and φ
such that for any polyhedron P ⊆ Rn with facet complexity φ and for any c ∈ Rn, the dual of the





where T is the time complexity of solving the separation problem on P with points x such that∑n
i=1 log(xi) = O(f(n, φ)).
Notice that any linear program can be rewritten in the form of the primal linear program
above. Thus we can take the dual of any linear program. It turns out the dual of the dual is
the primal. Moreover it is easy to show the Weak Duality Theorem which states that any dual
feasible solution provides an upper bound on the optimal value of the primal. In fact we can
say something much stronger: the Strong Duality Theorem states that when one of the linear
programs is feasible, their optimal values are equal.
Theorem 1.1.8 (Strong Duality) If the primal linear program is feasible then the dual is also
feasible and the optimal value of the primal is equal to the optimal value of the dual.
An interesting corollary of strong duality are the Complementary Slackness Conditions. They
allow the characterization of an optimal primal solution and optimal dual solution pair.
Corollary 1.1.9 (Complementary Slackness) Let x be a feasible solution to the primal and let
y be a feasible solution to the dual. Then x is optimal for the primal and y is optimal for the
dual if and only if the Primal and Dual Complementary Slackness Conditions hold. The Primal
Complementary Slackness Conditions state that for all for all i ∈ [n] either





Similarly the Dual Complementary Slackness Conditions state that for all j ∈ [m] either
yj = 0 or
n∑
i=1
ai,jxi = bj .
Example: We now consider an example related to the matching problem. For any graph
G = (V,E) let Pf (G) denote the fractional matching polytope of G defined as follows:
Pf (G) = {x ∈ RE : x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V, x ≥ 0}.
Let w ∈ RE be a vector of edge weights. The following linear program is a relaxation of the
associated instance of the matching problem called the fractional matching linear program:
max{wTx : x ∈ Pf (G)}.
The dual of this linear program is:
min{1T y : yu + yv ≥ wuv for alluv ∈ E, y ≥ 0}.
Solutions to the dual linear program are called fractional covers.
We say that a polytope is integral is every extreme point of that polytope has integer coordi-
nates. For example, on bipartite graphs the fractional matching polytope is integral. That means
its extreme points are characteristic vectors of matchings and we can use the ellipsoid method to
find max weight matchings in polynomial time on bipartite graphs.
What about finding matchings on non-bipartite graphs? Notice that for C3 with unit weights,
the unique optimal solution is 12χ(E(C3)), which is decidedly non-integral. Fortunately we can
add constraints to the fractional matching linear program to obtain an integral formulation which
is efficiently solvable. By a celebrated result of Edmonds [22] there is a linear programming
description for the convex hull of matchings on a general graph.
Example: (Edmonds [22]) Let G = (V,E) be a graph. Let O be the set of node sets S ⊆ V
such that |S| ≥ 3 and |S| is odd. Let the matching polytope of G be
P = conv({χ(M) ∈ {0, 1}E : M is a matching in G}).
Then P can be described as
P = {x ∈ RE :
x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V




Optimizing a linear function over P is called the matching linear program.
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Theorem 1.1.10 (Edmonds [23]) Given a w-weighted graph G = (V,E) an integral optimal
solution to the associated matching linear program, and an optimal solution to its dual, can be
found in polynomial time. Hence the weighted matching problem can be solved in polynomial time.
1.2 Cooperative Game Theory
Game Theory studies the decision-making of rational, self-interested agents in strategic envi-
ronments. Cooperative Game Theory is the branch of game theory which studies situations where
players are able to making binding agreements about the distribution of payoffs outside the rules
of the game [65]. For more in depth coverage see the textbook of Chalkiadakis, Georgios and
Elkind [13].
Mathematically a cooperative game is defined by a set of players and a function which deter-
mines the value (or cost) generated by a coalition of players. Formally a cooperative game is an
ordered pair (n, ν) where n ∈ Z+ is the number of players, and ν : 2[n] → R is the so-called value
function of the game. For any S ⊆ [n], ν(S) indicates the value generated when the players in S
collaborate.
Some common classes of cooperative games are: monotone, superadditive, and convex games.
A cooperative game (n, ν) is said to be monotone if ν(S) ≤ ν(T ) for and S ⊆ T ⊆ [n]. The game
(n, ν) is called superadditive if
ν(S) + ν(T ) ≤ ν(S ∪ T )
for any S, T ⊆ [n] such that S ∩ T = ∅. The game is said to be convex if
ν(S) + ν(T ) ≤ ν(S ∪ T ) + ν(S ∩ T )
for any S, T ⊆ [n]. In combinatorial optimization the value function ν of a convex game would
be referred to as supermodular.
A basic assumption we make in the games we will study is that the value of ν(S) can be
distributed amongst the players in S in any way they see fit. Formally, games with this property
are known as transferable utility games (TU games).
Example: Let G = (V,E) be a w-weighted graph. Then the matching game on G is the
cooperative game (n, ν) where n = |V | and for any S ⊆ V , ν(S) is the maximum w-weight of a
matching on G[S].
The matching game will serve as the central topic of this thesis. Its generalization to b-
matching games will also play a large role, so we will define them now.
13
Example: Let G = (V,E) be a b-valued, w-weighted graph. Then the b-matching games
on G is the cooperative game (n, ν) where n = |V | and for any S ⊆ V ,
ν(S) := max wTx
s.t. x(δ(v)) ≤ bv ∀v ∈ S
x(δ(v)) = 0 ∀v ∈ V \S
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
x ∈ ZE .
If we add the constraint that xe ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E, then we call the b-matching game simple.
The underlying combinatorial optimization problem is called a b-matching problem. Notice
when b = 1 we recover the matching problem.
1.2.1 Solution Concepts
Given a cooperative game how should the value of the grand coalition, [n], be distributed
amongs the players? Cooperative Game Theorists have proposed many different solution concepts
which provide a mathematical characterization of desireable propreties a outcome should have.
A solution concept is an allocation x ∈ Rn (where the i-th coordinates indicates that player i is
allocated xi units of value) with some additional properties. Generally these properties capture
one of two ideas: fairness and stability. Fairness is the idea that the value a player receives
should somehow reflect the value of their contribution. Stability is the idea that players should
receive value in a way that disincentives defecting from the grand coalition. We will now discuss
a some important classical solution concepts. Our discussion is by no means exhaustive. We have
concentrated on solution concepts related the nucleolus, which the central object of study and
one of the most influential solution concepts in cooperative game theory. We have also chosen
to describe the Shapley Value. While this thesis does not present results related to the Shapley
Value we would be remiss to omit it from a discussion of solution concepts as it is the arguably
the most well-known solution concept in the field.
Shapley Value
The Shapley Value’s is driven by the idea of fairness. It was invention by Shapley in 1951 [74].
It is a solution concept which seeks to pin a player’s payoff to their marginal contribution. It
does this by measuring how much the value of the game increases when player i joins, averaged
over the possible orders in which agents can join. We will make this idea formal now.
Let Πn be the set of permutations of [n]. For each π ∈ Πn and each i ∈ [n], define
Sπ(i) := {j ∈ [n] : π(j) < π(i)}.
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Intuitively, if we this of a permutation π as describing the order the players join the game then
Sπ(i) is the set of players who joined the game before i. The Shapley Value, ϕ ∈ Rn assigns







(ν(Sπ(i) ∪ {i})− ν(Sπ(i))) .
Imputations
We now start considering solution concepts built around the notion of stability. The question
here is what qualitites should an allocation have to disincentive players from leaving the grand
coalition?
Let x ∈ Rn be an allocation. The property of individual rationality states that every player
is allocation at least the amount of value they can generate on their own. Formally we say x
is individually rational if xi ≥ ν({i}) for all i ∈ [n]. Another important property is that an
allocation only uses as much value as the grand coalition has generated. We say x is efficient if
x([n]) = ν([n]).
An imputation is an allocation which is both individually rational and efficient. For a coop-
erative game (n, ν) we use I(n, ν) to denote the set of imputations of (n, ν). Formally,
I(n, ν) := {x ∈ Rn : x([n]) = ν([n]), xi ≥ ν({i}) for all i ∈ [n]}.
Core and Leastcore
Imputations make the game stable for individuals, but what about coalitions? For an allocation
x ∈ Rn if it were the case the x(S) < ν(S) for some S ⊆ [n] then S may have incentive to deviate
from the grand coalition and form their own group. The core [36] is the set of efficient allocations
that forbid this incentive to deviate. We denote the core of (n, ν) by C(n, ν), which we formally
define as
C(n, ν) := {x ∈ Rn : x([n]) = ν([n]), x(S) ≥ ν(S) for all S ⊆ [n]}.
Notice that core allocations are imputations.
Observe that the core may sometimes be empty. For example, consider the matching game
on the cycle C3 with unit weight edges. If there existed x ∈ Rn in the core of this game then we





The equality follows since x is efficient, and the inequality follows since x(e) ≥ 1 for all e ∈ E(C3).
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When the core is empty we relax the stability constraints. The ε-core [75] is the set of efficient
allocations such that x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ε for all S ⊆ [n]. Let ε∗ be the largest value of ε for which
the ε-core is nonempty. Then the ε∗-core has a special name: the leastcore [61].
Notice that core emptiness implies that ε∗ will be negative, and thus that the ε∗-core need not
contain an imputation. In particular allocations in the ε∗-core may not be individually rational.
If we want individual rationality we instead consider P1(ε):
P1(ε) := {x ∈ I(n, ν) : x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ε for all S ⊂ [n]}.
We let ε1 be max{ε : P1(ε) 6= ∅}. The reason for the name for this object will become clear when
we discuss the nucleolus. For now, notice that the core, ε-core, and P1(ε) are all polyhedra.
We define the excess of coaltion S ⊆ [n] with respect to an allocation x to be x(S)−ν(S) and
denote this quantity by ex(x, S). One can think of the excess as a measure of satisfaction of a
coalition. A non-negative excess means S is satisfied with x in the sense that they have as much
allocation as they could earn alone. A negative excess means the coalition is unhappy in that
same sense. Now we can think of P1(ε1) as the set of imputations which maximize the bottleneck
excess, or satisfaction of the worst off coalition.
The following folklore lemma, Lemma 1.2.1, says that for superadditive games, the leastcore
and P1(ε1) coincide.
Lemma 1.2.1 Let (n, ν) be a superadditive cooperative game. If x is an allocation in the ε∗-core
(i.e. the leastcore) of (n, ν) then x satisfies individual rationality.
Proof: If ε∗ ≥ 0 (i.e. the core is nonempty) then the claim is trivial. So we may assume that
ε∗ < 0.
Suppose for a contradiction there exists i ∈ [n] such that xi < ν({i}). Let S ⊂ [n] such that
ex(x, S) = ε∗.
If i is not in S then
x(S ∪ {i}) = x(S) + xi = ν(S) + ε∗ + xi < ν(S) + ν({i}) + ε∗ ≤ ν(S ∪ {i}) + ε∗,
contradicting that x is in the ε∗-core. In the chain of inequality above, the last inequality is where
superadditivity is needed.
Thus for every S ⊂ [n] such that ex(x, S) = ε∗ we have that i is in S. Now we can choose
δ > 0, increase xi by δ and decrease xj by δ/(n− 1) for each j ∈ [n]\{i} to obtain an allocation
x′. The resulting allocation x′ is efficient, and yet ex(x′, S) > ε∗ for all S ⊂ [n]. This contradicts
the definition of ε∗.
Notice that b-matching games, and in particular matching games, are superadditive. So by
Lemma 1.2.1, for b-matching games ε∗ = ε1 and the leastcore is equal to P1(ε1). Since this thesis
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is primarily concerned with matching and b-matching games, for the remainder of this thesis
we will treat the leastcore and P1(ε1) as interchangeable. Alternatively the reader may want to
assume we are always working in the setting of superadditive games.
Kernel
The kernel [17] is based around the idea of players being unable to bargain for a fraction of
another player’s payoff in the allocation. As a measure of power of player i over player j we
define the surplus of i over j to be
Si,j(x) = max{ν(S)− x(S) : S ⊂ [n], i ∈ S, j 6∈ S}.
This quantity is the most i could earn if orchestrated a deviation without j. Player i does so by
asking S\{i} to join them in deviating, pays each player in S\{i} what they received under x,
and i keeps the surplus.
If Si,j(x) = Sj,i(x) then j can counter i’s threat with one of his own. If Si,j(x) > Sj,i(x) then
the only way j is unharmed is if xj = ν({j}) as in this case j can earn their payoff on their own.
If either of these two situations happened, then we can think of i as not having bargaining power
over j.
The kernel is the set of imputations for which no player has bargaining power over another
and we denote it by K(n, ν):
K(n, ν) : {x ∈ I(n, ν) : for all i 6= j ∈ [n], either:
Si,j(x) = Sj,i(x); or
Si,j(x) > Sj,i(x), and xj = ν({j}); or
Si,j(x) < Sj,i(x), and xi = ν({i}).}
Nucleolus
The nucleolus was first defined by Schmeidler [71]. It is a classical solution concept which builds
upon the idea of P1(ε1). Recall that P1(ε1) maximizes the minimum excess over the imputation
set. Nucleolus maximizes the second minimum excess subject to being in P1(ε1), and maximizes
the third minimum excess subject to that and so on.
Formally consider a cooperative game (n, ν). Let x ∈ Rn be an allocation. Enumerate
the coalitions as S1, S2, . . . , S2n such that they are sorted in order of non-decreasing excess, i.e.
ex(x, Si) ≤ ex(x, Si+1). Define θ(x) ∈ R2
n
to be the vecor where θ(x)i = ex(x, Si). The nucleolus
is an allocation which lexicographically maximizes θ(x) over the imputation set. We denote the
nucleolus of (n, ν) by η(n, ν):
η(n, ν) := arg lex max{θ(x) : x ∈ I(n, ν)}.
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Schmeidler [72] proved the nucleolus was unique and that it lied in ther intersection of the
kernel and leastcore of the game.
Despite its intricate definition the concept of the nucleolus is surprisingly ancient. Its history
can be traced back to a discussion on bankruptcy division in the Babylonian Talmud [2]. Some
notable modern applications of the nucleolus include but are not limited to water supply manage-
ment [1], fair file sharing on peer-to-peer networks [62], resource sharing in job assignment [77],
and airport pricing [10].
Current research interest in the nucleolus stems not only from its geometric beauty [61], or
several practical applications (e.g., see above or [11, 58]), but from the strange way problems
of computing the nucleolus fall in the complexity landscape, seeming to straddle the NP vs P
boundary.
1.2.2 Cooperative Combinatorial Optimization Games
Naively to specify a game as input to computational problem one needs to write down ν(S)
for every S ⊆ [n]. This is a number of values which is exponential in the number of players, and
for inputs of this size computing any reasonable solution concept is trivial. What is interesting
is that many games value functions can be implicitly defined in terms optimizing over some
combinatorial structure on the player set, just as we did with the matching game.
Notice that to give a matching game as input to a computational problem, it suffices to specify
the graph G and edge weights w rather than encode every value of ν(S).
By modifying the underlying optimization problem coalitions need to solve, we can generate
many examples of combinatorial optimization games. For instance, we can replace solving the
matching linear program on the subgraph induced by a coalition with the fractional matching
linear program to obtain the fractional matching game. We can also start with other combinatorial
optimization problems, such as in spanning tree games where the value of ν(S) is the minimum
cost5 of a spanning tree connecting the coalition to a special vertex identified as the root.
We need not restrict ourselves to players being vertex sets. For example, given a directed
graph D = (V,E) with a source node s and sink node t, the maximum flow game is the cooperative
game with player set E, and the value of a coalition is the value of a maximum st-flow using only
arcs in the coalition.
In a similar fashion all manner of combinatorial optimization games can be defined. The
question of finding efficient algorithms for computing the nucleolus of such games has garnered
much attention from the community. This has lead to polynomial time algorithms, such as for
5Our usual perspective is of profit games, but this is an example of cost game, where the coalitions are
incurring a cost to achieve some objective and need to decide how to share this cost.
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fractional matching, cover, and clique games [15], simple flow games [67], assignment games[78],
and unweighted matching games [45]. Such methods worked by analyzing the Maschler Peleg
Shapley Scheme for computing the nucleolus which we will discuss in Section 2.1.2. Another
approach was taken by Fleiner, Solymosi and Sziklai, who used the concept of dually essential
coalitions [79] to compute the nucleolus of a large class of directed acyclic graph games [80] via
the characterization set method (Granot, Granot, and Zhu [38] and independently Reinjerse and
Potters [68]). Other cases have led to NP-hardness proofs, such as flow games [19], weighted
voting games [25], simple b-matching games [6], and spanning tree games [29]. It is interesting
to observe that the complexity of computing the nucleolus does not always correspond to the
complexity of the underlying combinatorial optimization problem.
1.3 Connections
Before outlining the contribution we will cover in main body of the thesis, we would like to
mention some interesting connections between matching games and other adjacent research areas.
Network bargaining games model situations closely related to matching games. They are
a model for studying network exchange theory, a field of social science which studies power
imbalances during bilateral negotiations between agents in a social network [16]. In a network
bargaining game we have a b-capacitated w-weighted graph G = (V,E) as in matching games.
The difference from matching games is that agents negotiate how they will split the value of
their shared edge if a partnership forms rather than the value being distributed globally as in
cooperative games. A solution in a network bargaining game is a pair (M, z) where M is a simple
b-matching and z is a non-negative vector with entries zuv and zvu for each edge uv in G. Where
zuv indicates the share that u earns from the value of edge uv and zvu indicates the share that v
earns. If uv is in M then zuv + zvu = wuv, and otherwise zuv = zvu = 0.
A solution (M, z) to a network bargaining game is said to be stable if the profit an agent earns
from any contract in M is at least as much as its outside option. An agent’s outside option is the
maximum profit that the agent can earn by forming a mutually beneficial contract with one of
its neighbours. A solution is called balanced if the difference between zuv and u’s outside option
is equal to the difference between zvu and v’s outside option for every edge uv in M . Kleinberg
and Tardos [47] showed how to compute balanced solutions in polynomial time when b is the
all-ones vector, and they showed that having a stable solution implies having a balanced solution.
Farczadi, Georgiou, and Könemann [32] extended this result to network bargaining games with
general vertex capacities. Bateni, Hajiaghayi, Immorlica, and Mahini [4] showed a connection
between matching games and network bargaining by proving that stable outcomes coincide with
the core and balanced outcomes correspond with the kernel.
In presenting the leastcore and nucleolus, the discussion was in part motivated by the possi-
bility of the core being empty and hence that there was a need for a more sophisticated solution
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concept. Another approach to dealing with core emptiness in matching games would be to ask
how many vertices or edges need to be removed from the underlying graph to produce an instance
with a non-empty core? So called graph stabilization has been intensely studied in the literature,
see for instance [9, 44, 49]. Chandrasekaran [14] wrote an excellent survey on the topic which we
recommend for readers looking for details on subject.
Connections have also been made between matching games and stable matchings. Allocations
in the core of the corresponding matching game have been found to be in 1-to-1 correspondence
with stable matchings with payments, a variant of the Gale and Shapley’s [34] famous stable
marriage problem. See Koopmans and Beckmann [52], Shapley and Shubik [76], Eriksson and
Karlander [27], and Biró, Kern, and Paulusma [7] for details.
1.4 Outline
In this thesis we study the complexity of computing solution concepts for matching games and
their generalization to b-matching games, which poses significant additional challenges. In par-
ticular we focus on computing the nucleolus. Our work concentrates on computing the nucleolus
over the Shapley value for two reasons. The first being that Shapley Value has already been well-
studied [3], leading to a #P-completeness result for computing the Shapley Value of unweighted
matching games and fully polynomial time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS). The
second reason being that the problem of computing the nucleolus of matching games had been
open since at least 1998, when Faigle, Kern, Fekete, and Hochstättler [28] mention the problem
in their work on the nucleon, a multiplicative-error analog to the nucleolus which they show is
polynomial time computable.
In Chapter 2 we study efficient algorithms for computing the nucleolus of matching games. We
describe two classical frameworks for the computing the nucleolus: the Kopelowitz Scheme [53]
and the Maschler, Peleg, Shapley (MPS) Scheme [61]. In this chapter we will discuss the long
history of related work on this problem. Our main contribution will be Theorem 2.0.1, which
states that the nucleolus of any weighted matching game can be computed in polynomial time.
We achieve this result by providing a polynomially sized description of each linear program in
the MPS Scheme for matching games. This chapter is based on work in a paper with Jochen
Koenemann and Kostya Pashkovich [50].
In Chapter 3 we consider the generalization of matching games to b-matching games. In
view of Theorem 2.0.1 these problems are significantly harder, as computing the nucleolus of
such games is NP-hard in general [6]. We will survey the complexity landscape of computing the
nucleolus of b-matching games and strengthen the hardness result. In particular we will show
Theorem 3.0.1, which states that deciding if an allocation is the nucleolus of a b-matching game
is NP-hard even when every b-value is 3, every weight is 1, and the underlying graph is bipartite.
We augment these results with some positive findings when b-values are restricted to b ≤ 2. This
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includes a separation oracle for the leastcore of such b-matching games, and an algorithm for
computing the nucleolus in some special cases. The main result of this chapter is based onwork
with Jochen Koenemann and Felix Zhou that is pending publication.
In Chapter 4 we have two goals. The first is to identify a large class of b-matching games for
which computing the nucleolus is easy. We do this in Theorem 4.0.2 which states that the nucleolus
of any b-matching game whose underlying graph has bounded treewidth can be computed in
polynomial time. The technique is based on the results of our second goal: devise a general
framework for computing the nucleolus of a large class of cooperative games. The framework we
contribute is summarized by Theorem 4.0.1 which states that for any game where the minimum
excess coalition for a given allocation can be found using a dynamic programming technique,
the nucleolus can be computed in time proportional to the size of that dynamic program. This
technique is inspired by the work of Pashkovich [63] on weighted voting games. The work in this
chapter is based on a joint paper with Jochen Koenemann [51].
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Chapter 2
Computing the Nucleolus of
Matching Games
Beyond being one of the most fundamental problems in combinatorial optimization, starting
with the founding work of Kuhn on the Hungarian method for the assignment problem [54],
matching problems have historically teetered on the cusp of hardness. For example, prior to
Edmonds’ celebrated Blossom Algorithm [23, 22] it was not clear whether Maximum Matching
belonged to P. For another example, until Rothvoß’ landmark result [70] it was thought that the
matching polytope could potentially have polynomial extension complexity.
In cooperative game theory, matchings live up to their historical pedigree of representing a
challenging problem class. The long standing open problem in this area was whether the nucleolus
of a weighted matching game instance can be computed in polynomial time. The question was
posed as an important open problem in multiple papers. In 1998, Faigle, Kern, Fekete, and
Hochstättler [28] mention the problem in their work on the nucleon. Kern and Paulusma state the
question of computing the nucleolus for general matching games as an important open problem
in 2003 [45]. In 2008, Deng and Fang [18] conjectured this problem to be NP-hard, and in
2017 Biró, Kern, Paulusma, and Wojuteczky [8] reaffirmed this problem as an interesting open
question. Theorem 2.0.1 settles the question, providing a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
the nucleolus of a general instance of a weighted cooperative matching game.
Theorem 2.0.1 Given a graph G = (V,E) and weights w : E → R, the nucleolus η(|V |, ν) of
the corresponding weighted matching game can be computed in polynomial time.
Prior to our work, the nucleolus was known to be polynomial-time computable only in struc-
tured instances of the matching game. Solymosi and Raghavan [78] showed how to compute the
nucleolus in an (unweighted) assignment game instance in polynomial time, i.e. on instances of
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the matching game on bipartite graphs. Kern and Paulusma [45] later provided an efficient algo-
rithm to compute the nucleolus in general unweighted matching game instances. Paulusma [64]
extended the work in [45] and gave an efficient algorithm to compute the nucleolus in match-
ing games where edge weights are induced by node potentials. Farczadi [31] finally extended
Paulusma’s framework further using the concept of extendible allocations. We note also that it
is easy to compute the nucleolus in weighted instances of the matching game with non-empty
core. For such instances, the leastcore has a simple compact description that does not include
constraints for coalitions of size greater than 2. Thus it is relatively straightforward to adapt the
iterative algorithm of Maschler [61] to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the nucleolus,
as we will describe towards the end of Section 2.1. Such an algorithm for computing the nucleolus
would rely on the ellipsoid method. Circumventing this, Biró, Kern, and Paulusma [7] gave a
combinatorial algorithm for computing the nucleolus of matching games with non-empty core.
In Section 2.1 we will describe classical techniques for computing the nucleolus of a cooperative
game. These techniques proceed by a hierarchy of linear programs, where the solution of each
linear program in the sequence depends on the solution of the previous linear program in the
sequence. When the core of a matching game is non-empty, it is well-known and straightforward
to compute the nucleolus using the latter of these schemes, the Maschler Peleg Shapley (MPS)
Scheme, as we will discuss.
The first linear progam in both schemes for computing the nucleolus which we will describe
is
P1 := max{ε : x ∈ P1(ε)}. (P1)
The optimal value of (P1) is ε1. For matching games it is well known how to solve this linear
program.
Our approach to proving Theorem 2.0.1 is to provide a compact (polynomially sized) descrip-
tion of each feasible region polytope in the MPS Scheme. While there are a linear number of
linear programs in the sequence, their naive implementation requires an exponential number of
constraints. While it is known how to separate over the feasible region of (P1), the challenge lies
in solving all successive linear programs in the sequence. Previous results in [45, 64] made use of
the unweighted nature of node-weighted instances of matching games, and were able to employ
the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem to derive compact formulations for the LPs in the MPS
hierarchy. We do not know how to extend this line of work beyond node-weighted instances.
In our work, we identify a minimal family of tight excess constraints of (P1) corresponding to
coalitions whose vertices are saturated by so called universal matchings. A matching is universal
if it saturates a coalition of vertices that is tight for all allocations in the leastcore. As we will
show, universal matchings are the optimal matchings for carefully chosen cost functions derived
from so called universal allocations (see Section 2.2.4).
From there we rely on well-known characterizations of extreme points of matching polyhedra,
and the fact that these are defined by laminar families of blossom constraints. Ultimately, the
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above allows us to obtain a decomposition of the input graph into the edges on either the inside
or outside of blossoms. The structure of the associated optimum face of the matching polytope
(e.g., see Schrijver [73]) elucidates the structure of excess over all coalitions in the matching game.
Our proof uses a critical insight into the symmetric nature of exchange on the nodes of a blossom
as we move between leastcore allocations (see Lemma 2.2.8).
We present the details of the leastcore LP in Section 2.2. There we introduce the concept
of universal matchings which are fundamental to our approach, and give a compact formulation
for the leastcore linear program, (P1). We also present our main technical lemma, Lemma 2.2.8,
which provides a crucial symmetry condition on the values allocations can take over the vertices
of blossoms in the graph decomposition we use to describe the compact formulation. In Sec-
tion 2.3 we describe the successive linear programs in Maschler’s Scheme and provide a compact
formulation for each one in a matching game. We show how this formulation can be used in
Maschler’s framework to compute the nucleolus in Section 2.3.
2.1 Schemes For Computing the Nucleolus
2.1.1 Kopelowitz Scheme
The first scheme for computing the nucleolus is due to Kopelowitz [53]. It is defined as follows.
Consider a cooperative game (n, ν). Define a sequence of linear programs (Ki) for i =
1, . . . , N . The first linear program K1 will be equal to (P1) as defined earlier. The feasible
region of each linear program will be a subset of Rn×R. The optimal value of Ki will be denoted
εKi , and the set of x ∈ Rn such that (x, ε) is feasible for Ki will be denoted Ki(ε).
The remaining linear programs in the sequence are defined recursively
max ε







Here for each j = 1, . . . , N ,
Tight(Kj(ε
K
j )) = {S ⊆ [n] : ex(x, S) = εKj , for all x ∈ Kj(εKj )}.
We call coalitions in the above set, the tight coalitions for Kj .
The sequence terminates, i.e. we obtain KN , when the feasible region of the current linear




i )) = 2
[n], the set of all coalitions.
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It is immediate that N is finite, since at least one coalition is add to the tight set in every
round of Kopelowitz Scheme. It is also clear from the definitions that KN (ε
K
N ) contains η(n, ν),
the nucleolus of the game. The issue is that it may take an exponential number of rounds for
Kopelowitz Scheme to terminate, as the following example shows.
Example: This example from Greco, Malizia, Palopoli, Scarcello [39] shows that there exist
cooperative games where Kopelowitz Scheme runs in an exponential number of rounds.
For any n ≥ 3, let (n, ν) be the cooperative game defined as follows. Let m = n−2 and fix an
arbitrary ordering over the subsets of {W ⊆ [m] : 2 ≤ |W | < m}, labelling the sets W1, . . . ,Wh
where h = 2m −m− 2.
For any S ⊂ [n], we define
ν(S) :=

m+ 2, if S = [n]
m, if S = [m]
|Wi| − 1 + 2−i, if S = Wi, for i ∈ [h]
2, if S = [n]\[m]
1, if S = {j} for some j ∈ [m]
0, if S = {m+ 1} or S = {m+ 2}
−2, otherwise.
This definition may appear complex, but it is in service of creating a simple effect: for each
i ∈ [h] there is a round of Kopelowitz Scheme where Wi is the only coalition added to the tight
sets.
First observe that if x ∈ K1(εK1 ) then x is an imputation by definition, and so xj ≥ 1 for all
j ∈ [m] and xm+1, xm+2 ≥ 0 by individual rantionality. Further, by efficiency x([n]) = m + 2.




K) = {x ∈ Rn : x1 = · · · = xm = 1, xm+1 ≥ 0, xm+2 ≥ 0, x[n]\[m] = 2}.
Therefore Tight(K1(ε
K
1 )) = {{1}, . . . , {m}, [m], {m+ 1,m+ 2}}.
Now, for each i ∈ [h],
ex(x,Wi) = x(Wi)− ν(Wi) = |Wi| − |Wi|+ 1− 2−i = 1− 2−i.
Since the value of xj is fixed to 1 after the first round for each j ∈ [m], each subsequent round
of Kopelowitz Scheme adds one coalition from W1, . . . ,Wh to the tight sets in that order. Thus
taking at least h rounds, i.e. a number of rounds on the order of an exponential in n, to find the
nucleolus.
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2.1.2 Maschler, Peleg, Shapley Scheme
In the last subsection we saw that Kopelowitz Scheme takes an exponential number of rounds
to find the nucleolus of a cooperative game in the worst case. The scheme we present in this
subsection improves upon that bound dramtically, taking a linear number of rounds in the worst
case. It is the well-known Maschler Peleg Shapley (MPS) Scheme [53, 61].
Notice how in the worst case example for the Kopelowitz Scheme, an exponential number of
rounds were needed, but in each of those rounds no change was being made to the total amount
allocated to the coalitions entering the tight set? The key idea in the MPS Scheme is to only
consider coalitions in subsequent rounds for which the total value assigned to a coalition is not
yet fixed over the potential allocations which are still feasible. Toward this end, for a polytope
Q ⊆ Rn, we define Fix(Q) as follows
Fix(Q) := {S ⊆ [n] : ∃cS ∈ R, x(S) = cS for all x ∈ Q}.
We call the coalitions in Fix(Q) the fixed coalitions. Observe that for the polytopes appearing
Kopelowitz Scheme, Tight(Ki(ε
K
i )) ⊆ Fix(Ki(εi)).
Consider a cooperative game (n, ν). Similar to how we defined Kopelowitz Scheme, we define
a sequence of linear programs (Pi) for i = 1, . . . , N whose feasible regions are subsets of Rn ×R.
The first linear program will be equal to (P1) as defined earlier. The optimal value of Pi will be
denoted εi, and the set of x ∈ Rn such that (x, ε) is feasible for Pi will be denoted Pi(ε).
The remaining linear programs in the sequence are defined recursively
max ε (Pi)
s.t. ex(x, S) ≥ ε ∀S ⊆ [n], S 6∈ Fix(Pi−1(εi−1))
x ∈ Pi−1(εi−1).
As with the Kopelowitz Scheme, the sequence terminates when the feasible region of the current
linear program is a singleton. In other words, when Fix(Pi(εi)) = 2
[n].
To see that the MPS Scheme terminates in O(n) rounds, consider a coalition S ⊆ [n] and
observe that if χ(S) is in the linear span of the incidence vectors of coalitions in Fix(Pi(εi)) then
S is in Fix(Pi(εi)). Therefore in each round i, there exists S ⊆ [n] such that x(S)−ν(S) = εi and
χ(S) is not in the linear span of incidence vectors of coaltions in Fix(Pi−1(εi−1)). Hence after at
most n rounds the incidence vectors of the coalitions in the tight set span Rn, at which point the
next polytope in the sequence has a unique solution, the nucleolus.
When the core is non-empty, it is easy to compute the nucleolus of a matching game in
polynomial time using the MPS Scheme. We will explain how by giving the proof of this well-
known theorem. Although more technically complex, our result for the core empty case will follow
the same high-level structure and so it is worth going over in detail.
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Theorem 2.1.1 ( [64]) Let G = (V,E) be a w-weighted graph and let (n, ν) be the matching
game on G. Suppose that the core of (n, ν) is non-empty. Then η(n, ν) can be computed in
polynomial time in |E| and the encoding size of w.
Proof: First notice that since the core non-empty, P1(ε1) = C(n, ν), the core of the game.
Indeed, core non-emptiness implies ε1 ≥ 0. To see that ε1 ≤ 0 observe that if ε1 > 0 then
x(M) > w(M) for all matchings M . In particular this would hold for the maximum weight
matching in G, implying that x(V ) > ν(V ), a contradiction to efficiency.
We claim that the core has a polynomially sized descripition of the form
C(n, ν) = {x ∈ Rn : ex(x, e) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
x(V ) = ν(V )
x ≥ 0}.
If this claim holds then we can use any polynomial time linear programming algorithm, such as
the ellipsoid method for instance, to compute allocations in the core in polynomial time and thus
solve the first linear program in the MPS Scheme.
To see the claim holds it suffices to show for any imputation x, x(uv) ≥ w(uv) for all uv ∈ E
if and only if x(S) ≥ ν(S) for all S ⊆ V . The ‘if’ direction is immediate since ν({u, v}) = w(uv).
For the ‘only if’ direction, let S ⊆ V and let M ⊆ E(G[S]) be a matching such that w(M) = ν(S).
Since x ≥ 0 by individual rationality, x(S) ≥ x(V (M)) and therefore, by summing x(e) ≥ w(e)
over the edges of M ,
x(S) ≥ w(M) = ν(S).
Thus the claim holds.
Now we need to give a compact description of the higher round polytopes in the MPS Scheme.
We claim that for any ε ≥ 0, and i ≥ 2,
Pi(ε) = P̂i(ε) := {x ∈ Rn : ex(x, e) ≥ ε, ∀e ∈ E\Fix(Pi−1(εi−1))
xv ≥ ε, ∀v ∈ V, {v} 6∈ Fix(Pi−1)(εi−1)
x ∈ Pi−1(εi−1)}
The fact that Pi(ε) is contained in P̂i(ε) is immediate since P̂i(εi) is a relaxation of Pi(ε). For
the reverse inclusion consider x ∈ P̂i(ε). It remains to show that ex(x, S) ≥ ε for all S ⊆ [n], S 6∈
Fix(Pi−1(εi−1)).
Let S ⊆ [n] such that S 6∈ Fix(Pi−1(εi−1)). Let M ⊆ E(G[S]) be a matching such that
ν(S) = w(M). Since S is not fixed, either there exists v ∈ S such that {v} is not fixed or there
exists e ∈M such that e is not fixed.
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If there exists v ∈ S\V (M) such that {v} 6∈ Fix(Pi−1(εi−1)) then since x is in the core,
ex(x, S) ≥ xv + x(V (M))− w(M) ≥ xv ≥ ε
as desired. Otherwise, there exists e ∈ M such that e 6∈ Fix(Pi−1(εi−1)). In this case, since x is
in the core,
ex(x, S) ≥ ex(x, V (M)) = ex(x, e) + ex(x, V (M − e)) ≥ ε.
This proof also shows the optimal value of max{ε : P̂i(ε) 6= ∅} is equal to εi. Thus we
can replace Pi−1(εi−1) with P̂i−1(εi−1) in the description of P̂i(εi) and thus obtain a compact
description of each linear program in the MPS Scheme for matching games with non-empty core.
From the compact formulation of the core of a matching game, one can see that ε1 = 0 if
and only if the value of a maximum weight matching in G with weights w equals the value of a
maximum weight fractional matching. This follows since x ∈ P1(ε1) is a fractional weighted node
cover of value ν(V ) when ε1 = 0.
2.2 Leastcore Formulation
2.2.1 Leastcore and Core of Matching Games
The leastcore linear program (P1) can be rewritten equivalently as
max ε
s.t. x(M) ≥ w(M) + ε for all M ∈M (P1)
x(V ) = ν(V )
x ≥ 0 ,
whereM is the set of all matchings M on G, and x(M) is a shorthand for x(V (M)). To see this,
since x ≥ 0 observe that for any S ⊆ V ,
x(S)− ν(S) ≥ x(M)− w(M)
where M is a matching in G[S] for which w(M) = ν(S).
The separation problem for the linear program (P1) can be reduced to finding a maximum
weight matching in the graph G with edge weights w(uv)−xu−xv, uv ∈ E. Since the maximum
weight matching can be found in polynomial time [22], we know that the linear program (P1) can









Figure 2.1: A matching game with empty core
When the core is non-empty we saw in Theorem 2.1.1 how to compute the nucleolus. Our
contribution is to give an algorithm for computing the nucleolus when the core is empty. As the
following example shows, this situation can occur when very simple structures are present in our
input graph. We also give a calculation of the nucleolus of this game as a concrete example.
Example:
Consider the graph in Fig. 2.1. This graph G = (V,E) is a 5-cycle with two adjacent edges
15 and 45 of weight 2, and the remaining three edges of weight 1. Since the maximum weight
matching value is ν(G) = 3, but the maximum weight fractional matching value is 7/2, the core
of this game is empty. The allocation x∗ defined by






lies in the leastcore. Each edge has the same excess, −1/5, and any coalition of four vertices
yields a minimum excess coalition with excess −2/5. Hence the leastcore value of this game is
ε1 = −2/5.
In fact, we can see that x∗ is the nucleolus of this game. To certify this we can use the result
of Schmeidler [71] that the nucleolus lies in the intersection of the leastcore and the prekernel.
For this example, the prekernel condition is that for all i 6= j ∈ V ,
max
S⊆V \{j}
x(S ∪ {i})− ν(S ∪ {i}) = max
S⊆V \{i}
x(S ∪ {j})− ν(S ∪ {j}).
This condition reduces to the condition that the excess values of non-adjacent edges are equal.
Since G is an odd cycle, this implies that all edges have equal excess, i.e.
ex(x, 12) = ex(x, 23) = ex(x, 34) = ex(x, 45) = ex(x, 15).
Combining the four equations above with the leastcore condition that x(V ) = ν(G) we obtain
a system of equations with the unique solution x∗. Hence the intersection of the leastcore and
prekernel is precisely {x∗}, and so by Schmeidler, x∗ is the nucleolus.
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Now we will work towards providing a polynomial-size description of (P1). For the remainder
of this chapter we assume that the cooperative matching game (n, ν) determined by w-weighted
graph G has an empty core, as computing the nucleolus is otherwise well-known to be solvable
in polynomial time [64].
2.2.2 Universal Matchings, Universal Allocations
For each x ∈ P1(ε1) we say that a matching M ∈ M is an x-tight matching whenever
ex(x,M) = ε1. Note that ex(x,M) is a shorthand for ex(x, V (M)). We denote by Mx the
set of x-tight matchings.
A universal matching M ∈ M is a matching which is x-tight for all x ∈ P1(ε1). We denote
the set of universal matchings in G by Muni. A universal allocation x∗ ∈ P1(ε1) is a leastcore
point whose x∗-tight matchings are precisely the set of universal matchings, i.e. Mx∗ =Muni.
Lemma 2.2.1 There exists a universal allocation x∗ ∈ P1(ε1).
Proof: Indeed, it is straightforward to show that every x∗ in the relative interior of P1(ε1) is a
universal allocation. If the relative interior is empty then P1(ε1) is a single point, which trivially
contains a universal allocation. For the sake of completeness we now provide a combinatorial
proof that universal allocations exist.
Let Mx denote the set of x-tight matchings for some x ∈ P1(ε1). That is Mx := {M ∈ M :





Let x∗ ∈ P1(ε1) be chosen to minimize |Mx
∗ |. Suppose for a contradiction that x∗ is not universal.
Then there exists x ∈ P1(ε1) and M ∈Mx
∗\Mx.
Let x̄ := 12(x
∗+x). Since P1(ε1) is a convex set, x̄ ∈ P1(ε1). Furthermore,Mx̄ =Mx
∗ ∩Mx,
and thus Mx̄ ⊆Mx∗\{M} contradicting the minimality of |Mx∗ |.
Lemma 2.2.1 tells us universal allocations exist. The following lemma, Lemma 2.2.2, tells
us how to compute them in polynomial time. This lemma implies Lemma 2.2.1, but the pure
existence proof is more elegant and gives the idea behind the algorithm which proves Lemma 2.2.2.
Lemma 2.2.2 A universal allocation x∗ ∈ P1(ε1) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: A point x∗ in the relative interior of P1(ε1) can be found in polynomial time using the
ellipsoid method 1.1.6. Since any allocation x∗ from the relative interior of P1(ε1) is a universal
allocation, this implies the statement of the lemma.
In Section 2.2.3 we provide a self-contained proof of this Lemma.
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2.2.3 Computing a Universal Allocation
For the sake of completeness, we prove Lemma 2.2.2 by providing an algorithm for computing a
universal allocation x∗. Consider the following algorithm:
1: Compute x ∈ P1(ε1).
2: F ← face of matching polytope maximizing function defined by w(uv)−x(u)−x(v), uv ∈ E.
3: Compute M ∈M, such that χ(M) is a vertex of F .
4: Initialize K ← ∅.
5: loop
6: y ← arg max{y(M) : y ∈ P1(ε1)}.
7: if y(M) > x(M) then
8: x← 12(x+ y)
9: Let F be the face of the matching polytope maximizing the linear function defined by
weights w(uv)− x(u)− x(v), uv ∈ E.
10: else {M is a universal matching}
11: K ← K ∪ {χ(M)}





Theorem 2.2.3 The allocation x∗ returned in Step 15 of the above algorithm is a universal
allocation.
Proof: Suppose that x∗ is not a universal allocation, then there exists a non-universal x∗-tight
matching M ; i.e., there exists y ∈ P1(ε1) such that M is not y-tight.





for some αj ∈ R, j ∈ [p], where K = {χ(M1), . . . , χ(Mp)}. Recall, that all matchings M1,. . . , Mp
are universal matchings, hence
x∗(Mj) = y(Mj) = ε1 + w(Mj)
for all j ∈ [p]. It follows that








αjy(Mj) = y(M) ,
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contradicting the fact that M is x∗-tight but not y-tight.
Theorem 2.2.4 The algorithm terminates in polynomial time.
Proof: Indeed, if y(M) > x(M) in Step 7 of the algorithm then Step 9 leads to a dimension
reduction for face F . This dimension reduction follows since the vertices of the old F correspond
to the set of x-tight matchings, whereas the vertices of the new F correspond to the set of
1
2(x + y)-tight matchings. Since y(M) > x(M), the
1
2(x + y)-tight matchings are a strict subset
of the x-tight matchings, and hence the new F is a strict subface of the old F .
If on the other hand y(M) ≤ x(M) then the dimension of K as defined in Step 11 increases
because of our choice of M in Step 12. The upper bound on the dimensions of the linear space
span(K) and the face F is |E|, while the lower bound on their dimensions is 0.
Since we can separate over P1(ε1) in polynomial time we can solve the optimization problem
in Step 12 in polynomial time. Moreover, since we can separate over F in polynomial time, we
can decide if F has a vertex outside the linear space span(K) in polynomial time by solving two
optimization problems for each of the (at most |E|) equations defining span(K): maximizing and
minimizing the corresponding (normal to span(K)) vector over F , and checking if both optimal
values are zero. Since each step of the algorithm runs in polynomial time, this implies that the
algorithm terminates in polynomial time. Hence, the statement of the theorem follows.
Given a non-universal allocation x and a universal allocation x∗, we observe that Mx∗ ⊂Mx
and so θ(x∗) is strictly lexicographically greater than θ(x). Thus the nucleolus is a universal
allocation. We emphasize that Mx∗ = Muni is invariant under the (not necessarily unique)
choice of universal allocations x∗. Henceforth we fix a universal allocation x∗ ∈ P1(ε1).
2.2.4 Description of the Convex Hull of Universal Matchings
By the definition of universal allocation x∗, a matching M is universal if and only if it is x∗-tight.
Thus, M is a universal matching if and only if its characteristic vector lies in the optimal face
of the matching polytope corresponding to (the maximization of) the linear objective function
assigning weight − ex(x∗, uv) = w(uv) − x∗(u) − x∗(v) to each edge uv ∈ E. Let O be the set
of node sets S ⊆ V such that |S| ≥ 3, |S| is odd. Edmonds [22] gave a linear description of the
matching polytope of G as the set of y ∈ RE satisfying:
y(δ(v)) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V
y(E(S)) ≤ (|S| − 1)/2 for all S ∈ O
y ≥ 0 .
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Thus, a matching M ∈M is universal if and only if it satisfies the constraints
M ∩ δ(v) = 1 for all v ∈W
M ∩ E(S) = (|S| − 1)/2 for all S ∈ L
M ∩ {e} = 0 for all e ∈ F ,
(2.1)
where W is some subset of V , L is a subset of O, and F is a subset of E. Using an uncrossing
argument, as in [57, Pages 141-150], we may assume that the collection of sets L is a laminar
family of node sets; i.e., for any two distinct sets S, T ∈ L, either S ∩ T = ∅ or S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S.
For completeness we include the most important lemma behind the uncrossing here.
Lemma 2.2.5 Let S, T ∈ O such that S ∩ T 6= ∅. Consider the face of the matching polytope of




and y(E(T )) =
|T | − 1
2
which is to say that S and T are tight constraints of the matching polytope with respect to y, then
either
(i) the sets S ∩ T, S ∪ T are tights sets in O and
χ(E(S)) + χ(E(T )) = χ(E(S ∩ T )) + χ(E(S ∪ T )),
(ii) or the sets S\T, T\S are tight sets in O, the degree constraints for each vertex in S ∩ T are
tight, and




Proof: First suppose that |S ∩ T | is odd. In this case we will show (i). We have that |S ∪ T | is




|T | − 1
2
= y(E(S)) + y(E(T ))
≤ y(E(S ∩ T )) + y(E(S ∪ T )) (by supermodularity)
≤ |S ∩ T | − 1
2
+






|T | − 1
2
.
Therefore each inequality above holds with equality. By the second inequality holding at equality
both S∩T and S∪T are tight. The first inequality holding at equality implies there are no edges
between S\T and T\S. Thus
χ(S) + χ(T ) = χ(S ∩ T ) + χ(S ∪ T ).
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Now suppose |S∩T | is even. In this case will show (ii). We have that |S\T | is odd and |T\S|




|T | − 1
2
= y(E(S)) + y(E(T ))














|T | − 1
2
.
The second inequality above follows from the degree and odd set constraints. The second inequal-
ity holding at equality implies that S\T , T\S, and δ(v) are tight for each v ∈ S ∩ T . The first
inequality holding at equality implies there are no edges between S∩T and V \(S∪T ). Therefore




We will now show a crucial lemma demonstrating that no node is covered by every universal
matching.
Lemma 2.2.6 For every node v ∈ V there exists M ∈Muni such that v is exposed by M . Hence,
W = ∅.
Proof: Assume for a contradiction that there exists a node v ∈ V such that v ∈W .
First, note that there always exists a non-universal matching M ∈M\Muni since otherwise
the empty matching would be universal, and thus
0 = x∗(∅) = w(∅) + ε1,
implying that the core of the given matching game instance is non-empty.
Suppose first that there exists a node u ∈ V exposed by some matching M ′ ∈ Muni such
that x∗u > 0. Our strategy is to shift a small amount of allocation from u to v while preserving
feasibility. Shifting by any sufficiently small positive δ will work. In what follows we explicitly
define a value for δ for concreteness. We define
δ0 := min{ex(x∗,M)− ε1 : M ∈M \Muni} .
Recall thatMuni is the set of maximum weight matchings in G with respect to the node weights
w(uv) − x∗(uv), uv ∈ E, i.e. Muni is the set of x∗-tight matchings. Moreover, recall that
ex(x∗,M) = ε1 for M ∈Muni. Thus, we have δ0 > 0.
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We define δ := min{δ0, x∗u} > 0 and a new allocation x′ as follows:
x′r :=

x∗r + δ, if r = v
x∗r − δ, if r = u
x∗r , otherwise.
Since all universal matchings contain v, the excess with respect to x′ of any universal matching is
no smaller than their excess with respect to x∗. Therefore, by our choice of δ, (x′, ε1) is a feasible,
and hence optimal, solution for (P1). But M
′ is not x′-tight, since M ′ covers v and exposes u.
This contradicts that M ′ is a universal matching.
Now consider the other case: for all u ∈ V if u is exposed by a universal matching then
x∗u = 0. Then, for every universal matching M ∈Muni we have
ε1 = ex(x
∗,M) = x∗(V )− w(M) = ν(G)− w(M).
Since ν(G) is the maximum weight of a matching in G with respect to the weights w, we get that
ε1 ≥ 0. Thus x∗ is in the core, contradicting our assumption that the core is empty.
2.2.5 Description of Leastcore
We denote inclusion-wise maximal sets in the family L as S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗k .We define the edge set E+
to be the set of edges in G such that at most one of its nodes is in S∗i for every i ∈ [k] := {1, . . . , k},
i.e.






Lemma 2.2.7 For every choice of vi ∈ S∗i , i ∈ [k], there exists a universal matching M ∈Muni




Proof: By Lemma 2.2.6, we know that for every i ∈ [k] there exists a universal matching
Mvi ∈Muni such that vi is exposed by Mvi . Now, for every i ∈ [k], let us define
Mi := E(S
∗
i ) ∩Mvi .
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is a matching satisfying all the constraints (2.1), and hence is a universal matching covering the
desired nodes.
Representative Universal Matching For each i ∈ [k] fix a unique representative node





For any x ∈ P1(ε1) and S ⊆ V we use diff(x, S) to denote
diff(x, S) := x(S)− x∗(S) .
For single nodes we use the shorthand diff(x, v) = diff(x, {v}). We now prove the following crucial
structural result on allocations in the leastcore.
Lemma 2.2.8 For every leastcore allocation x, i.e. for every x ∈ P1(ε1), we have that
(i) for all i ∈ [k], for all u ∈ S∗i : diff(x, u) = diff(x, v∗i ),
(ii) for all e ∈ E+: ex(x, e) ≥ 0.
Proof: Consider u ∈ S∗i , and note that we may use Lemma 2.2.7 to choose a universal





Hence we have V (Mu) ∪ {u} = V (M∗) ∪ {v∗i }, and since M∗ and Mu are universal, x(M∗) =
x∗(M∗) and x(Mu) = x
∗(Mu). Using these observations we see that
diff(x, u) = x(u)− x(Mu)− (x∗(u)− x∗(Mu))
= x(v∗i )− x(M∗)− (x∗(v∗i )− x∗(M∗))
= diff(x, v∗i ).
showing (i).
Now we prove (ii). Consider e ∈ E+ where e = {u, v}. Since e 6∈ E(S∗i ) for all i ∈ [k], we
can choose a universal matching M exposing u and v by Lemma 2.2.7. Thus M ∪ {e} is also a
matching. Notice M is x-tight, and so we have
ex(x, e) = ex(x,M ∪ {e})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ε1





2.2.6 Optimal Matchings of Restricted Cardinality
This section will study the way that minimum excess matchings of a particular cardinality can
can be found within S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
k . The observed structure will be essential for arguing correctness
of our compact formulation for the leastcore in Section 2.2.7.
It is well-known [73], that for any t ∈ N and for any graph H,
conv{χ(M) : M ∈M(H), |M | = t}
has the following linear description:
Pt(H) := {x ∈ RE :
x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V (H)
x(E(U)) ≤ |U | − 1
2
for all U ∈ O(H)
x(E(H)) = t
x ≥ 0}.
For any given c ∈ RE(H) we denote by P ct (H) the set of vertices x of the above polytope max-
imizing cTx, i.e. the optimal solutions to the linear program max{cTx : x ∈ Pt(H)}. Since the
vertices are integral
P ct (H) = {χ(M) : M is a maximum c-weight matching of size t}.





|U | − 1
2
zU + tγ
where (y, z, γ) is in Dt,c(H) defined as follows:
Dt,c(H) := {(y, z, γ) ∈RV (H) × RO(H) × R :
yu + yv + γ +
∑
U∈O:uv⊆U
zU ≥ c(uv) for all uv ∈ E(H)
y, z ≥ 0}.







|U | − 1
2
zU + tγ : (y, z, γ) ∈ Dt,c(H)}.
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. Let x ∈ P ct (H) and (y, z, γ) ∈ Dct (H). If the support
of z is laminar and y = 0 then there exists e ∈ supp(x) such that
x− χ(e) ∈ P ct−1(H)
and there exists (0, z′, γ′) ∈ Dct−1(H) with the support of z′ laminar.
Proof: Let L = supp(z) be the laminar family defined by the support of z. Let S1, . . . , S` ∈ L
be the top level sets of L (i.e. containment maximal sets), ordered so that
0 < zS1 ≤ zS2 ≤ · · · ≤ zS` .
Since y = 0, if there exists e ∈ supp(x) ∩ (E(H)\
⋃
i∈[`]E(Si)) then by complementary slackness,
x − χ(e) ∈ P ct−1(H) and (0, z, γ) ∈ Dct−1(H). Thus we may assume that x(uv) = 0 for all
uv ∈ E(H)\
⋃
i∈[`]E(Si). Let uv ∈ E(S1) such that xuv = 1 and S1 is a minimal set in L
containing uv. Complementary slackness assures us that such uv exists. Let x′ = x − χ(uv).
Define z′ ∈ RO(H) as follows
z′U =
{
zU − zS1 , if U = Si for some i ∈ [`]
zU , otherwise.
Define γ′ = γ + zS1 . We will show x
′ ∈ P ct−1(H) and (0, z′, γ′) ∈ Dct−1(H). First we verify
feasibility. Indeed, since x is a matching with t edges, x′ is a matching with t − 1 edges and
primal feasibility is satisfied. For dual feasibility, observe by our choice of S1 that z
′ ≥ 0, and for
any edge uv ∈
⋃
i∈[`]E(Si) the net effect on the left hand side of the dual constraint associated
with e is 0. For uv ∈ E(H)\
⋃
i∈[`]E(Si), the left hand side of the dual constraint associated with
e increased by zS1 .
Clearly since supp(z) is laminar, and supp(z′) ⊆ supp(z)\{S1}, we have that supp(z′) is lami-
nar. It remains to verify optimality, which we will show via complementary slackness. Consider








where the last equality follows from complementary slackness for x and (0, z, γ). Lastly, let U ∈ L
such that z′U > 0. By our choice of z
′, U 6= S1 and so
x′(E(U)) = x(E(U)) =
|U | − 1
2
where the last equality follows from complementary slackness for x and (0, z, γ).
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Then there exists M ′ ⊆ M∗ such that ex(x,M ′) ≤ ex(x,M) and for all i ∈ [k], |M ′ ∩ E(S∗i )| =
|M ∩ E(S∗i )|.
Proof: Let i ∈ [k] and let H = G[S∗i ]. Let t = |M∗ ∩ E(H)|, and let c ∈ RE(H) be defined by
c(uv) := w(uv)− x(uv) for all uv ∈ E(H).
Let (y, z, γ) ∈ Dct (H). Since cTχ(M) = − ex(x,M) for all M ∈ M(H), by Lemma 2.2.6 and
complementary slackness, we have y = 0. Now we use standard uncrossing techniques (see for
ex. [57, Pages 141-150]) to obtain (0, z, γ) ∈ Dct (H) with supp(z) laminar.
Note that χ(M∗ ∩E(H)) is in P ct (H), otherwise we can replace M∗ ∩E(H), within H, with
an optimal matching in P ct (H) to obtain a matching with lower excess than M
∗, contradicting
the universal tightness of M∗.
Apply Lemma 2.2.9 inductively to obtain M ′i ⊆M∗∩E(H) such that χ(M ′i) ∈ P c|M ′∩E(H)|(H).





i is the desired matching.
2.2.7 Compact Formulation
Recall that x∗ is a fixed universal allocation in P1(ε1). Let E
∗ ⊆ E denote the union of universal
matchings, i.e. E∗ = ∪M∈MuniM . Since a matching is universal if any only if it is x∗-tight it
is not hard to compute E∗. To test if an edge uv is in E∗, one simply computes a maximum
weight matching on the graph obtained by deleting u and v from G, G − u − v, with respect to
the weights − ex(x∗, e) for all e ∈ E(G − u − v). Then uv ∈ E∗ if and only if the value of this
maximum weight matching is −ε1 + ex(x∗, uv).
We now define linear program (P 1).
max ε (P 1)
s.t. diff(x, u) = diff(x, v∗i ) for all u ∈ S∗i , i ∈ [k] (2.2)
ex(x, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E∗
ex(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E+
ex(x,M∗) = ε
x(V ) = ν(V )
x ≥ 0 .
Let ε1 be the optimal value of the linear program (P 1). We now show that P1(ε1) is indeed a
compact description of the leastcore P1(ε1).
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Theorem 2.2.11 We have ε1 = ε1 and P1(ε1) = P 1(ε1).
Proof: First, we show that P1(ε1) ⊆ P 1(ε1). Consider x ∈ P1(ε1). By Lemma 2.2.8(i) we have
diff(x, u) = diff(x, v∗i ) for all u ∈ S∗i , i ∈ [k].
Lemma 2.2.8(ii) shows that ex(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E+, and ex(x,M∗) = ε1 holds by the
universality of M∗. It remains to show that
ex(x, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E∗.
Suppose for contradiction there exists e ∈ E∗ such that ex(x, e) > 0. By the definition of E∗,
there exists a universal matching M ′ containing e. Since M ′ is universal, ex(x,M ′) = ε1. But by
our choice of e,
ex(x,M ′ \ {e}) < ex(x,M ′) = ε1
contradicting that x is in P1(ε1). Thus we showed that (x, ε1) is feasible for (P 1), i.e. we showed
that P1(ε1) ⊆ P 1(ε1).
To complete the proof we show that P 1(ε1) ⊆ P1(ε1). Let x be an allocation in P 1(ε1).
Due to the description of the linear program (P1), it is enough to show that for every matching
M ∈M we have
ex(x,M) ≥ ε1 .
Since ex(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E+, it suffices to consider only the matchings M , which are unions
of matchings in the graphs G[S∗i ], i ∈ [k]. Let ti := |M ∩E(S∗i )|. By Lemma 2.2.10 applied to x∗
there exists M ′ ⊆M∗ such that
ex(x∗,M) ≥ ex(x∗,M ′)
and
|M ′ ∩ E(S∗i )| = ti, for all i ∈ [k].






i ) + ex(x
∗,M)
= diff(x,M) + ex(x∗,M)




where the last inequality follows since M ′ ⊆M∗ and ex(x, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E∗.
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Thus, we showed that P1(ε1) ⊆ P 1(ε1) and P 1(ε1) ⊆ P1(ε1). Recall, that ε1 and ε1 are the
optimal values of the linear programs (P1) and (P 1) respectively. Thus, we have ε1 = ε1 and
P1(ε1) = P 1(ε1).
2.3 Computing the Nucleolus
The last section presented a polynomial-size formulation for the leastcore LP (P1). In this
section we complete our polynomial-time implementation of MPS Scheme by showing that the
j-th linear program, (Pj), in the MPS Scheme has the following compact reformulation:
max ε (P j)
s.t. ex(x, e) ≥ ε− ε1 for all e ∈ E+, e 6∈ Fix(P j−1(εj−1))
x(v) ≥ ε− ε1 for all v ∈ V, v 6∈ Fix(P j−1(εj−1))
ex(x, e) ≤ ε1 − ε for all e ∈ E∗, e 6∈ Fix(P j−1(εj−1))
x ∈ P j−1(εj−1) ,
where εj is the optimal value of the linear program (P j)
Theorem 2.3.1 For all j = 1, . . . , j∗, we have εj = εj and Pj(εj) = P j(εj).
Proof: We proceed by induction. For j = 1 the statement holds due to Theorem 2.2.11.
Let us show that the statement holds for each j = 2, . . . , j∗, assuming that the statement holds
for j − 1.
By induction, Pj−1(εj−1) = P j−1(εj−1). We let F := Fix(Pj−1(εj−1)) = Fix(P j−1(εj−1)) to
ease presentation.
First we show Pj(εj) ⊆ P j(εj). Let x ∈ Pj(εj). First consider an edge e ∈ E+\F . By
Lemma 2.2.7 there exists a universal matching M ∈Muni exposing the endpoints of e. Moreover,
since V (M) ∈ Fix(P1(ε1)) ⊆ F we have V (M ∪ {e}) 6∈ F . Thus we see that
ex(x, e) = ex(x,M ∪ {e})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥εj
− ex(x,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ε1
≥ εj − ε1.
Now consider v ∈ V \F . Similar to the previous argument, but via Lemma 2.2.6, we can find a
universal matching M exposing v. Thus, since M is universal, V (M) ∪ {v} 6∈ F . We also have
ν(V (M) ∪ {v}) ≥ w(M), so
x(v) = x(M ∪ {v})− w(M)− ex(x,M) ≥ εj − ε1.
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Finally consider e = {u, v} ∈ E∗\F . Since e ∈ E∗ there exists a universal matching M ∈ Muni
such that e is in M . Since V (M) ∈ Fix(P1(ε1)) ⊆ F and {u, v} 6∈ F , we see that M \ {e} 6∈ F .
Thus we have
ex(x, e) = ex(x,M)− ex(x,M\{e}) ≤ ε1 − εj
as desired.
So we have shown Pj(εj) ⊆ P j(εj), and thus it remains to show P j(εj) ⊆ Pj(εj). Let
x ∈ P j(εj) and let S ⊂ V such that S 6∈ F . We need to show
x(S)− ν(S) ≥ εj .
Since S 6∈ F , there exists v ∈ S such that {v} 6∈ F . Let M be a maximum w-weight matching in
G[S], i.e. w(M) = ν(S). Either v ∈ S\V (M) or v ∈ V (M). We proceed by case distinction.
Case 1: v ∈ S\V (M). Since x ≥ 0 we have x(S) ≥ x(V (M) ∪ {v}), and it suffices to prove
that the right-hand side exceeds the weight of M by at least εj . By assumption, x ∈ P j(εj) ⊆
P 1(ε1) = P1(ε1), and hence
ex(x,M) ≥ ε1. (2.3)
Together with x(v) ≥ εj − ε1 this yields the desired inequality.
Case 2: v ∈ V (M). The same argument as before applies if there is u ∈ S\V (M) with
{u} 6∈ F . Therefore, we focus on the case where {u} ∈ F for all u ∈ S\V (M). Then M contains
an edge f such that f 6∈ F . Again using x ≥ 0, it suffices to show that x(V (M)) ≥ εj . We further
distinguish cases: either f ∈M ∩ E+ or f ∈M\E+.
Case 2a: f ∈ M ∩ E+. Here, the desired inequality follows from ex(x,M\{f}) ≥ ε1 due to
x ∈ P1(ε1) and from ex(x, f) ≥ εj − ε1.
Case 2b: f ∈M\E+. If M ∩E+ has an edge that is not in F then we use the same argument
as in Case 2a. So we may assume that all of the edges in M ∩ E+ are in F . Now recall that
x ∈ P1(ε1), and hence ex(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E+ by Lemma 2.2.8.(ii). Thus, we may assume
that V (M) 6∈ F and M ∩ E+ = ∅.
By Lemma 2.2.10, applied to x, there exists M ′ ⊆M∗ such that |M ′ ∩E(S∗i )| = |M ∩E(S∗i )|
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x(e) + x∗(e)− x∗(e)
= x∗(M ′) +
k∑
i=1
|V (M ′) ∩ S∗i | · diff(x, v∗i ) (by Lemma 2.2.8)
= x∗(M ′) +
k∑
i=1
|V (M) ∩ S∗i | · diff(x, v∗i ) (since |M ′ ∩ E(S∗i )| = |M ∩ E(S∗i )|)
= x∗(M ′) + x(M)− x∗(M).
That is, since x∗(M ′) − x∗(M) is constant, x(M ′) is a constant difference from x(M). Hence
V (M) ∈ F if and only if V (M ′) ∈ F . Since V (M) 6∈ F we have V (M ′) 6∈ F . Thus V (M∗\M ′) 6∈
F and hence there exists e ∈M∗\M ′ such that e 6∈ F . Observe that e is in E∗. Hence,
ex(x,M) ≥ ex(x,M ′)
= ex(x,M∗)− ex(x, e)− ex(x,M∗\(M ′ ∪ {e}))
≥ ε1 − (ε1 − εj)
= εj ,
where the last inequality follows since ex(x,M∗\(M ′ ∪ {e})) ≤ 0 and x ∈ P j(εj), e ∈ E∗\F .
Supposing we have a separation oracle for Pj(εj), we can decide, for any S ⊆ V , if S ∈
Fix(Pj(εj)) in polynomial time. To do so, using equivalence of separation and optimization we
solve two linear programs: max{x(S) : x ∈ Pj(εj)} and min{x(S) : x ∈ Pj(εj)}, and test if their
optimal values are equal. Note that their optimal values are equal if and only if S ∈ Fix(Pj(εj)).
With Theorem 2.3.1 we can replace each linear program (Pj) with (P j) in the MPS Scheme.
We already know how to execute the first round of MPS Scheme in polynomial time via Sec-
tion 2.2.1. Therefore consider the j-th round of the MPS Scheme, for j > 1, and suppose
inductively that we can optimize over P j−1(εj−1). Since the universal allocation x
∗, the node
sets S∗i , i ∈ [k], the edge set E+, and the edge set E∗ can all be computed in polynomial time,
and we can test if a coalition is fixed over P j−1(εj−1) in polynomial time, we have shown that
the j-th round of the MPS Scheme can be executed in polynomial time for cooperative matching
games with empty core. Hence we can compute the nucleolus of such games in polyomial time.
Therefore we have shown Theorem 2.0.1.
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Chapter 3
Results on b-Matching Games
In Chapter 2 we gave an algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a cooperative matching
game with empty core. This resolved the question of the complexity of computing the nucleolus
of a matching game. What remains to study is the complexity of computing the nucleolus of
b-matching games.
The game-theoretic interpretation of a matching game is a model of a situation where players
represented by vertices enter into partnerships with their neighbours to generate value. From this
perspective simple b-matching games are well motivated. They model situations where players
have the capacity to enter into more than one partnership simultaneously.
In [8] Biró, Kern, and Paulusma showed that separating core of simple b-matching games
can be done in polynomial time when bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V . In Section 3.2 we generalize this
result to the leastcore constraints, and hence to the first linear program (P1) of the MPS Scheme,
capturing the case where the core is empty.
On the hardness side when b = 3 · χ(V ) separating the core is NP-hard even when the
underlying graph is unweighted and bipartite [8]. In [6] Biró, Kern, Pálvölgyi, and Paulusma
showed that computing the nucleolus of simple b-matching games is NP-hard even for unweighted
graphs. This result uses a gadget which does not produce a bipartite graph. In Theorem 3.0.1
we generalize this result to unweighted bipartite bounded-degree graphs.
Theorem 3.0.1 The problem of deciding whether an allocation is equal to the nucleolus of an
unweighted bipartite 3-matching game is NP-hard, even in graphs of maximum degree 7.
Since the core is always non-empty for bipartite b-matching games [20], this result implies
hardness of computing the nucleolus when the core of a simple b-matching game is non-empty.
Section 3.1 covers the proof of Theorem 3.0.1. It combines the approach in [8] for hardness of core
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separation on bipartite graphs with a careful analysis of multiple rounds of Kopelowitz Scheme
inspired by Deng, Fang, and Sun [19].
Our technique uses an intermediate reduction to a variant of cubic subgraph known as Two
from Cubic Subgraph. Let G be an arbitrary graph. The Two from Cubic Subgraph problem
is to decide if G contains a subgraph H such that there are u 6= v ∈ V (H) satisfying
degH(w) =
{
2, w ∈ {u, v}
3, else
for all w ∈ V (H). We say that H is a Two from Cubic Subgraph. We say that vertices u and v
are lacking and we say the edges incident to u or v in G which are not present in H are lacking
edges.
In Section 3.1.1 we prove Theorem 3.0.2 which states that the Two from Cubic Subgraph
problem is NP-complete. Observe that Two from Cubic Subgraph is in NP as we can efficiently
verify a Yes instance when the prover gives us a Two from Cubic Subgraph in the input graph.
Theorem 3.0.2 Two from Cubic Subgraph is NP-complete, even in bipartite graphs of max-
imum degree 4.
Notice that The Cubic Subgraph problem, which is used in the core separation hardness
result of [8], was shown to be NP-complete by Plesnik [66]. The hardness of Two from Cubic
Subgraph requires significant technical innovation over the hardness of Cubic Subgraph. Our
gadget is more complex, and its analysis more involved.
The gap in our knowledge of computing the nucleolus of b-matching games now is when bv ≤ 2
for all v ∈ V . In Section 3.3, we attempt to chip away at this gap with efficient algorithms to
compute the nucleolus in two relevant cases when b ≤ 2. Section 3.3.1 explores the scenario when
only a constant number of vertices satisfy bv = 2 and Section 3.3.2 studies the case when we relax
the constraints to allow for non-simple b-matchings.
3.1 Hardness
We consider simple b-matching games for b ≡ 3 and uniform weights. The goal of the this section
is to prove Theorem 3.0.1.
Hereinafter, G = (V,E) is a bipartite instance of Two from Cubic Subgraph. We assume
that E 6= ∅ so that |V | ≥ 2.








Figure 3.1: The gadget graph from [8].
For each original vertex u ∈ V , create 5 new vertices vu, wu, xu, yu, zu. Then, define
V ∗ := V ∪ {vu, wu, xu, yu, zu : u ∈ V }. (3.1)
To obtain E∗ from E, we add edges until ({u, vu, wu}, {xu, yu, zu}) is a K3,3 subgraph for every
u ∈ V .
In Figure 3.1, the bigger vertices with bolded edges indicate the original graph and the smaller
vertices with thinner edges were added to obtain the gadget graph. The square and circular
vertices depict a bipartition of G∗. Observe that the maximum degree of G∗ is the maximum
degree of G plus 3.
For each u ∈ V , let
Tu := {vu, wu, xu, yu, zu} (3.2)
Vu := Tu ∪ {u}. (3.3)
We say that Tu are the gadget vertices of u and Vu is the complete gadget of u.
Let Γ = (|V ∗|, ν) be the unweighted 3-matching game on G∗.
In Lemma 3.1.2, we show that if no two from cubic subgraphs of G exists, then the nucleolus
is precisely x∗ = 32χ(V
∗). Conversely, we prove in Lemma 3.1.3 that the existence of a two from
cubic subgraph implies that x∗ cannot be the nucleolus. The proof of Theorem 3.0.1 will follow
from Lemma 3.1.2, Lemma 3.1.3, and the hardness of Two from Cubic Subgraph to be proven
in Section 3.1.1. Remark that the degree bound follows from the degree bound in Theorem 3.0.2
and the fact that our gadget graph increases the maximum degree of the original graph by 3.
Lemma 3.1.1 Let M be a maximum 3-matching in G∗. Let C be the set of connected components
of G∗[M ]. Then for all core allocations x and every component C ∈ C,
x(C) = ν(C).
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|S ∩ {u, vu, wu}| |S ∩ {xu, yu, zu}| ν(S) ex(x∗, S)
0 1 0 3
2
0 2 0 3
0 3 0 9
2
1 0 0 3
2
1 1 1 2
1 2 2 5
2
1 3 3 3
2 0 0 3
2 1 2 5
2
2 2 4 2
2 3 6 3
2
3 0 0 9
2
3 1 3 3
3 2 6 3
2
Table 3.1: The excess computation for Lemma 3.1.2 when x∗ = 3
2
χ(V ∗), S ( Vu.
Proof: Observe that









|M ∩ E(C)| = |M | = ν(V ∗)
with the first inequality following since x ≥ 0 and the second inequality following since x is in
the core.
Lemma 3.1.2 If G does not contain a two from cubic subgraph, the uniform allocation x∗ =
3
2χ(V
∗) is the nucleolus of Γ.
Proof: We argue using the Kopelowitz Scheme. Put (Kk) as the k-th LP in the Kopelowitz
Scheme.
We check through computation that
ex(x∗, S) ≥ 3
2
∀S ( Vu,∀u ∈ V. (3.4)
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See Table 3.1.
Let εK1 be the optimal objective value to (K1). We claim that ε
K
1 = 0. By core non-emptiness,
we have εK1 ≥ 0. Moreover, using Lemma 3.1.1, since E 6= ∅, we can choose u ∈ V so that Vu ( V
is a coalition for which
ex(x, Vu) = 0
for all core allocations x. Thus εK1 = 0 and the set of optimal solutions to (K1) is precisely the
core.
Let S1 = Tight(K1(εK1 )). We now claim that




These are the unions of complete gadgets.
Let (x, 0) be an optimal solution to (K1), i.e. let x ∈ C(Γ) be a core allocation. Clearly, if S
is a union of complete gadgets, then ex(x, S) = 0 due to Lemma 3.1.1. This shows the reverse
inclusion in Equation 3.5
We now want to show that if S is not a union of complete gadgets then S is not in S1. Notice
that for any coalition S ⊆ V ∗, ν(S) ≤ 32 |S| = x
∗(S) by the definition of a 3-matching, so (x∗, 0)
is an optimal solution to (K1).
We claim that




This shows that if S is not a union of complete gadgets, then there is some optimal solution
of (K1) for which S does not attain equality in (K1) and hence S /∈ S1. Thus the inclusion in
Equation 3.5 would hold.
Inequality 3.6 is true if S = {u} for some u ∈ V ∗. If S ⊆ V with |S| ≥ 2, then ν(S) ≤ 32 |S|−2.
Otherwise, the edges of a maximum 3-matching in G[S] induce a two from cubic subgraph. Thus









It remains to consider the case when there is some u ∈ V such that Tu∩S 6= ∅. The argument
here is similar to the reduction employed in [8]: If S ∩ Vu = Vu, then
ex(x∗, S \ Vu) ≤ ex(x∗, S)− 9 + 9 = ex(x∗, S).
We can remove as many of these complete gadgets from S as possible to obtain some coalition
S′.
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If S′ = ∅, then S ∈ S1 by definition. In addition, if S′ ⊆ V , there is again nothing to prove.
Thus there must be some u′ ∈ S′ such that |Tu′ ∩ S′| ≥ 1 and S′ ∩ Vu′ 6= Vu′ .
If |S′ ∩ Tu′ | ≤ 4, then
ex(x∗, S′ \ Tu′) ≤ ex(x∗, S′)−
3
2
|Tu′ |+ |E∗(S′ ∩ Tu′ ∪ {u′})| ≤ ex(x∗, S′).
Finally, if |S′ ∩ Tu′ | = 5, we are required to have u′ /∈ S′. So
ex(x∗, S′ \ Tu′) ≤ ex(x∗, S′)− 5 ·
3
2
+ 6 ≤ ex(x∗, S′).
We may thus again repeatedly remove vertices of V ∗ \ V until we arrive back at the base case of
S′ ⊆ V .
Thus Inequality 3.6 holds as all other coalitions have strictly greater excess with respect to
x∗.
To complete the proof, we now argue that εK2 =
3
2 . Observe ν(V






for any allocation x in the core and thus also for feasible solutions to (K2) as well as the nucleolus.
It follows that ε2 ≤ 32 . But Inequality 3.6 shows that this upper bound is attained by x
∗.
For all feasible solutions x to (K2), x(a) ≥ 32 for all a ∈ V
∗. But x(a) ≤ 32 for all a ∈ V
∗ as
well, or else x(V ∗) > 32 |V
∗| and x would not be an allocation. Since all the singleton coalitions
attain equality in (K2), we have that Kopelowitz Scheme terminates after two rounds and x
∗ ≡ 32
is the nucleolus.
Lemma 3.1.3 If G contains a two from cubic subgraph, then the nucleolus of the gadget graph
is not x∗ = 32χ(V
∗).
Proof: We will show that x∗ = 32χ(V
∗) is not an optimal solution to (K2). Recall that the
nucleolus is necessarily an optimal solution to each linear program in the Kopelowitz Scheme.
Hence this would show that x∗ not the nucleolus.
Let us introduce a parameter as follows:
∆ :=
{
0, if G contains a cubic subgraph
1, if G contains a two from cubic subgraph but no cubic subgraph.
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|S ∩ {u}| |S ∩ {vu, wu}| |S ∩ {xu, yu, zu}| ν(S) ex(xδ, S)




0 0 2 0 3− 2δ
5








0 1 1 1 2− 2δ
5




0 1 3 3 3− 4δ
5
0 2 0 0 3− 2δ
5




0 2 2 4 2− 4δ
5
0 2 3 6 3
2
− δ
1 0 0 0 3
2
+ δ
1 0 1 1 2 + 4δ
5




1 0 3 3 3 + 2δ
5
1 1 0 0 3 + 4δ
5




1 1 2 4 2 + 2δ
5








1 2 1 3 3 + 2δ
5




Table 3.2: The excess computation for xδ from Lemma 3.1.3 when S ( Vu.
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Let V ′ ⊆ V be the vertices in a cubic subgraph or the vertices of a two from cubic subgraph















In particular, the minimum excess over all coalitions in S is at most ∆.








5 , if a ∈ V
∗ \ V
We check by computation in Table 3.2 that




The coalitions with minimum excess among such coalitions are S = Tu for some u ∈ V .
As in Lemma 3.1.2, let S1 = Tight(K1(εK1 )). We claim that εK1 = 0 and




The fact that ε1 = 0 is clear from the proof of Lemma 3.1.2. Moreover, it is clear that the
unions of complete gadgets must attain equality in (K1). We need only show that ex(xδ, S) > 0
if S is not a union of complete gadgets. This would show that if S is not a union of complete
gadgets, then there is some core allocation (in particular xδ) for which S does not attain equality
in (K1).






















Suppose now that there is some u ∈ V such that S ∩ Tu 6= ∅. Once again, if S ∩ Vu = Vu,
ex(xδ, S \ Vu) ≤ ex(xδ, S)− 9 + 9 = ex(xδ, S).
51
We can thus remove all complete gadgets from S to obtain another coalition S′. If S′ = ∅, then
S ∈ S1. Similar to before, if S′ ⊆ V , we are back at the base case.
Pick some u′ ∈ S′ such that |S′ ∩ Tu′ | ≥ 1. Observe that
ν(S′) ≤ ν(S′ \ Tu′) + ν(S′ ∩ Vu′).
This is because any maximum 3-matching on S′ is a disjoint union of 3-matchings on S′ \Tu′ and
S′ ∩ Vu′ .
Suppose u′ ∈ S′. We must have |S′ ∩ Tu′ | ≤ 4.
ex(xδ, S
′) = x(S′ \ Tu′) + x(S′ ∩ Vu′)− x(u′)− ν(S′)
≥ x(S′ \ Tu′)− ν(S′ \ Tu′) +
[
x(S′ ∩ Vu′)− x(u′)
]
− ν(S′ ∩ Vu′)







− |E∗(S′ ∩ Vu′)|




Suppose now that u′ /∈ S′. In this case,
ex(xδ, S
′) = x(S′ \ Tu′) + x(S′ ∩ Tu′)− ν(S′)
≥ x(S′ \ Tu′)− ν(S′ \ Tu′) + x(S′ ∩ Tu′)− ν(S′ ∩ Tu′)
= ex(xδ, S
′ \ Tu′) + ex(xδ, S′ ∩ Tu′)







By repeatedly removing vertices of V ∗ \ V , we see that
ex(xδ, S








































The last inequality follows from the assumption that S′ 6= ∅. In particular, at least one of S′∩V
or {u ∈ V \ S′ : S′ ∩ Tu 6= ∅} is non-empty.
This shows that εK1 = 0 is indeed the optimal solution to (K1). Moreover, S1 is again the
union of complete gadgets.
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+ ∆ > ∆.
Recall there was a coalition V ′ ⊆ V satisfying Inequality 3.7. It follows that x∗ ≡ 32 is not an
optimal solution to (K2) and therefore cannot be the nucleolus.
3.1.1 Two from Cubic Subgraph
In this subsection, we prove that Two from Cubic Subgraph, from which we reduce to
nucleolus testing is NP-hard.
Let X = {a1, a2, . . . , a3k} be a ground set and let S be a collection of 3-element subsets of X
of the form S = {S1, S2, . . . , St}. In the Exact Cover by 3-Sets problem, the input is (X,S)
and the decision is to decide if there is a subcollection Y ⊆ S where element ai ∈ X is included
in exactly one subset Sj ∈ Y . We call such a Y an exact cover .
It is well known that Exact Cover by 3-Sets is NP-hard, even if every element of the
ground set belongs to exactly three subsets [37]. We reduce Exact Cover by 3-Sets to Two
from Cubic Subgraph. We construct a gadget graph from an instance of Exact Cover by
3-Sets as follows.
Step I
Let (X,S) be an instance of the Exact Cover by 3-Sets where every element of the ground
set belongs to exactly three subsets. Create the bipartite graph G0 with bipartition X∪̇S, where
aiSj ∈ E(G0) ⇐⇒ ai ∈ Sj .
The problem is reformulated as follows: Does there exist a subgraph with vertex set X∪̇S ′ such
that every vertex of X has degree 1 and each vertex of S ′ has degree 3? Notice we require the
entire ground set to be included in the subgraph vertex set.
Step II
Add 7k new vertices to G0
b1, b2, . . . , b7k
as follows. Each bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k is adjacent to ai and b3k+i. If i > 1, then bi is also adjacent to
b3k+i−1. Otherwise, i = 1 and bi is also adjacent to b6k. Finally, each b6k+j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, is adjacent






Figure 3.2: A subgraph of G1 for k = 2, depicting the changes in Step I.
See Figure 3.2. The square and circular vertices depict a bipartition of G1.
Define the following tripartition of the newly added vertices
B1 := {bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k} (3.9)
B2 := {b3k+i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k} (3.10)
B3 := {b6k+i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} (3.11)
Let us refer to this graph as G1.
Step III
At this step, we diverge from the work in [66]. In Plesnik’s hardness proof of Cubic Subgraph,
the author substituted a complete bipartite graph at each ai so the resulting graph has a cubic
subgraph if and only if it has the desired subgraph in Step I. We proceed by using a grid-like
substitution at each ai into two copies of G1.
Let G2 be the graph obtained after the following substitution: At each vertex ai, we substitute
the following gadget.
Let {Si,j ∈ S : j = 1, 2, 3} be the set of 3-element subsets containing ai. Add vertices
ui,j , wi,j , cui,j , cwi,j for j = 1, 2, 3.
For j = 1, 2, 3, create the edges
wi,j−1ui,j , ui,jwi,j , wi,jSi,j ,









































Figure 3.3: The substitution at what used to be ai, a
′
i.
Here we understand wi,0 = bi.
Next, create a copy G′2 of G2. For each v ∈ G2, we let v′ denote the corresponding copy in




ui,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3.
See Figure 3.3. The square and circular vertices depict a bipartition of G.
Define
Oi,j := {ui,j , wi,j , cui,j , cwi,j}. (3.12)





the ore of bi ∈ B1 and similarly for b′i ∈ B′1.
Let this new graph be G. In summary we have the vertex sets B := B3 ∪ B2 ∪ B1, S and
Oi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k coming from the substitution in G1. Similarly B′, S′, O′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3k are the vertex
sets from G′2. Let A = B ∪ S ∪
⋃
1≤i≤2k Oi and A




i be the vertices which
originated from G2, G
′
2 respectively, so V (G) = A∪̇A′.
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We are now ready to show Theorem 3.0.2 by proving that G has a Two from Cubic Subgraph
if and only if (X,S) has an exact cover. Since the construction of G from (X,S) can be done in
polynomial time, this will suffice to show the theorem.
First we will show in Lemma 3.1.4 the sufficient direction of the if and only if statement.
Lemma 3.1.4 If there is an exact cover of X by 3-sets then G contains a two from cubic sub-
graph.
Proof: Let Y ⊆ S be the exact cover of X.
We will describe the vertices from A of a cubic subgraph and take the exact copy within A′.
First, take all vertices b ∈ B.
Fix bi ∈ B1. There is exactly one Si,j ∈ Y such that ai ∈ Si,j . Let Pi be the unique biSi,j-path












as well as their copies in A′ to be the vertex set of our cubic subgraph.
To prove the necessary direction of the if and only if statement we need to study the structure
of the gadget graph G. The following easy proposition follows from inspection of Oi. It allows
us to extrapolate from certain vertices being in a Two from Cubic Subgraph that other vertices
must be in that subgraph as well.
Proposition 3.1.5 Let Ḡ be a graph. Let H be a two from cubic subgraph of Ḡ and let v ∈ V (H).
Let h ∈ [3] and let g ∈ {0, 1, . . . , h}.
Suppose there are edge disjoint paths P1, . . . , Ph in Ḡ all starting at v and each ending at wi
for i = 1, . . . , h respectively. Further suppose that for all i ∈ [h], each vertex in V (Pi)\{wi} is of
degree at most 3 in Ḡ.
If H has at most g lacking vertices in
⋃h
i=1 Pi then there exist h− g unique paths Pi, i ∈ [h]
such that every vertex of Pi is in H.
Proof:
Let L be the set of lacking vertices in H which lie on a path in P1, . . . , Ph. For each vertex
u ∈ L there exists at most one edge in δḠ(u)\E(H) since u is of degree at most 3 in Ḡ. Let EL
be the set of such edges. Hence |EL| ≤ g.
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Now observe that for every i ∈ [h], if E(Pi) ∩ EL = ∅ then Pi ⊆ H. This follows inductively
from the observation that since v is of degree at most 3 in Ḡ the edge from v to its neighbour on
Pi must be present in H. We repeat this observation at every subsequent vertex of Pi until we
see that Pi ⊆ H.
We complete the proof by the pigeonhole principle: at least h − g paths Pi must satisfy
E(Pi) ∩ EL = ∅.
We use Proposition 3.1.5 to draw two conclusions. The first is that if there are vertices in a
Two from Cubic Subgraph contained in B or S then there is an ore with vertices in the Two from
Cubic Subgraph and there is no lacking vertex in that ore. This is the content of Lemma 3.1.6.
Notice that by symmetry this lemma could also apply to B′ or S′. The second conclusion we draw
using Propagation 3.1.5 is that if there is an ore with vertices in a Two from Cubic Subgraph
then one of B,S,B′, or S′ has vertices in the Two from Cubic Subgraph.
Lemma 3.1.6 If B ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ or S ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ then there exists i ∈ [3k] such that (Oi ∪
O′i) ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ and there is no lacking vertex of H in Oi ∪O′i.
Proof: The case S ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ is a simple application of the pigeonhole principle, so it
remains to consider the case where B ∩ V (H) 6= ∅.
Suppose B ∩ V (H) 6= ∅. Let bi ∈ B ∩ V (H). Without loss of generality we have three cases:
i = 1, 3k + 1, 6k + 1. In each case we will construct three edge disjoint paths from bi ending in
vertices amongst ui,1, . . . , u3k,1. Then using Proposition 3.1.5 with G = Ḡ, and the pigeonhole
principle on where lacking vertices can lie, we obtain the desired result.
Consider the first case, bi = b1. We construct 3 edge disjoint paths starting from b1. The first
path is b1, u1,1. The second path is b1, b3k+1, b2, u2,1. The third path is b1, b6k, b3k, u3k,1.
Consider the second case, bi = b3k+1. We construct 3 edge disjoint paths starting from
b3k+1. The first path is b3k+1, b1, u1,1. The second path is b3k+1, b2, u2,1. The third path is
b3k+1, b6k+1, b3k+2, b3, u3,1.
Consider the third case, bi = b6k+1. We construct 3 edge disjoint paths starting from b6k+1.
The first path is b6k+1, b3k+1, b1, u1,1. The second path is b6k+1, b3k+2, b2, u2,1. The third path is
b6k+1, b3k+3, b3, u3,1.
Lemma 3.1.7 If there exists i ∈ [3k] such that (Oi ∪O′i) ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ then
V (H) ∩
(
S ∪ S′ ∪B ∪B′
)
6= ∅.
Proof: Let i ∈ [3k] such that (Oi ∪ O′i)) ∩ V (H) 6= ∅. Let v ∈ (Oi ∪ O′i)) ∩ V (H) 6= ∅}. Let
F = {Si,1wi,1, Si,2wi,2, S′i,1w′i,1, S′i,2w′i,2}. If
F ∩ E(H) 6= ∅
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then we are done. So suppose that F ∩ E(H) = ∅.
Let Ḡ = G − F be the graph obtained from G by deleting edges in F . Now H is a two
from cubic subgraph of Ḡ. By inspection we can construct 3 edge disjoint paths in G′ starting
from v and ending in vertices in {Si,3, S′i,3, bi, b′i}, satisfying the hypothesis of Proposition 3.1.5.
Therefore by Proposition 3.1.5 the result holds.
Lemma 3.1.6 and Lemma 3.1.7 when taken together imply that a Two from Cubic Subgraph
of G always has vertices of some ore, and in particular the vertices of that ore are not lacking.
By inspecting an ore we obtain the easy Proposition 3.1.8 which says that vertices of an ore in
a Two from Cubic Subgraph are forced to choose certain edges if their is no lacking vertex in
that ore. We can use Proposition 3.1.8 with our conclusion from combining Lemma 3.1.6 and
Lemma 3.1.7 to see that any Two from Cubic Subgraph must simultaneously have vertices in the
ores, B, B′, S, and S′. This is the content of Lemma 3.1.9.
Proposition 3.1.8 Let H be a two from cubic subgraph of G. Let Oi be the ore of bi ∈ B for
some i ∈ [3k]. If V (H)∩V (Oi) 6= ∅ and no lacking vertex of H is in Oi then H contains exactly
one edge from
{Si,1wi,1, Si,2wi,2Si,3wi,3},
and the edge ui,1bi.










V (H) ∩K 6= ∅.
Proof: Since H is non-empty we may assume without loss of generality that V (H)∩A 6= ∅.
Therefore by Lemma 3.1.7 and Lemma 3.1.6 there exists i ∈ [3k] such that (Oi∪O′i)∩V (H) 6= ∅
and Oi ∪O′i contains no lacking vertex of H.
Thus by Proposition 3.1.8 applied to each of Oi and O
′
i we obtain the desired result.
Using Lemma 3.1.9 we can restrict our attention to proving that G having a Two from Cubic
Subgraph implies an exact cover in the setting where all the sets mentioned in the lemma intersect
with the Two from Cubic Subgraph. This is the content of Lemma 3.1.12. To prove this lemma
we will need Lemma 3.1.10 and Corollary 3.1.11 which follow.
Lemma 3.1.10 If V (H) ∩ B 6= ∅ and there is at most one lacking vertex in V (H) ∩ B then
B ⊆ V (H).
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Proof: Since B ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ let v ∈ B ∩ V (H). Notice that B is connected and every
vertex of B lies on a cycle. Hence B is 2-connected and thus 2-edge-connected, i.e. there are
two edge disjoint paths between v and every other vertex in B using only edges in B. Thus by
Proposition 3.1.5 the result holds.
When every vertex of B is in a Two from Cubic Subgraph H then the only way an ore Oi
cannot have a vertex in H is if bi is lacking and specifically lacks edge ui,1bi. This observation
yields the following Corollary to Lemma 3.1.10.
Corollary 3.1.11 If V (H) ∩ B 6= ∅ and there is at most one lacking vertex in V (H) ∩ B then
there is at most one i ∈ [3k] such that Oi ∩ V (H) = ∅.
Furthermore if V (H)∩B 6= ∅ and there is no lacking vertex in V (H)∩B B has no lack then
Oi ∩ V (H) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [3k].
Lemma 3.1.12 Let H be a two from cubic subgraph of G. If








then there is an exact cover of X by 3-sets.
Proof: Without loss of generality we have two cases: either every lacking vertex of H is in
A′ or exactly one lacking is in A and one lacking vertex is in A′.
Consider the first case, that every lacking vertex is in A′. Since V (H) ∩ B 6= ∅ and there is
no lacking vertex in A, by Lemma 3.1.10, B ⊆ V (H) and further every ore Oi for i ∈ [3k] has a
non-trivial intersection with V (H).
Now by Proposition 3.1.8 for every i ∈ [3k] there is a j(i) ∈ [3] such that Si,j(i)wi,j(i) ∈ E(H).
Choose Y = ∪i∈[3k]Si,j(i). By construction there is exactly one set in Y containing ai for each
i ∈ [3k] and moreover there is at most one such set. Therefore Y is an exact cover of X by 3-sets
as desired.
Now we need to consider the second case, that exactly one lacking vertex of H is in each of
A and A′. Let ` ∈ V (H) ∩ A be the lacking vertex of H which is in A. For this case we need to
consider three distinct subcases: ` ∈ S, ` ∈ B, and ` ∈
⋃
i∈[3k]Oi. Notice the proof from the first
case works without modification in the first subcase, and in fact provides a contradiction showing
this subcase is impossible. It remains to study the latter two subcases.
First consider the subcase where ` ∈ B. By Corollary 3.1.11 there is at most one i0 ∈ [3k]
such that Oi0 is disjoint from V (H). Thus we can obtain a unique set Si,j(i) covering each ai for
i ∈ [3k]\{i0} by the construction from the proof of the first case. Let Y be the union of those
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covering sets as in the first case. If Y is not an exact cover then Y covers every element of the
ground set except for ai0 . Then
3k − 1 = |X| − 1 = 3|Y |,
a contradiction since k and |Y | are integers.
Finally consider the subcase where ` ∈ Oi0 for some i0 ∈ [3k]. Since V (H)∩B 6= ∅, and there
is no lacking vertex in V (H) ∩ B, by Corollary 3.1.11, V (H) ∩ Oi 6= ∅ for each i ∈ [3k]. Since
every ore in A except Oi0 has no lacking vertex, by Proposition 3.1.8, for every i ∈ [3k]\{i0},
there exists a unique Si,j(i) covering ai by construction from the proof of the first case. Let Y
be the union of those covering sets as in the first case. If Y is not an exact cover then Y covers
every element of the ground set except for ai0 . Then
3k − 1 = |X| − 1 = 3|Y |,
a contradiction as in the previous subcase. Therefore Y is an exact cover as desired.
Lemma 3.1.9 and Lemma 3.1.12 show that if G has a Two from Cubic Subgraph then (X,S)
has an exact cover. Since we showed the converse in Lemma 3.1.4 this means we have shown
Theorem 3.0.2.
3.2 Leastcore Separation for Simple b-Matching
Games
It has been shown that core separation, and hence leastcore separation, is NP-hard [8] for
simple b-matching games when we allow bv ≥ 3 for arbitrary nodes v ∈ V , even for unweighted
bipartite graphs. In Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2 we saw that the separation of (P1) is polynomial
time solvable when bv = 1 for all v ∈ V . Thus we restrict our attention to b vectors such that
bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V , and consider simple b-matching games in this setting. Hence we will resolve
the complexity of computing (P1) for simple b-matching games.
Given a b-valued w-weighted graph G = (V,E) where bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V , let (n, ν) be the
associated simple b-matching game. The leastcore linear program (P1) for (n, ν) can equivalently
be stated as
max ε
s.t. x(M) ≥ w(M) + ε for all M ∈Mb (P b1 )
x(V ) = ν(V )
x ≥ 0 ,
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where Mb is the set of simple b-matchings in G.
3.2.1 Max-Weight Min-Cost Matching
To separate the leastcore linear program for a given point (p, ε) ∈ RV × R it suffices to be able
to solve
max w(M)− p(V (M)) (P b2 )
s.t. M ∈Mb
and verify that this value is at most −ε.
The challenge with adapting the leastcore separation algorithm for matching games to b-
matching games is deciding what the weight of edges adjacent to b-value 2 nodes should be.
If we simply take weights w̄(uv) = w(uv)− p(u)− p(v), for all uv ∈ E, as we would for matching
games, then the cost p(u) for nodes u with bu = 2 would be double counted in b-matchings which
cover u with 2 edges. On the other hand if we only subtracted 12p(u) from weights of edges
incident with b-value 2 node u, the cost p(u) would only be half accounted for in b-matchings
which only use one edge incident to u. To put it succinctly, we do not know a priori if the optimal
matching will use one edge or two edges incident to any given b-value 2 node and hence do not
known what the appropriate reduced weights should be.
To overcome the aforementioned difficulty, we will construct an auxiliary graph instance on
which we can control the number of edges incident to b-value 2 nodes and still solve (P b2 ).
Construct graph Ḡ = (V̄ , Ē) by starting with graph G. Now, for each v ∈ V such that bv = 2
add nodes v1, v2 to Ḡ and create a cycle vv1v2. Let T be the set of all such cycles. Additionally
for each v ∈ V such that bv = 2, add node v′ to Ḡ and create edge vv′. Now Ḡ consists of graph
G, triangles T , and edges vv′ for each v ∈ V such that bv = 2.
For each v ∈ V set b̄v = bv. Set b̄v1 = b̄v2 = 2 for each vv1v2 ∈ T . Set b̄v′ = 1 for each v ∈ V
such that bv = 2. For each e ∈ Ē set
c̄(e) =
{
2, if e = v1v2 for some vv1v2 ∈ T
1, otherwise.






, if uv ∈ E







Figure 3.4: The transformation of a b-value 2 vertex in G to the corresponding gadget in
Ḡ.
The problem of finding a maximum w̄-weight, c̄-capacitated, b̄-matching in Ḡ which fully
matches each b̄-value 2 node can be solved in polynomial time by computing a vertex solution to
the following polynomial time solvable linear program [73]:
max w̄Tx (Q)
s.t. x(δ(v)) = b̄v ∀v ∈ V̄ : b̄v = 2
x(δ(v)) ≤ b̄v ∀v ∈ V̄ : b̄v = 1
x(E(U)) + x(F ) ≤ b̄(U) + c̄(F )− 1
2
∀U ⊆ V̄ , F ⊆ δ(U) : b̄(U) + c̄(F ) is odd
0 ≤ x ≤ c̄.
Note that the vertices of the feasible region of (Q) are all integral. We will show the optimal
value of (Q) is equal to the value of an optimal solution to (P b2 ).
Lemma 3.2.1 For each x feasible for (Q), for each vv1v2 ∈ T either x(v1v2) = 2 or
x(vv1) = x(vv2) = x(v1v2) = 1.
Proof: First observe that x(v1v2) ≥ 1, for otherwise
x(δ(v1)) ≤ x(vv1) ≤ c̄(vv1) = 1 < 2 = b̄v1
and so x is not feasible for (Q). Now suppose for a contradiction that the claim is false. Then
x(v1v2) = 1 and, without loss of generality, x(vv1) = 0. But then
x(δ(v1)) = x(vv1) + x(v1v2) = 1 < 2 = b̄v1 ,
contradicting that x is a feasible for (Q).
For an edge set F ⊆ Ē, and a node v ∈ V̄ , define
δF (v) := {e ∈ F : v ∈ e},
and define dF (v) := |δF (v)|.
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Lemma 3.2.2 Let M̄ be the c̄-capacitated b̄-matching defined by the support of a vertex solution
to (Q). Let M be the restriction of M̄ to the edges of G. Let v ∈ {v ∈ V : bv = 2}. The following
hold:
1. If dM (v) = 0 then vv1, vv2, and v1v2 are edges of M̄ .
2. If dM (v) = 1 then vv
′ is an edge of M̄ .
3. If dM (v) = 2 then v1v2 appears twice in the multiset M̄ .
Proof: The third claim is immediate from Lemma 3.2.1. The first claim follows from Lemma
3.2.1 and the necessity that v has two incidence edges in M̄ . The second claim follows from the
same reasoning as the first claim.
Theorem 3.2.3 The optimal values of (P b2 ) and (Q) are equal.
Proof: Let M ∈ Mb be an optimal solution to (P b2 ). Then M is a node-disjoint union of a
family of cycles, which we will denote by C, and a family of paths which we will denote by P. Let
B := {v ∈ V : v is an endpoint of some path P ∈ P and bv = 2}.


















= w(M)− p(V (M)) + p(B)
2
.
Let EB = {vv′ : v ∈ B}. Then w̄(EB) = −p(B)/2. So we have that
w̄(M ∪ EB) = w̄(M) + w̄(EB) = w(M)− p(V (M)).
So if we let M̄0 = M ∪ EB then M̄ is a c̄-capacitated, b̄-matching in Ḡ with w̄-weight equal to
the optimal value of (P b2 ). It remains to add edges to M̄0 to create a feasible solution to (Q)
decreasing its w̄ value.
Observe that every node that is covered by M̄0 is covered by precisely its b̄-value number of
edges. Further observe that each pair of dummy nodes v1, v2 for each triangle vv1v2 ∈ T is M̄0
exposed. Construct M̄ from M̄0 by adding the following edges for each v ∈ V such that bv = 2.
Add edges {vv1, vv2, v1v2} if v is M̄0 exposed; if v is M̄0 covered then add edge v1v2 twice to M̄
(recalling that M̄ is a multiset). It is not hard to see the resulting multiset M̄ is feasible for (Q).
The edges added to M̄0 to obtain M̄ all have cost 0 and hence M̄ is a solution to (Q) of weight
exactly that of an optimal solution to (Q). Thus the value of (P b2 ) is at most that of (Q).
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Now suppose that x is an optimal extreme point solution to (Q). Let M̄ be the c̄-capacitated,
b̄-matching in Ḡ obtained from the support of x. Let M be the restriction of M̄ to the edges of G.
Let M ′ := M̄\E(T ) be obtained from M̄ by deleting all edges vv1, vv2, v1v2 such that v ∈ V (M̄).
Observe that w̄(M̄) = w̄(M ′), and the restriction of M ′ to edges of G is equal to M . Now we
have,






by our choice of weights w̄. But by Lemma 3.2.2, each node v ∈ V such that bv = 2 and dM (v) = 1
is also matched to their corresponding node v′ in M ′ in addition to their partner in M . Further,
such vv′ edges are the only edges in M ′\M . Hence by the choice of weight w̄,





p(v) = w(M)− p(V (M)).
Hence the value of (Q) is at most the value of (P b2 ) and thus the result holds.
Since we can solve (Q) in polynomial time, this Theorem implies we can separate over the
leastcore of simple b-matching games where bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V , and hence we can compute a
leastcore allocation of such games. Consequently, via the Faigle, Kern, and Kuipers algorithm [30]
we can compute points in the intersection of leastcore and kernel in polynomial time for b-matching
games with b ≤ 2. If the leastcore intersect kernel is unique for such an instance we can compute
the nucleolus.
3.3 Efficient Algorithms in Special Cases
In the case of b-matching games where bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V , computing the nucleolus is a
major open problem in the area. As we discussed in Section 3.2, b-values higher than one pose
a significant challenge in studying the minimum excess coalitions. Even the case of b ≤ 2χ(V )-
matching games on unweighted bipartite graphs poses a challenge compared to their matching
game counterparts. Leastcore allocations no longer correspond to optimal dual solutions to the
fractional b-matching problem. Moreover it is no longer clear whether it is possible to obtain
a compact formulation of every linear program in the MPS Scheme in this, as was done in
Theorem 2.1.1. The analogous linear programs for b ≤ 2χ(V )-matching games would have a
constraint for every path whose internal vertices have b-value 2 and for every cycle whose vertices
have b-value 2, yielding exponentially sized linear programs. This is not an issue for finding core
allocations [8] but for higher rounds when avoiding fixed coalitions is involved things become
more challenging.
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In this section we will discuss some special cases of b ≤ 2χ(V )-matching games where the
nucleolus can be efficiently computed. We will show in Section 3.3.1 that the nucleolus is easy
to compute when there are few vertices of with b-value 2. In Section 3.3.2 we will treat the non-
simple case in bipartite graphs when every vertex has b-value 2. These are not groundbreaking
results, but they do give us an occasion to discuss the method of characterization sets [38]. This
is an alternative technique for computing the nucleolus by showing that we need only concern
ourselves this a polynomially sized subset of coalitions.
Let (n, ν) be a cooperative game. Let S be a collection of subsets of [n], let x ∈ Rn, and write
θS(x) ∈ RS (3.16)
to denote containing the excess values ex(x, S) for S ∈ S in non-decreasing order of excess. In
other words θS(x) is the projection of θ(x) onto RS .
We say S is a characterization set for the nucleolus of the cooperative game (n, ν) if the
lexicographic maximizer of θS(x) is a singleton that is equal to η(n, ν). Intuitively, the nucleolus
of the game restricted to S is the same as the nucleolus of (n, ν).
Observe that if S is a characterization set for (n, ν) then for S ∈ 2[n] \ S, we can drop the
constraint corresponding to S from the Kopelowitz Scheme when computing the nucleolus.
Proposition 3.3.1 Let (n, ν) be a cooperative game with non-empty core. Suppose S is a poly-
nomial sized characterization set for the nucleolus of (n, ν).
Then the nucleolus of (n, ν) is polynomial time computable.
Proof: Let S be a characterization set of the nucleolus of some game (n, ν). Consider the
following modification of the `-th iteration of Kopelowitz Scheme (K ′`) (with optimal value ε
′
`)
where we only have constraints corresponding to coalitions in the characterization set S instead
of every coalition.
max ε (K ′`)
x(S) = ν(S)− ε′k ∀0 ≤ k < `,∀S ∈ Sk




Here Sk denotes the tight coalitions at the k-th round of this modified Kopelowitz Scheme.
The tweaked Kopelowitz Scheme computes the lexicographic maximizer of θS by definition.
Since S is polynomially sized, each linear program in the scheme can be solved in polynomial
time (for instance, by the ellipsoid method).
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for identifying a characterization set.
65
Theorem 3.3.2 (Granot, Granot, and Zhu[38]) Let (n, ν) be a cooperative game with non-
empty core.
Suppose S is a collection of subsets of [n] which is a characterization set for the nucleolus of
(n, ν). if for every S ∈ 2[n] \ S there exists a non-empty subcollection SS of S such that
(i) For all T ∈ SS and core allocations x, ex(x, T ) ≤ ex(x, S).





We can obtain a characterization set for b-matching games as a corollary to this theorem.
Corollary 3.3.3 Let (n, ν) be a not necessarily simple weighted b-matching game with non-empty
core. Define
S := {S ⊆ [n] : For all maximum b-matchings M of G[S], (S,M) is connected}
Then S is a characterization set for the nucleolus of Γ.
Proof: Fix S ∈ 2[n] \ S. Suppose M is a maximum b-matching of G[S]. Let T1, T2, . . . , Tk
be the components of (S,M) for k ≥ 2. Suppose x is a core allocation.
Since x(S) =
∑k
i=1 x(Ti) and ν(S) =
∑k
i=1 ν(Ti), we have
k∑
i=1
ex(Si, x) = ex(S, x). (3.18)
In particular, condition (ii) of Theorem 3.3.2 is satisfied.
But all excesses are non-negative as x is a core allocation, hence each ex(Si, x) ≤ ex(S, x) and
condition (i) of Theorem 3.3.2 is also satisfied, as desired.
Lemma 3.3.4 Let (n, ν) be a not necessarily simple weighted b-matching game with non-empty
core. Suppose
S := {S ∈ 2[n] : For all maximum b-matchings M of G[S], (S,M) is connected}.
is polynomially sized.
Then the nucleolus of (n, ν) is polynomial time computable.
Proof: Apply Proposition 3.3.1 and Corollary 3.3.3.
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Notice that for matching games with non-empty core the characterization set S from Corol-
lary 3.3.3 is E unioned with the singleton coalitions. Thus Lemma 3.3.4 provides a quick and
easy proof of Theorem 2.1.1.
3.3.1 Simple b-Matching Games
Theorem 3.3.5 Let G be a bipartite graph with bipartition N = A∪̇B and k ≥ 0 a constant.
Suppose bv = 2 for all v ∈ A but bv = 2 for at most k vertices of B, then the nucleolus of the
simple b-matching game on G can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: By Lemma 3.3.4, it suffices to show that any component of a b-matching in some
arbitrary induced subgraph G[S] has at most 2k + 3 vertices. If we show this, then the set
S := {S ∈ S : For all maximum b-matchings M of G[S], (S,M) is connected}
is polynomially sized since it is contained in the subsets of V (G) of size at most 2k + 3.
Let C be a component of (S,M) for some S ⊆ N and maximum b-matching M of G[S].
If C is a cycle, then exactly half the vertices of C are from B with bv = 2. It follows that
|C| ≤ 2k.
Suppose now that C is some path. By deleting at both endpoints and one more vertex, we
may assume that every other vertex in the path are from B with bv = 2. Thus |C| ≤ 2k + 3 as
required.
This result can be modified for the case where at most O(log(n + m)) vertices in total have
bv = 2.
3.3.2 Non-Simple 2-Matching Games
In the case where we allow for edges to be included multiple times in a 2-matching, we leverage
core non-emptiness and the non-existence of odd cycles to compute the nucleolus in polynomial
time.
Consider the following LP formulation of the maximum non-simple b-matching from [73].
max wT y (Pb)






∀U ⊆ V, b(U) is odd (3.19)
y ≥ 0
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Observe that for the case b ≡ 2, b(U) is never odd and hence there are no constraints of the form
(3.19).





s.t. xu + xv ≥ w(uv) ∀uv ∈ E
x ≥ 0
Lemma 3.3.6 Let G be an arbitrary graph with edge weights w : E → R.
The core of the weighted non-simple 2-matching game on G is non-empty.
Proof: Let x̄ be an optimal solution to (Db). Since 2x̄(N) = ν(N) by the integrality of (Pb),
2x̄ is an allocation.
Fix a coalition ∅ 6= S ( N . Define (DS) as the dual to the non-simple 2-matching LP (Pb)
on G[S]. Write 2x̄ |S as the restriction of 2x̄ to entries indexed by vertices of S.
Observe that 2x̄ |S is feasible in (DS), thus ν(S) ≤ 2x̄(S) = 2x̄ |S (S) by weak duality and
2x̄(S)− ν(S) ≥ 0.
By the arbitrary choice of S, 2x̄ is a core allocation and consequently, the core is non-empty.
Notice that since b = 2χ(V ), we did not need to assume G to be bipartite.
Lemma 3.3.7 For any bipartite graph, there is a maximum weighted non-simple 2-matching
consisting only of parallel edges.
Proof: Let M be a maximum non-simple 2-matching in G. Observe that the components
of (V (M),M) are parallel edges, even cycles, and paths. Moreover, any path contains at least 2
edges, or else adding that single edge a second time to our matching can only increase the weight
of the matching.
We argue that all vertex solutions to (Pb), such as χ(M), contain no even cycles nor paths
containing at least 2 edges. Hence an optimal vertex solution has the desired properties.
Case I: Even Cycles Suppose C ⊆M for some even cycle C. Enumerate the edges
C : e1, e2, e3, . . . , ek
for some k ≡ 0 mod 2.
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For i = 0, 1, put
M (i) := M \ C ∪ {ej , ej : j ≡ i mod 2}.









and so χ(M) was not a vertex solution.
Case II: Paths of Length At Least 2 Let P ⊆ M be a path of length at least 2. Enu-
merate the edges
P : e1, e2, . . . , ek.
Similarly to the previous case, define for i = 0, 1









and so χ(M) was not a vertex solution.
We are now ready to prove the result.
Theorem 3.3.8 Let G be a bipartite graph.
The nucleolus of the non-simple 2-matching game on G can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: By Lemma 3.3.4, it suffices to show that if |S| ≥ 3, then there is a 2-matching in
G[S] with multiple components.
But this is precisely what we proved in Lemma 3.3.7, concluding the proof.
Unfortunately, Lemma 3.3.7 does not hold when the graph is non-bipartite, even when we
restrict ourselves to uniform edge weights. Indeed, consider the simple triangle. The maximum
non-simple 2-matching has size 3. However, when we restrict ourselves to matchings composed
of only parallel edges, the maximum matching we can obtain has cardinality 2.
Similarly, Lemma 3.3.7 does not in general hold when there are some vertices v where bv = 1.
Consider the path of 3 edges where the endpoints have bv = 1 while the internal vertices have
bv = 2. The maximum non-simple 2-matching has size 3. However, if we only allow parallel
edges, the maximum matching we can obtain again has cardinality 2.
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Chapter 4
A Dynamic Programming Framework
For Computing the Nucleolus
This chapter studies the relationship between the nucleolus, finding the minimum excess coali-
tion with respect to an alloation, congruency-constrained optimization, and dynamic program-
ming. Our first result unifies these areas and provides a general method for computing the
nucleolus.
Theorem 4.0.1 For any cooperative game (n, ν), if the minimum excess coalition problem on
(n, ν) can be solved in time T via an integral dynamic program then the nucleolus of (n, ν) can be
computed in time polynomial in T .
This framework is inspired by work done by Elkind and Pasechnik [26], and work done by
Pashkovich [63] on computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games. Section 4.1 will discuss
the necessary background on weighted voting games. That section will also discuss the question
of how many rounds Kopelowitz Scheme needs to compute the nucleolus of a weighted voting
game, an interesting puzzle in the area.
Pashkovich [63] showed how to reduce the problem of computing the nucleolus for weighted
voting games to a congruency-constrained optimization problem. Pashkovich then shows how
to solve this congruency-constrained optimization problem for this specific class of games via a
dynamic program. In Section 4.2.2 we abstract his reduction to the setting of computing the
nucleolus of general combinatorial optimization games.
Our main technical achievement is showing that adding congruency constraints to dynamic
programs modelled by a directed acyclic hypergraph model inspired by the work of Campbell,
Martin, and Rardin [12] adds only a polynomial factor to the computational complexity. This is
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the content of Theorem 4.3.7, which is instrumental in demonstrating Theorem 4.0.1. Our formal
model of dynamic programming, where solutions correspond to directed hyperpaths in a directed
acyclic hypergraph, is described in Section 4.3. Proving Theorem 4.3.7 requires new techniques
beyond [63]. These new techniques are new needed to handled the extra complexity of hyperarcs
in the hypergraph abstraction. The series of lemmas in Section 4.3.1 take the reader through
these techniques for manipulating directed acyclic hypergraph dynamic programs.
We show how Theorem 4.0.1 not only generalizes previous work on computing the nucleolus,
but extends our capabilities to new classes of combinatorial optimization games that were not
possible with just the ideas in [63]. In Section 4.4 we will discuss applications. We will begin by
discusing how our result generalizes the weighted voting games result, and we will show how to
compute the nucleolus of b-matching games on graphs of bounded treewidth.
Theorem 4.0.2 For any cooperative b-matching game on a graph whose treewidth is bounded by
a constant, the nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time.
We will also show how our results give an easier algorithm for computing the nucleolus of
b-matchng games on bipartite graphs when one side has b-values all 1 than the one known in the
literature [4].
By the complexity discussion in Chapter 3, it is necessary to impose some structure on b-
matching games to compute their nucleolus in polynomial time unless P = NP. In Sectino 3.3
we studied bipartite graphs with limitations on the b-values. In Theorem 4.0.2 we impose the
structure of bounded treewidth.
To achieve this result we give a dynamic program for computing the minimum excess coalition
of a b-matching game in Lemma 4.4.4 then apply Theorem 4.0.1. This dynamic program neces-
sarily requires the use of dynamic programming on hypergraphs instead of just simple graphs,
motivating the increased complexity of our model over previous work.
4.1 Weighted Voting Games
A weighted voting game is a cooperative game (n, ν) compactly represented by a weight vector




1, if w(S) ≥ T
0, otherwise.
The intuition is that of a collection of voters who have different weights wi indicating their voting
power who are voting on a motion which needs a threshold T of total voter weight to pass.
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Elkind and Pasechnik [26] gave an algorithm to solve each linear program in Kopelowitz
Scheme for weighted voting games in time pseudopolynomial in the input size for the compact
representation of the game. Their claim was that this gave a pseudopolynomial time algorithm
for computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games. Unfortunately, as we saw in Section 2.1.1,
it is possible for Kopelowitz Scheme to run in an exponential number of rounds in the number
of players and so their proof was not sufficient to conclude that there is a pseudopolynomial
time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games. Note that computing the
nucleolus of a weighted voting game is known to be NP-hard [25].
Notice that the example given in Section 2.1.1 is very different from a weighted voting game in
the structure of its value function. Whereas weighted voting games only assign coalitions values
in {0, 1}, the exponential rounds example given assigns coalitions values amongst an exponential
number of different values. It then fixes the value allocated to most players in the nucleolus to 1
and uses the many varying coalition values to argue an exponential number of different coalition
excesses with respect to the nucleolus (and hence an exponential number of rounds in Kopelowitz
Scheme). Such a technique would not work for weighted voting games where only two different
values for a coalition are possible.
It is an open question how many rounds Kopelowitz Scheme needs in the literature to compute
the nucleolus of a weighted voting game. In Corollary 4.1.2 we prove that when the player weights
are drawn from a constant number of distinct weights, Kopelowitz Scheme only needs a polynomial
number of iterations to compute the nucleolus.
Lemma 4.1.1 Let x∗ be the nucleolus of a weighted voting game (n, ν)) determined by weights
w ∈ Zn and threshold T ∈ Z. If wi ≥ wj for some i, j ∈ [n] then x∗i ≥ x∗j .
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. there exist i, j ∈ [n] such that wi ≥ wj but x∗i < x∗j .
Let x′ be the allocation obtained from x∗ by exchanging the values of on i and j, more
precisely
x′ := x∗ −
(











where ei = χ({i}) and ej = χ({j}) are the i-th and j-th standard basis vectors. Then x′ is
individually rational and efficient, so it is an imputation
Consider the sequence of polytopes
K1(ε
K
1 ), . . . ,KN (ε
K
N )
generated by Kopelowitz Scheme to compute the nucleolus of (n, ν). Since the nucleolus is unique,
x′ is not the nucleolus. Thus there exists k such x′ 6∈ Kk(εKk ). Choose such k as small as possible.
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Then there exists S ⊆ [n] such that x′(S) − ν(S) < εk but x∗(S) − ν(S) = εk. By the
construction of x′ we have j ∈ S and i 6∈ S. Now observe that
x∗(S)− ν(S) = x∗(S∆{i, j})− x∗i + x∗j − ν(S)
> x∗(S∆{i, j})− ν(S) (since x∗j > x∗i )
≥ x∗(S∆{i, j})− ν(S∆{i, j}) (since w(S∆{i, j}) ≥ w(S))
Thus x∗(S∆{i, j})− ν(S∆{i, j}) < εKk . So by the feasibility of x∗ for Kk(εKk ), there exists ` < k
such that
x∗(S∆{i, j})− ν(S∆{i, j}) = ε`,
and moreover by Kopelowitz Scheme S∆{i, j} is universal at level `: for all x ∈ K`(εK` ),
ex(x, S∆{ij}) = εK` .
But now observe that
x′(S∆{i, j})− ν(S∆{i, j}) = x∗(S)− ν(S∆{i, j})
= x∗(S∆{i, j})− x∗i + x∗j − ν(S∆{i, j})
> x∗(S∆{i, j})− ν(S∆{i, j})
= ε`.
Since x′ ∈ K`(εK` ) by the minimality of k, this contradicts that S∆{i, j} is universal at level `.
Corollary 4.1.2 Consider an instance of a weighted voting game (n, ν) with weight vector w ∈
Zn and threshold T ∈ Z. If |{wi : i ∈ [n]}| = O(1) then Kopelowitz Scheme computes the nucleolus
of this instance in a polynomial number of rounds.






|{x∗i : i ∈ [n]}| ≤ |{wi : i ∈ [n]}| = O(1).
Let D := {x∗i : i ∈ [n]}. We want to upper bound |{x∗(S) : S ⊆ [n]}|. The value of x∗(S) is





where sd is the number of players i in S for which x
∗
i = d. There are at most n players i such that
x∗i = d. Thus there are at most n
|D| possible values for x∗(S). Thus there are at most n|D| values
for x∗(S) − ν(S). Let εK` is the optimal value of the `-th round linear program in Kopelowitz
Scheme, and let N be the number of rounds Kopelowitz Scheme runs for.
Observe that ε1 < ε2 < · · · < εN , and each ε` value is equal to x∗(S)− ν(S) for some S since
x∗ is universal at level `. Therefore N is at most n|D|. Since |D| = O(1) this implies Kopelowitz
Scheme runs in a polynomial number of rounds.
73
It is not hard to see that (n, ν) is completely determined by (w, T ). In this case (w, T ) is a
compact representation of the weighted voting game (n, ν). Even though they may appear simple
at first, weighted voting games can have a lot of modelling power. In fact the voting system of
the European Union can be modelled by a combination of weighted voting games [5]. In [25]
Elkind, Goldberg, Goldberg, and Wooldridge show that the problem of computing the nucleolus
of a weighted voting game is NP-hard, in fact even the problem of testing if there is a point in
the leastcore of a weighted voting game that assigns a non-zero payoff to a given player is NP-
complete. Pashkovich [63] later followed up with an algorithm based on the MPS Scheme which
solves O(n) linear programs, each in pseudopolynomial time, and thus computes the nucleolus of
a weighted voting game in pseudopolynomial time.
Pashkovich’s result crucially relies on the existence of a well-structured dynamic program for
knapsack cover problems which runs in pseudopolynomial time. Theorem 4.0.1 and Section 4.4
place Pahskovich’s algorithm in the context of a general framework for computing the nucleolus
of cooperative games where a natural associated problem has a dynamic program: the minimum
excess coalition problem.
In the minimum excess coalition problem the given input is a compact representation of a
cooperative game (n, ν) with characterization set S, and an imputation x. The goal is to output
a coalition S ⊆ S which minimizes excess, i.e. x(S)− ν(S), with respect to x.
4.2 Computing the Nucleolus Via
Congruency-Constrained Optimization
4.2.1 Relaxed MPS Scheme
Since the MPS Scheme ends after at most n linear program solves, the run time of the method
is dominated by the time it takes to solve (Pi). To use the Ellipsoid Method [46, 59] to implement
the MPS Scheme we need be able to separate over the constraints corresponding to all coalitions
in Fix(Pi−1(εi−1)) in each iteration. There can be an exponential number of such constraints in
general, and some structure on the underlying cooperative game would need to be observed in
order to separate these constraints efficiently. This requirement can be relaxed somewhat, and
still retain the linear number of iterations required to compute the nucleolus. At the same time
we would like to incorporate the use of characterization set techniques (see Section 3.3) in our
relaxation of the MPS Scheme.
Let (n, ν) be a cooperative game and let S be a characterization set for (n, ν). We will define
a sequence of linear programs Q1, Q2, . . . , QN where the unique optimal solution to QN is the
nucleolus of (n, ν). With each linear program Qi there will be an associated set of vectors Vi
contained in the set of incidence vectors of Fix(Qi). The feasible solutions to Qi will lie in Rn×R.
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In keeping with the notion we used for Pi(εi), for each linear program Qi we let ε̄i be the optimal
value of Qi and let
Qi(ε̄i) := {x ∈ Rn : (x, ε̄i) is feasible for Qi}.
We will describe the linear programs {Qi}i inductively. The first linear program is the least-
core linear program of (n, ν) restricted to coalitions in S. That is to say Q1 is equal to
max ε (Q1)
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ε ∀S ∈ S : χ(S) 6∈ span(V0)
x ∈ I(n, ν).
where V0 = {χ([n])}.
Let V1 ⊆ Rn be obtained from V0 by adding the incidence vector of one coalition in S ∩
Fix(Q1(ε̄1))\ span(V0). Now given Qi−1 and Vi−1 we describe Qi as follows
max ε (Qi)
s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ε ∀S ∈ S : χ(S) 6∈ span(Vi−1)
x ∈ Qi−1(ε̄i−1).
Now we choose v ∈ S ∩Fix(Qi(ε̄i))\ span(Vi−1) and set Vi := Vi−1 ∪{v}. By the optimality of ε̄i,
v always exists as long as Qi(ε̄i) has affine dimension at least 1. If Qi(ε̄i) has affine dimension 0
we terminate the procedure and conclude that Qi(ε̄i) is a singleton containing the nucleolus.
Lemma 4.2.1 ([63]) When the Relaxed MPS Scheme is run on a cooperative game (n, ν) yielding
a hierarchy of linear programs Q1, . . . , QN , with optimal values ε̄1, . . . , ε̄N respectively, the set
QN (ε̄N ) is a singleton containing the nucleolus of (n, ν). Moreover N is at most n.
Proof: The claim that N is at most n follows since the dimension of Vi increases by 1 in every
round and the dimension of the ambient space is n. It remains to argue that the relaxed MPS
Scheme computes the nucleolus.
By construction QN (ε̄) is a singleton since the set has affine dimension 0. To see that it
contains the nucleolus we claim that in fact every set Qi(ε̄i) contains the nucleolus. Let x
∗ =
η(n, ν).
Suppose for a contradiction there exists i such that Qi(ε̄i) does not contain the x
∗. Choose i
as small as possible. Let x′ ∈ Qi(ε̄i). Then there exists S ∈ S\ span(Vi−1) such that
ε̄1 = ex(x
′, S) < ex(x∗, S).
Moreover, using the minimality of i, we can choose S so that for any S′ ∈ S such that ex(x∗, S′) <
ex(x∗, S) we have ex(x∗, S′) = ex(x′, S′).
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But then θS(x′) is lexicographically smaller than θS(x∗), which contradicts that x∗ is the
nucleolus of (n, ν) and S is a characterization set of (n, ν).
4.2.2 The Linear Subspace Avoidance Problem
Motivated by the desire to design a separation oracle for the constraints of (Qi) we initiate
a general study of combinatorial optimization problems whose feasible region avoids a linear
subspace. Recall from Section 1.1 that a combinatorial optimization problem is an optimization
problem of the form
max{f(x) : x ∈ X} (P )
where X ⊆ {0, 1}n is known as the feasible region, and f : X → R is the objective function.
Normally (P ) is presented via a compact representation. For example in the shortest path problem
on a directed graph, X is the family of paths in a directed graph D and f(x) is a linear function.
The entire feasible set X is uniquely determined by the underlying directed graph D, and f is
determined by weights on the arcs of D. When giving as input D and the arc weights, the problem
is completely determined without specifying every one of the exponentially many paths in X .
For compactly represented cooperative games the minimum excess coalition problem can be
phrased as a problem of the form (P ). Simply take X to be the set of incidence vectors of subsets
of S and take f(x) to be x(S)− ν(S).
Now consider a linear subspace L ⊆ RE . For our combinatorial optimization problem (P ),
the associated linear subspace avoidance problem is
max{f(x) : x ∈ X\L} (PL)
Even when (P ) can be solved in polynomial time with respect to its compact representation and
L is given through a basis, (PL) can be NP-hard.
Lemma 4.2.2 (PL) is NP-hard in general even when (P ) can be solved in polynomial time with
respect to its compact representation and L is given through a basis. In fact, even deciding if the
feasible region (PL) is non-empty is NP-complete.
Proof: We begin by considering the Two Disjoint Directed Paths (TDDP) problem.
This well-known NP-complete problem [33] gives as input a directed graph G with two source
nodes s1, s2 and two sink nodes t1, t2, and the problem is to decide if there exists a pair of arc
disjoint paths, one from s1 to t1 and the other from s2 to t2.
Add an arc (t1, s2) if it does not already exist. Call the new graph G
′. Observe that there
are arc disjoint s1 − t1 and s2 − t2 paths in G if and only if there is an s1 − t2 path in G′ using
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the arc (s2, t1) in G
′. Let X be the set of incidence vectors of s1 − t2 paths in G′. The graph
G′ with s1, s2, t1, t2 labelled may serve as a compact presentation of X . Let c ∈ RE(G
′) be the
all-ones vector and let f(x) := −cTx. Furthermore, the corresponding problem (P ) can be solved
in polynomial time with respect to the encoding size of G′ and c.
Suppose we have an oracle which can solve the corresponding instance of (PL) in polynomial
time for any linear subspace L ⊆ RE(G′). Consider the particular linear subspace
L := {x ∈ RE(G′) : x(t1,s2) = 0}.
Observe that there an s1 − t2 path in G′ using arc t1 − s2 if and only if X\L is nonempty. Using
our oracle for (PL) we can decide in polynomial time if this is the case.
Observe that when we formulate the minimum excess coalition problem for a cooperative
game (n, ν) with characterization set S as a problem of the form (P ) and we take L = span(Vi−1)
then (PL) is the separation problem for (Qi), the i-th linear program in the relaxed MPS Scheme.
This discussion yields the following easy lemma
Lemma 4.2.3 If (P ) is a minimum excess coalition problem of a cooperative game (n, ν) on
characterization set S and one can solve the associated (PL) for any L in polynomial time then
the nucleolus of (n, ν) can be computed in polynomial time.
4.2.3 Reducing Linear Subspace Avoidance to
Congruency-Constrainted Optimization
The goal of this subsection is to show the connection between congruency-constrained opti-
mization and solving (PL). This connection was first drawn in the work of Pashkovich [63] for
the special case of weighted voting games. Here we abstract their work to apply it to our more
general framework.
By the following lemma, we can restrict our attention from linear independence over R to
linear independence over finite fields. We present the proof for completeness.
Lemma 4.2.4 (Pashkovich [63]) Let P be a set of prime numbers such that |P | ≥ log2(n!) with
n ≥ 3. A set of vectors v1, . . . , vk ∈ {0, 1}n are linearly independent over R if and only if there
exists p ∈ P such that v1, . . . , vk are linearly independent over Fp.
Moreover, the set P can be found in O(n3) time, and each p in P can be encoded in O(log(n))
bits.
Proof: ( [63]) Let A be the n × k matrix whose ith column is vector vi. If v1, . . . , vk are
linearly independent over Fp then there exists a k × k submatrix B of A such that det(B) 6= 0
(over Fp). Then det(B) 6= 0 over R and hence v1, . . . , vk are linearly independent over R.
77
Now suppose that v1, . . . , vk are linearly dependent over Fp for all p ∈ P . If k > n then clearly
v1, . . . , vk are linearly dependent over R and we are done. So suppose that k ≤ n. Let B be a
k × k submatrix of A. We will show that det(B) = 0.
For each p ∈ P , p divides det(B) since v1, . . . , vk are linearly dependent over Fp. Note that




and hence, if det(B) 6= 0 then ∏
p∈P
p ≤ det(B).




p ≤ det(B) ≤ n!,
with the last inequality following since B is a 0-1 matrix, yielding a contradiction. Therefore
det(B) = 0 as desired.
Now generate a set P of primes such that |P | ≥ log2(n!). By the Prime Number Theorem,
we can simply find the first log2(n!) primes in O(n
3) time and thus we can construct P in time
polynomial in n. Furthermore, the value of each prime in P will be polynomial in n (i.e. each
prime in P can be encoded with O(log(n)) bits).
This lemma enables us to reduce the problem (PL) to the problem of computing (P ) subject
to a congruency constraint with respect to a given prime p, k ∈ Zp, v ∈ ZEp :
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , vTx = k mod p}. (PL,p,v,k)
Lemma 4.2.5 If one can solve (PL,p,v,k) in time T then one can solve (PL) in time O(n
6T ).
Proof: For a linear subspace L ⊆ Rn, we say that x ∈ span(L) over Fp if there exists a basis B
of L such that B∪{x} is linearly dependent over the field Fp. By Lemma 4.2.4 we can solve (PL)
by solving,
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , x 6∈ span(L) over Fp for some p ∈ P}
The above problem can be solved by solving for each p ∈ P ,
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , x 6∈ span(L) over Fp} (PL,p)
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and taking the solution of maximum objective value found. Let Bp be a basis of L⊥ over Fp.
Assuming L is presented to us through a fixed basis, we can compute Bp in polynomial time via
Gaussian Elimination [24]. Now, x is not in the span of L over Fp if and only if there exists
v ∈ Bp such that vTx 6= 0 mod p. Hence we can solve (PL,p) by solving for each v ∈ Bp,
max{f(x) : x ∈ X , vTx 6= 0 mod p} (PL,p,v)
and taking the solution of maximum value found. Now vTx 6= 0 mod p if and only if there exists
k ∈ [p−1] such that vTx = k (over Fp). Thus we can solve (PL,p,v) by solving for each k ∈ [p−1],
(PL,p,v,k) and taking the solution of maximum value found.
Hence by solving O(|P |(n − dim(L)) maxp∈P p) = O(n3 maxp∈P p) = O(n6) congruency-
constrained optimization problems of the form (PL,p,v,k) we can solve (PL).
4.3 Dynamic Programming
Our goal is to define a class of problems where tractability of (P ) can be lifted to tractability
of (PL,p,v,k) and hence via Lemma 4.2.5 to (PL). Our candidate will be problems which have a
dynamic programming formulation. The model of dynamic programming we propose is based on
the model of Martin, Rardin, and Campbell [12].
The essence of a dynamic programming solution to a problem is a decomposition of a solution
to the program into optimal solutions to smaller subproblems. We will use a particular type of
hypergraph to describe the structure of dependencies of a problem on its subproblems.
To begin we will need to introduce some concepts. A directed hypergraph H = (V,E) is an
ordered pair, where V is a finite set referred to as the vertices or nodes of the hypergraph, and E
is a finite set where each element is of the form (v, S) where S ⊆ V and v ∈ V \S. We refer to the
elements of E as edges or arcs of H. For an arc e = (v, S) ∈ E we call v the tail of e and say e is
outgoing from v. We call S the heads of e, call each u ∈ S a head of e, and say e is incoming on
each u ∈ S. We call vertices with no incoming arcs sources and we call vertices with no outgoing
arcs sinks. For a directed hypergraph H, the set L(H) denotes the set of sinks of H.
For any non-empty strict subset of vertices U ⊂ V , we define the cut induced by U , denoted
δ(U), as follows
δ(U) := {(v, S) ∈ E : v ∈ U and S ∩ (V \U) 6= ∅}.
We say a directed hypergraph is connected if it has no empty cuts.
A directed hyperpath is a directed hypergraph P satisfying the following:
• there is a unique vertex s ∈ V (P ) identified as the start of P ,
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Figure 4.1: A directed acyclic hypergraph rooted at 1 with leaves 4, . . . , 9. Dashed arrows
show a directed hyperpath.
• the start s is the tail of at most one arc of P , and the head of no arcs of H,
• every vertex in V (P )\{s} is the tail of precisely one arc of H,
• P is connected.
Observe that there is at least one, and potentially many, vertices of a path which have one
incoming arc and no outgoing arcs. These vertices we call the ends of the path. If there is a path
starting from a vertex u and ending with a vertex v then we say u is an ancestor to v and v is
a descendant of u. For any vertex v ∈ V (H), the subgraph of H rooted at v, denoted Hv, is the
subgraph of H induced by the descendants of v (including v).
We say that a directed hypergraph H = (V,E) is acyclic if there exists a topological ordering
of the vertices of H. That is to say, there exists a bijection t : V → [|V |] such that for every
(v, S) ∈ E, for each u ∈ S, t(v) < t(u). Figure 4.1 depicts a directed acyclic hypergraph and one
of its hyperpaths.
A common approach to dynamic programming involves a table of subproblems (containing
information pertaining to their optimal solutions), and a recursive function describing how to
compute an entry in the table based on the values of table entries which correspond to smaller
subproblems. The values in the table are then determined in a bottom-up fashion. In our formal
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model, the entries in the table correspond to vertices of the hypergraph, and each hyperarc (v, S)
describes a potential way of computing a feasible solution to the subproblem at v by composing
the solutions to the subproblems at each node of S.
Consider a problem of the form (P ). That is, we have a feasible region X ⊆ Rn and an
objective function f : X → R and we hope to maximize f(x) subject to x ∈ X . We need some
language to describe how solutions to the dynamic program, i.e. paths in the directed hypergraph,
will map back to solutions in the original problem space. To do this mapping back to the original
space we will use an affine function. A function g : Rm → Rn is said to be affine if there exists a
matrix A ∈ Rn×m and a vector b ∈ Rn such that for any x ∈ Rm, g(x) = Ax+ b.
Oftentimes an affine function g will have a domain RE indexed by a finite set E. When this
happens for any S ⊆ E we use g(S) as a shorthand for g(χ(S)) where χ(S) is the incidence vector
of S. We further shorten g({e}) to g(e).
Let H = (V,E) be a directed acyclic connected hypergraph with set of sources T . Let P(H)
denote the set of paths in H which begin at a source in T and end only at sinks of H. Let
g : RE → Rn be an affine map which we will use to map between paths in P(H) and feasible
solutions in X . Let c : RE → R be an affine function we will use as an objective function. We say
(H, g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ) if g(P(H)) = X , and moreover for any




In other words, the optimal values of
max{c(P ) : P ∈ P(H)} (DP)
and (P ) are equal, and the feasible region of (P ) is the image (under g) of the feasible region of
(DP). The size of a dynamic programming formulation is the number of arcs in E(H).
In [12] the authors show that (DP) has a totally dual integral extended formulation of poly-
nomial size. Thus they show that (DP) can be solved in polynomial time via linear programming.
They further show that the extreme point optimal solution of this extended formulation lies in
{0, 1}E under the following reference subsets condition: there exists a ground set I, and nonempty
subsets Iv ⊆ I for each vertex v ∈ V (H) satisfying
1. Ij ⊆ I` for all (`, J) ∈ H such that j ∈ J
2. and Ij ∩ Ij′ = ∅ for all (`, J) ∈ E(H) such that j, j′ ∈ J with j 6= j′.
This condition is equivalent to the following no common descendants condition: for each
(`, J) ∈ E(H) for all u 6= v ∈ J , there does not exist w ∈ V (H) such that w is a descendant of
both u and v.
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Lemma 4.3.1 For any directed acyclic hypergraph H = (V,E) the reference subsets condition is
equivalent to the “no common descendants” condition defined above.
Proof: First suppose that H does not satisfy the no common descendants condition. Then
there exists (`, J) ∈ E such that there exist u, v ∈ J and w ∈ V such w is a descendant of u and
of v. Suppose for a contradiction that H has a reference subset system with ground set I.
We claim that Iw ⊆ Iv. The proof of this claim will symmetrically show that Iw ⊆ Iu. Then
Iw ∩ Iv ⊃ Iw 6= ∅ violating the second property of a reference subset system.
To prove the claim we will prove something stronger. In particular we will show that for
any x, y ∈ V such that y is a descendant of x, we have that Iy ⊆ Ix. Suppose not. Choose
a counterexample x, y with path P starting at x and ending at y so that the number of edges
in P is minimal. Clearly |E(P )| 6= 0 as otherwise x = y. Now, from the definition of P there
exists an arc (x, J) ∈ E(P ) and there exists z ∈ J such that there is a subgraph of P , denoted
P ′, such that P ′ is a path starting at z and ending at y. By minimality, Iy ⊆ Iz. By the first
property of reference subset systems, Iz ⊆ Ix. Thus Iy ⊆ Ix contradicting that x, y and P form
a counterexample.
Now for the other direction of the equivalence suppose that H satisfies the no common de-
scendants condition. We will construct a reference subset system for H as follows. Let I = V
and for each v ∈ V let Iv be the set of descendants of v. Then I satisfies the first property of
a reference subset system since the descendant relation is transitive. Further, the no common
descendants condition implies that I satisfies the second property of a reference subset system.
Lastly, no Iv is empty since every vertex is their own descendant.
We say that a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) of a problem (P ) is integral if H
satisfies the no common descendants condition. By the preceding discussion we have the following
lemma
Lemma 4.3.2 If a problem (P ) has an integral dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) then
(P ) can be solved in time polynomial in the encoding of (H, g, c).
4.3.1 Congruency Constrained Dynamic Programming
In this subsection our goal is to show that when a problem of the form (P ) has a dynamic
programming formulation, then its congruency constrained version (PL,p,v,k) has a dynamic pro-
gramming formulation that is only a O(p3) factor larger than the formulation for the original
problem. This will prove Theorem 4.3.7.
We begin with a handy lemma for constructing dynamic programming formulations of combi-
natorial optimization problems. This lemma allows us to manipulate the dynamic programming
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formulation for a combinatorial optimization problem to obtain a new dynamic programming
formulation.
Lemma 4.3.3 If (H, g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ) and (H ′, g′, c′) is a
dynamic programming formulation for (DP) with respect to hypergraph H and costs c then (H ′, g◦
g′, c′) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ).
Proof: The function g ◦ g′ is map between P(H ′) and X , and moreover it is affine since both
g and g′ are affine. Furthermore,
g ◦ g′(P(H ′)) = g(P(H)) = X .
Finally, for any P ∈ P(H ′),
f(g ◦ g′(P )) = c(g′(P )) = c′(P ).
Consider a directed hypergraph H = (V,E) and an edge (u, S) ∈ E. For v ∈ S we define
the hypergraph obtained from the subdivision of (u, S) with respect to v to be the hypergraph
H ′ = (V ′, E′) where V ′ = V ∪̇{bv} for a new dummy vertex bv and
E′ = (E\{(u, S)}) ∪ {(u, {v, bv}), (bv, S\{v})}.
That is, H ′ is obtained fromH by replacing edge (u, S) with two edges: (u, {v, bv}) and (bv, S\{v}).
We call the edges (u, {v, bv}) and (bv, S\{v}) the subdivision of edge (u, S).
Lemma 4.3.4 Let H = (V,E) be a directed acyclic hypergraph and let H ′ = (V ′, E′) be the
directed acyclic hypergraph obtained via a subdivision of (u, S) ∈ E with respect to v ∈ S. Then
there is an affine function g : RE
′ → RE, such that for any affine function c : RE → R, there
exists an affine function c′ : RE
′ → R such that (H, g, c′) is a dynamic programming formulation
of the problem (DP) on H with objective c.
Moreover if H satisfies the “no common descendants” property, this dynamic programming
formulation is integral.
Proof: Take g to be the affine function defined as follows. For any e ∈ E and x ∈ RE′ ,
g(x)e :=
{
x(u,{v,bv}), if e = (u, S)
xe, otherwise.
It is not hard to see that g is affine, and in fact linear. In fact, g is simply the function which
identifies e with (u, {v, bv}) and every other edge in e with the corresponding edge in E′.
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To see that g is a bijection between P(H) and P(H ′) it suffices to observe that a path P
in P(H ′) uses (u, {v, bv}) if and only P uses (bv, S\{v}). This follows immediately from the
definition of hyperpaths.
Now for any c : RE → R let c′ : RE′ → R be the unique affine function which acts on the
standard basis in the following way: for any e ∈ E′,
c′(e) =

c((u, S)), if e = (u, {v, bv})
0, if e = (bv, S\{v})
c(e), otherwise.
Again since a path P in P(H ′) uses (u, {v, bv}) if and only P uses (bv, S\{v}), it is easy to see
that c(g(P ) = c′(P ) for any P ∈ P(H ′). Hence (H ′, g, c′) is the desired dynamic programming
formulation.
Since the subdivision operation preserves the “no common descendants” property, (H ′, g, c)
is integral if H satisfies the no common descendants condition.
For a directed hypergraph H = (V,E) let ∆(H) := max{|S| : (u, S) ∈ E} and let Γ(H) :=
|{(u, S) ∈ E : |S| = ∆(H)}|. The following Lemma shows that we may assume the number of
heads of any arc in a dynamic programming formulation is constant.
Lemma 4.3.5 Consider a combinatorial optimization problem of the form (P ). If there exists
a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) for (P ) then there exists a dynamic programming







Moreover, if H is integral then H∗ is integral.
Proof: We proceed by double induction on ∆(H) and Γ(H). In the base case, for any Γ(H)
if ∆(H) ≤ 2 then (H, g, c) is the desired dynamic program. In the inductive case consider H
such that ∆(H) > 2 and suppose the lemma holds on all directed acyclic hypergraphs H ′ with
∆(H ′) < ∆(H) or ∆(H ′) = ∆(H) and Γ(H ′) < Γ(H). Since ∆(H) ≥ 3 there exists an edge
(u, S) ∈ E(H) such that |S| ≥ 3. Let (H ′, g′, c′) be the dynamic program for (DP) on H with
objective c given by Lemma 4.3.4 where H ′ is obtained by a subdivision of (u, S) with respect to
vertex v ∈ S. By Lemma 4.3.3 (H ′, g ◦ g′, c′) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P ).
Now notice that either ∆(H ′) = ∆(H)− 1 or ∆(H ′) = ∆(H) and Γ(H ′) = Γ(H)− 1. Hence
by induction there is a dynamic program (H∗, g∗, c∗) for the problem (DP) on hypergraph H ′
84



















where the second equality follows since H ′ is obtained from H via a subdivision of (u, S) with
respect to v. By Lemma 4.3.3 (H∗, g ◦ g′ ◦ g∗, c∗) is a dynamic programming formulation for (P )
as desired.
Since subdivision preserves the “no common descendants” property, if H is integral then H∗
is integral.
The next lemma is our main techincal lemma. It provides the backbone of our dynamic
programming formulation for (PL,p,v,k) by showing that we can track the congruency of all hy-
perpaths rooted at a particular vertex by expanding the size of our hypergraph by a factor of
p∆(H) + 1.
Lemma 4.3.6 Let H = (V,E) be a directed acyclic hypergraph. Let p be a prime. Let k ∈ Zp
and let a ∈ ZEp . There exists a directed acyclic hypergraph H ′ = (V ′, E′) and an affine function
g′ : P(H ′)→ P(H), g′(x) = Ax+ b, such that:
1) |E′| ≤ p∆(H)+1|E|
2) For every v ∈ V \L(H), for every k ∈ Zp, if {P ∈ P(Hv) : a(P ) = k mod p} 6= ∅ then
there exists v′ ∈ V (H ′) such that
g′(P(H ′v′)) = {P ∈ P(Hv) : a(P ) = k mod p}.
Moreover if H satisfies the “no common descendants” property then H ′ satisfies the “no common
descendants” property.
Proof: We may assume that each source u of H has at most one arc outgoing from u. To see
this, if the arcs leaving u are (u, S1), . . . , (u, S`) then we can replace u with ` vertices u1, . . . , u`
and replace the arcs of u with (u1, Sl),. . . , (u`, S`). This does not increase the number of arcs,
and preserves the structure of the paths in P(H).
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Now suppose for a contradiction that the lemma is false. Consider a counterexample H =
(V,E) which minimizes |E|. Then E 6= ∅, otherwise H is trivially not a counterexample. Let
u ∈ V be a source of H which has an outgoing arc, let (u, S) ∈ E be the arc outgoing from u and
let d = |S|. Arbitrarily fix an indexing on the vertices of S as in S = {s1, . . . , sd}.
Since H − u has fewer arcs than H, it is not a counterexample to the lemma. Hence there
exists a directed acyclic hypergraph H and an affine function g satisfying properties 1) and 2) of
the lemma with respect to H − u.
We now construct a new directed acylic hypergraph H ′ and affine function g′ : RE
′ → RE via
the following procedure.
1. Initialize H ′ = (V ′, E′) to be the hypergraph H̄.
2. For every k ∈ Zp such that {P ∈ P(H) : a(P ) = k mod p} 6= ∅ do:
(a) Add a new vertex uk to V ′.
(b) For each q ∈ Zdp such that aT q = k − g((u, S)) mod p do:
• if for every i ∈ [d] there exists s′i ∈ V ′ such that g is a bijection between P(H ′s′i)






3. We will define g′ by its action on the standard basis. For each e ∈ E′ we define
g′(e) :=
{
χ((u, S)), if e is outgoing from uk for some k ∈ Zp
g(e), otherwise.
We will first verify that property 1) is satisfied by H ′. Since H satisfies property 1), |E(H)| ≤
p∆(H−v)+1(|E|− 1). By our construction of H ′, E′ has at most p · |Zdp | more arcs than E(H), and
hence
|E′| ≤ |E|+ p · |Zdp | ≤ p∆(H−v)+1(|E| − 1) + pd+1 ≤ p∆(H)+1|E|.
Now we will show that property 2) is satisfied by H ′ and g′. Let v ∈ V \L(H). Let k ∈ Zp
and suppose that {P ∈ P(Hv) : a(P ) = k mod p} 6= ∅. If v 6= u, then since H and g satisfies
property 2), H ′ and g′ satisfy property 2) by steps 1. and 3. of the construction. Thus we may
assume that v = u. Then the vertex uk was added to V ′ in step 2a) of the construction. It
suffices to show that g′ is a bijection between P(H ′
uk
) and {P ∈ P(Hu) : a(P ) = k mod p}.
First we show surjectivity. Let P ∈ {P ∈ P(Hu) : a(P ) = k mod p}. Then P is the disjoint
union of (u, S) and d paths P1, . . . , Pd where each Pi is in P(Hsi) respectively. For each i ∈ [d],
let ki = a(Pi) mod p. By property 2) applied to H and g, and by our construction of H
′ starting
from H and g′ starting from g, for each i ∈ [d] there exists a vertex s′i ∈ V ′ ∩ V such that g′ is
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a bijection between P(H ′s′i) and {P ∈ P(Hsi) : a(P ) = ki mod p}. Since g
′ is such a bijection
there exists P ′i ∈ P(H ′s′i) such that g
′(P ′i ) = Pi.






is a path P ′ ∈ P(H ′
uk
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Now we show injectivity. Let P ′, Q′ ∈ P(H ′
uk
) be paths in H ′ such that g′(P ′) = g′(Q′). Let
P = g′(P ′) = g′(Q′). We consider the disjoint union of hyperpaths obtained by deleting uk (and
hence the single arc outgoing from uk) from P ′ and Q′. Observe that
P − u = g′(P ′ − u) = g′(Q′ − u).
By the bijectivity of g′ inherited from g, this implies that P ′ − u = Q′ − u. But that necessarily
implies that P ′ and Q′ have the same arc outgoing from uk. Thus P ′ = Q′. Therefore we have
shown property 2).
It is easy to see that the construction preserves the no common descendants property.
We are now ready to show our main theorem, which says that for any combinatorial opti-
mization problem which has a dynamic program, its congruency-constrained version also has a
dynamic program of proportional size.
Theorem 4.3.7 Consider an instance of a combinatorial optimization problem (P ). Let p be a
prime, let v ∈ Znp , and let k ∈ Zp. Consider the corresponding congruency-constrained optimiza-
tion problem (PL,p,v,k). If (P ) has a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) then (PL,p,v,k)
has a dynamic programming formulation (H ′, g′, c′) such that |E(H ′)| ≤ p3 · |V (H)| · |E(H)|.
Moreover if (H, g, c) is integral then (H ′, g′, c′) is integral.
Proof: We first apply Lemma 4.3.5 to problem (P ) and dynamic programming formulation
(H, g, c) to obtain a dynamic programming formulation (H∗, g∗, c∗) for (P ) such that
∆(H∗) ≤ 2 and |E(H∗)| ≤ |V (H)| · |E(H)|.
Since g∗ is an affine function, there exists a matrix A and a vector b such that g∗(x) = Ax+b for
any x. Now apply Lemma 4.3.6 to hypergraph H∗ with prime p, integer k−vT b ∈ Zp, and vector
AT v ∈ ZEp . We obtain a directed acyclic hypergraph H ′ and affine function g′ : P(H ′)→ P(H∗)
such that
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1) |E′| ≤ p∆(H∗)+1|E(H∗)| ≤ p3|V (H)||E(H)| and
2) For every v ∈ V (H∗)\L(H∗), if
{P ∈ P(H∗v ) : vTAχ(P ) = k − vT b mod p} 6= ∅
then there exists v′ ∈ V (H ′) such that g′ is a bijection between P(H ′v′) and {P ∈ P(H∗v ) :
vTAχ(P ) = k − vT b mod p}.
Let c′ : RE(H
′) → R be the affine function c∗ ◦ g′. Let T be the set of sources in H ′ that satisfy





∗ ◦ g′, c′)




H ′u)) = {P ∈: P(H∗) : vTA(P ) = k − vT b mod p}.
Now observe that
{P ∈: P(H∗) : vTA(P ) = k − vT b mod p}
= {P ∈: P(H∗) : vT (A(P ) + b) = k mod p}
= {P ∈: P(H∗) : vT g∗(P ) = k mod p}.
Since g∗(P(H∗)) = X , we have that





H ′u)) = {x ∈ X : vTx = k mod p},
the feasible region of (PL,p,v,k).





f(g∗ ◦ g′(P )) = c(g′(P )) = c′(P ).
Thus D is a dynamic programming formulation for (PL,p,v,k). Observe that the lemmas applied
in the construction of D all preserve integrality. Hence if (H, g, c) is integral then D is integral.
Due to Theorem 4.3.7 and Lemma 4.3.2 we have the following Corollary.
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Corollary 4.3.8 If (P ) has an integral dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) then for any
v, k, p problem (PL,p,v,k) can be solved in time polynomial in size of H, the prime p, and the
encoding of g, c, v, k,
Via this Corollary, Lemma 4.2.3, and Lemma 4.2.5 we obtain our first main result: Theo-
rem 4.0.1.
4.4 Applications
In this section we show some applications of Theorem 4.0.1 to computing the nucleolus of
cooperative games. We will study weighted voting games, b-matching games on bipartite graphs
where one side has all b-values 1, and b-matching games on graphs of bounded treewidth.
4.4.1 Weighted Voting Games
The first application is to Weighted Voting Games. In [63] a pseudopolynomial time algorithm
for computing the nucleolus of Weighted Voting Games was given. We show how the same result
can be obtained as a special case of Theorem 4.0.1. Recall that a weighted voting game (n, ν)
has value function ν : 2[n] → {0, 1} determined by a vector w ∈ Zn and T ∈ Z, such that for any
S ⊆ [n], ν(S) = 1 if and only if w(S) ≥ T .
We partition 2[n] into two classes: N0 := {S ⊆ [n] : w(S) < T} and N1 := {S ⊆ [n] : w(S) ≥
T}. If we can design a dynamic programming formulation for the minimum excess coalition
problem restricted to N0: max{−x(S) : w(S) ≤ T − 1, S ⊆ [n]} and a dynamic programming
formulation for the minimum excess coalition problem restricted to N1: max{−x(S)+1 : w(S) ≥
T, S ⊆ [n]}, then the dynamic programming formulation which takes the maximum of these two
formulations will provide a dynamic programming formulation for the minimum excess coalition
problem of the weighted voting game.
If we let W [k,D] denote max{−x(S) : w(S) ≤ D,S ⊆ [k]} then we can solve the minimum
excess coalition problem restricted to N0 by computing W [n, T − 1] via the following recursive
expression, which is essentially a dynamic program for Knapsack Cover,
W [k,D] =

max{W [k − 1, D − wk],W [k − 1, D]}, if k > 1
−x1, if k = 1 and w1 ≤ D
−∞, if k = 1 and w1 > D.
It is not hard to construct a dynamic programming formulation (H0, g0, c0) for the minimum
excess coalition problem restricted to N0 by following this recursive expression. The hypergraph
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H0 will in fact be a rooted tree (i.e. all heads will have size one), and H0 will have O(nT ) vertices
and arcs. Via a similar technique, a dynamic programming formulation (H1, g1, c1) with O(nT )
arcs can be constructed for the minimum excess problem restricted to N1. Then by taking the
union these dynamic programming formulations, we obtain an integral dynamic programming
formulation of size O(nT ). Therefore by Theorem 4.0.1 we obtain a short proof that
Theorem 4.4.1 ( [63] [25]) The nucleolus of a weighted voting game can be computed in pseu-
dopolynomial time.
In the following subsections we will see how the added power of hyperarcs lets us solve the
more complex problem of computing the nucleolus of b-matching games on graphs of bounded
treewidth.
4.4.2 Star Matching
In [4] Bateni, Hajiaghayi, Immorlica, and Mahini show that the nucleolus of a simple weighted
b-matching game on a bipartite graph can be computed in polynomial time in the case where the
b-value of every vertex on one side of the bipartition has b-value 1. Their proof is quite technical
and specialized to the problem. With access to the dynamic programming framework we can
provide a dramatically simpler proof.
Theorem 4.4.2 ( [4]) Let G = (V,E) be a b-valued, w-weighted graph and (n, ν) the associated
b-matching game. Suppose that G is bipartite with bipartition A∪̇B = V and suppose that for
every node a ∈ A we have ba = 1.
Then the nucleolus of (n, ν) can be computed in polynomial time.
Note that since one side of the bipartition has b-values all 1 we need not make the distinction
between simple and non-simple b-matching games.
Proof: By Theorem 4.0.1 it will suffice to provide a dynamic programming formulation for
the minimum excess problem with respect to a particular characterization set. In the previous
and subsequent application we use the trivial characterization [n] but this problem will actually
take advantage of a specific characterization set.
First we want to show that C(n, ν) is non-empty. Consider dual to the fractional b-matching
linear program:
min bT y
s.t. yu + yv ≥ w(uv) ∀uv ∈ E
y ≥ 0.
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Since G is bipartite, and ba = 1 for all a ∈ A, the optimal value of this linear program is equal
to ν(V ) [73]. Let y∗ be an optimal solution to the linear program above. Let x∗ ∈ Rn be chosen
such that x∗u = buy
∗
u. We claim that x
∗ ∈ C(n, ν). Clearly x∗ is efficient and individually rational.












with the last inequality following since the restriction of y∗ to S is dual feasible for the b-matching
linear program on G[S]. Therefore the core of (n, ν) is non-empty.
Observe that every b-matching on G is a disjoint union of stars with their centers in B. Since
the core of (n, ν) is non-empty, we can apply Corollary 3.3.3 to see that
S = {S ⊆ V : G[S] is a star with its center in B}
is a characterization set for (n, ν).
Given x ∈ Rn we now present a dynamic programming formulation for the minimum excess
problem
min{x(S)− ν(S) : S ∈ S}.
Suppose S ∈ S. Then for some integer k ≤ n, G[S] is a k-star centered at some vertex v ∈ B
with edges to vertices u1, . . . , uk ∈ A. The excess ex(x, S) of such a star decomposes into
x(S)− ν(S) = xv +
k∑
i=1
(xui − w(vui)) .
Finding the minimum excess of a star decomposes into the following decisions: choose the
center of the star, choose how many edges the star will have, and then choose which edges will
be in the star.
For a k-star with a fixed center at a vertex v, the problem of finding edges which minimize its
excess can be seen as a max knapsack problem with items with vu for each edge vu ∈ δ(v) with
cost w(uv)− xu, and knapsack capacity k. In Section 4.4.1 we already designed a dynamic pro-
gramming formulation for the maximum knapsack problem. Let (Hv,k, gv,k, cv,k) be the associated
dynamic programming formulation.
Then we can construct a dynamic programming formulation for the minimum excess problem
in our setting by constructing a hypergraph H rooted at r with arcs from r to the root of Hv,k
for each v ∈ B, and each k ∈ [n] ∪ {0}. The cost of each such arc will be xv, and taking such an
arc will be mapped to adding v to our coalition (i.e. choosing v as the center of our star). Each
dynamic program with hypergraph Hv,k tells us which vertices in A are joining our coalition and
the associated charge to the total excess.
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Since our dynamic programmin formulation will be the disjoint union of O(n2) dynamic
programs each with O(n2) arcs, by Theorem 4.0.1 this formulation implies that the nucleolus of
(n, ν) can be computed in polynomial time.
4.4.3 Treewidth
Consider a graph G = (V,E). We call a pair (T,B) a tree decomposition [41] [69] of G if




i∈VT Bi = V , i.e. every vertex is in some bag,
2. for each v ∈ V , the subgraph of T induced by {i ∈ VT : v ∈ Bi} is a tree, and
3. for each uv ∈ E, there exists i ∈ VT such that u, v ∈ Bi.
The width of a tree decomposition is the size of the largest bag minus one, i.e. maxi∈VT {|Bi|−1}.
The treewidth of graph G, denoted tw(G), is minimum width of a tree decomposition of G.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of the tree decomposition of a graph.
We may assume that tree decompositions of a graph have a special structure. We say a tree
decompostion (T,B) of G is nice if there exists a vertex r ∈ VT such that if we view T as a tree
rooted at r then every vertex i ∈ VT is one of the following types:
• Leaf: i has no children and |Bi| = 1.
• Introduce: i has one child j and Bi = Bj∪̇{v} for some vertex v ∈ V .
• Forget: i has one child j and Bi∪̇{v} = Bj for some vertex v ∈ V .
• Join: i has two children j1, j2 with Bi = Bj1 = Bj2 .
It turns out that if a graph has a tree decomposition of width w then a nice tree decomposition
of width w times the number of vertices of the graph can be computed in time polynomial in w
and the number of vertices of the graph.
Theorem 4.4.3 ( [48] Lemma 13.1.3) If G = (V,E) has a tree decompostion of width w with n
tree vertices then there exists a nice tree decomposition of G of width w and O(|V |) tree vertices












Figure 4.2: A b-matching game on a graph of bounded treewidth. Red numbers indicate
b-values and dashed edges indicate a b-matching. Figure 4.3 shows the tree decomposition
of this graph.
4.4.4 Dynamic Program for b-Matching Games
We want to show that on graphs of bounded treewidth, the nucleolus of b-matching games
can be computed efficiently. Fix a graph G = (V,E), a vector of b-values b ∈ ZV , and tree
decomposition (T,B) of treewidth w, where T is rooted at r, to be used throughout this section.
For i ∈ V (T ) let Ti denote the subtree of T rooted at i, and also let Gi := G[
⋃
j∈V (Ti)Bj ]. For




















Figure 4.3: Tree decomposition of the graph in Figure 4.2. On the right is the tree from
the decomposition, with each associated bag labelled on the left.
For any i ∈ V (T ), X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ {d ∈ ZBi : 0 ≤ d ≤ ∆(G)}, and F ⊆ E(Bi), we define the
combinatorial optimization problem C[i,X,d,F] to be the problem of finding a b-matching M and
a set of vertices S such that M uses only edges of Gi, S uses only vertices of Gi, the intersection
of M and E(Bi) is F , the number of edges in M adjacent to u is du for each u in Bi, and the
vertices in S not intersecting an edge in F is X. Formally C[i,X,d,F] is defined as follows
max w(M)− x(S) (C[i,X,d,F])
s.t. |M ∩ δi(v)| ≤ bv ∀v ∈ V
|M ∩ δi(u)| ≤ du ∀u ∈ Bi
du = 0 ∀u ∈ X
M ∩ E(Bi) = F




We define C[i] to be the union over all C[i,X, d, F ].
max w(M)− x(S) (C[i])
s.t. (M,S) is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]
for some (X, d, F ) ∈ Bi × ZBi × E(Gi).
We will show a dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) for C[i]. Since the feasible region
of the minimum excess coalition problem for b-matching games is the image of the feasible region of
C[i] under the linear map which projects out M , and ν(S)−x(S) = max(M,S)feasible for C[i]w(M)−
x(S), the existence of (H, g, c) will imply the existence a dynamic programming formulation of
the minimum excess coalition problem for b-matching games of the same encoding length.
Lemma 4.4.4 Let i ∈ V (T ). There exists an integral dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c)
for C[i] such that
1) |E(H)| ≤ |V (Ti)| · w ·∆(G)w · w2 and
2) For every j ∈ V (Ti), X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi, and F ⊆ E(Bi), if C[i,X,d,F]) has a feasible
solution then there exists a ∈ V (H) such that (Ha, g, c) is an integral dynamic programming
formulation for C[i,X,d,F]
Proof: We proceed by induction on the distance from i to a leaf of T . If i is a leaf of T the
Lemma is trivial. So we suppose that i is not a leaf of T and the Lemma holds for all vertices j
of T which are closer to a leaf than i.
Now we proceed by case distinction on which class of node i is: an Introduce node, a Forget
node, or a Join node.
Case: Introduce. If i is an Introduce node then i has one child j, and Bi = Bj∪̇{v} for some
vertex v ∈ V . Let (H ′, g′, c′) be the dynamic programming formulation for C[j] guaranteed by
the inductive hypothesis. We construct a new dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) via
the following procedure:
1. Initialize H to H ′.
2. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g′(e′).
3. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c′(e′).
4. For every X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , F ⊆ E(Bi) such that C[i,X, d, F ] has a feasible solution do:
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(a) Add a new vertex ai,X,d,F to V (H)
(b) Let aj,X∩Bj ,d
′,F∩E(Bj) be the vertex of V (H ′) guaranteed by property 2), such that
(H
aj,X∩Bj,d
′,F∩E(Bj) , g, c)
is a dynamic programming formulation for C[j,X ∩Bj , d′, F ∩ E(Bj)], where
d′u := du −
{
1, if uv ∈ F
0, otherwise.
for all u ∈ Bj .
(c) Add arc e = (ai,X,d,F , {aj,X∩Bj ,d′,F∩E(Bj)}) to E(H).




(X\Bj) ∪ ({v} ∩ V (F ))
)
∈ {0, 1}E(Gi),V (Gi)
(e) Define action of c on e to be
c(e) = w(F\E(Bj))− x(X\Bj)− x({v} ∩ V (F )).
Property 1) is immediate from induction and the number of arcs added by the construction.
To verify property 2) consider C[i′, X, d, F ] satisfying the hypothesis of property 2). If i′ 6= i
property 2) holds immediately by induction. So suppose i′ = i. We claim that (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) is




be a feasible solution to C[i,X, d, F ]. For any(
M S
)T
feasible for C[i,X, d, F ] there exists (
M ′ S′
)T
feasible for C[j,X ∩Bj , d′, F ∩E(Bj)] (where d′ is as defined in Step 2b) of the construction) such
that
M = M ′∪̇ (F ∩ E(Bj)) and S = S′∪̇ (X\Bj) ∪ ({v}) ∩ V (F ))) .




feasible for C[j,X ∩Bj , d′, F ∩ E(Bj)], we have that(
M ′∪̇ (F ∩ E(Bj))
S′∪̇ (X\Bj) ∪ ({v} ∩ V (F ))
)
is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Hence by Step 2d) and Step 2e) of the construction, and the inductive
hypothesis, g and c behave as desired for the dynamic program (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) to be a dynamic
programming formulation of C[i,X, d, F ].
Case: Forget. If i is a Forget node then i has one child j, and Bi∪̇{v} = Bj for some vertex
v ∈ V . Let (H ′, g′, c′) be the dynamic programming formulation for C[j] guaranteed by the
inductive hypothesis. We construct a new dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) via the
following procedure:
1. Initialize H to H ′.
2. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g′(e′).
3. For each e′ ∈ E(H ′), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c′(e′).
4. For every X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , F ⊆ E(Bi) such that C[i,X, d, F ] has a feasible solution do:
(a) Add a new vertex ai,X,d,F to V (H).
(b) For each J ⊆ δ(v) ∩ E(Bj), d′ ∈ ZBj such that d′u = du for all u ∈ Bi, and for each
Y ∈ {X,X ∪ {v}}, if C[j, Y, d′, F ∪ J ] has a feasible solution do:
i. Let aj,Y,d
′,F∪J be the vertex of V (H ′) guaranteed by property 2), such that
(Haj,Y,d′,F∪J , g, c) is a dynamic programming formulation for C[j, Y, d
′, F ∪ J ].
ii. Add arc e = (ai,X,d,F , {aj,Y,d′,F∪J}) to E(H).
iii. Define action of g on e to be g(e) = 0.
iv. Define action of c on e to be c(e) = −w(J) + x(Y ∩ {v}).
Property 1) is immediate from induction and the number of arcs added by the construction.
To verify property 2) consider C[i′, X, d, F ] satisfying the hypothesis of property 2). If i′ 6= i
property 2) holds immediately by induction. So suppose i′ = i. We claim that (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) is








∈ {0, 1}E(Gj),V (Gj)
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such that M ′ = M ∪̇J for some J ∈ δ(v) ∩ E(Bj) and S′ = S ∪ Y for some Y ∈ {X,X ∪ {v}}.
Further there exists d′ ∈ ZBj such that
|M ′ ∩ δ(u)| = d′u for all u ∈ Bj .
Hence (M ′, S′) is feasible for C[j, Y, d′, F ∪ J ]. Moreover for any(
M ′ S′
)T




is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Thus by induction and Step 2b) of the construction, g and c behave
as desired for (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) to be a dynamic programming formulation of C[i,X, d, F ].
Case: Join. If i is a Join node then i has two children: j1 and j2, and Bj1 = Bj2 = Bi.
Let (H1, g1, c1) be the dynamic programming formulation for C[j1] guaranteed by the induction
hypothesis, and let (H2, g2, c2) be the similarly guaranteed dynamic programming formulation for
C[j2] We construct a new dynamic programming formulation (H, g, c) via the following procedure:
1. Initialize H = H1∪̇H2.
2. For each e′ ∈ E(H1), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g1(e′). Similarly for each
e′ ∈ E(H2), define the action of g on e′ to be g(e′) = g2(e′).
3. For each e′ ∈ E(H1), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c1(e′). Similarly for each
e′ ∈ E(H2), define the action of c on e′ to be c(e′) = c2(e′).
4. For every X ⊆ Bi, d ∈ ZBi , F ⊆ E(Bi) such that C[i,X, d, F ] has a feasible do:
(a) Add a new vertex ai,X,d,F to V (H).
(b) For every d1 ∈ ZBj1 such that C[j1, X, d1, F ] has a feasible solution, and for every
d2 ∈ ZBj2 such that C[j2, X, d2, F ] has a feasible solution, if d1 + d2− |F ∩ δ(u)| = du
for all u ∈ Bi then do:
i. Let aj1,X,d
1,F be the vertex of V (H1) guaranteed by property 2), such that(
H
aj1,X,d
1,F , g, c
)
is a dynamic programming formulation for C[j1, X, d
1, F ].
ii. Let aj2,X,d
2,F be the vertex of V (H2) guaranteed by property 2), such that(
H
aj2,X,d
2,F , g, c
)
is a dynamic programming formulation for C[j2, X, d
2, F ].
iii. Add arc e = (ai,X,d,F , {aj1,X,d1,F , aj2,X,d2,F }) to E(H).
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iv. Define action of g on e to be g(e) = 0.
v. Define action of c on e to be
c(e) = −w(F ) + x({u ∈ Bi : d1u > 0 and d2u > 0}).
Property 1) is immediate from induction and the number of arcs added by the construction.
To verify property 2) consider C[i′, X, d, F ] satisfying the hypothesis of property 2). If i′ 6= i
property 2) holds immediately by induction. So suppose i′ = i. We claim that (Hai,X,d,F , g, c) is




be feasible for the problem C[i,X, d, F ]. Then there exists(
M1 S1
)T
feasible for the problem C[j1, X, d
1, F ] and(
M2 S2
)T
feasible for the probelm C[j2, X, d
2, F ] such that
d1 + d2 − |F ∩ δ(u)| = du
for all u ∈ Bi, satisfying that
M = M1 ∪M2 and S = S1 ∪ S2.
Moreover for any (
M1 S1
)T
feasible for C[j1, X, d
1, F ] and for any (
M2 S2
)T
feasible for C[j2, X, d




is feasible for C[i,X, d, F ]. Hence g(P (Hai,X,d,F )) is equal to the feasible region C[i,X, d, F ] by
Steps 2b)ii− 2b)iv of the construction. Furthermore
w(M)− x(S) = w(M1) + w(M2)− w(M1 ∩M2)− x(S1)− x(S2) + x(S1 ∩ S2)
= w(M1)− x(S1) + w(M2)− x(S2)− w(F )
+ x({u ∈ Bi : d1u > 0 and d2u > 0})
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with the second equality following since there are no edges from a vertex in V (Gj1)\Bi to a
vertex in V (Gj2)\Bi by the properties of tree decompositions. Hence c behaves as desired for
(Hai,X,d,F ] , g, c) to be a dynamic programming formulation of C[i,X, d, F ].
It is not hard to see that the constructions in each case preserve integrality.




In Chapter 2 we gave an algorithm for computing the nucleolus of any weighted cooperative
matching game in polynomial time (Theorem 2.0.1). To achieve this we gave a compact formula-
tion of each linear program in the MPS Scheme (Theorem 2.3.1) when the core of the underlying
game is empty. This compact formulation required us to first obtain a universal allocation in the
relative interior of the first linear program of the MPS Scheme (P1). Finding such an allocation
required the use of the ellipsoid method or similar method of solving linear programs using a
separation oracle. While the ellipsoid method runs in polynomial time in this case, the hidden
constants can make the technique prohibitive in practical settings.
When the core is non-empty allocations in (P1) are in bijection with solutions to the dual of
the fractional matching problem [20]. Using this fact allows for the design of algorithms for the
nucleolus of matching games with non-empty core which are more combinatorial in nature and
with faster runtimes, see for instance [7]. It would be interesting to see if there is a combinatorial
algorithm for computing the nucleolus of weighted matching games with empty core. The thesis
of John Hardwick [42] provides a graphical algorithm for computing the nucleolus of unweighted
matching games. Such work may provide an interesting starting point.
In a similar vein, it is an interesting open question to find a characterization of the the
allocations in the first linear program of the MPS Scheme for matching games with empty core
in terms of dual solutions to an associated weighted matching problem. If that is not possible,
maybe characterizing an interesting subset of such allocations, such as in the intersection with
the kernel?
Open Question 5.0.1 Is there a subset of allocations in the leastcore of a matching game with
empty core which admit a characterization in terms of the dual of some weighted matching prob-
lem?
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Open Question 5.0.2 Is there a combinatorial algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a
weighted matching game with empty core in polynomial time?
Open Question 5.0.3 What is the optimal runtime of an algorithm which computes the nucle-
olus of a weighted matching game with empty core?
In Chapter 3 we turned our attention from matching games to b-matching games. In this
setting we generalized work on the hardness of computing the nucleolus. In Theorem 3.0.1 we
show that deciding whether allocation is equal to the nucleolus of a simple b-matching game is
NP-hard on bipartite graphs. This holds even when the underlying graph is bipartite, the graph
is unweighted, the maximum degree is 7, and every vertex has b-value 3.
When bv ≤ 2 for each v ∈ V , we addressed some basic cases with polynomial nucleolus com-
putation algorithms. We also showed that even when the core is empty, the leastcore constraints
can be separated in polynomial time (Theorem 3.2.3). The final gap is computing the nucleolus
of simple b-matching games in general. This is open even when bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V , the core is
non-empty, and the graph is unweighted.
Open Question 5.0.4 Is there an algorithm which computes the nucleolus of a b-matching game
where bv ≤ 2 for all v ∈ V in polynomial time? How about in the special case where the graph is
bipartite and the edges are unweighted? Alternatively, is this problem NP-hard?
In Chapter 4 we provided a general framework for computing the nucleolus of a cooperative
matching game by proving that when you can characterize the min excess problem of the game as
a dynamic programming problem you can compute the nucleolus with only a polynomial factor
expansion of the time cost of solving the dynamic program (Theorem 4.0.1). We applied this result
to b-matching games on graphs of bounded treewidth (Theorem 4.0.2). It would be interesting to
explore what other potential applications this technique has and if it can be generalized further.
Chapter 4 also contained a discussion of weighted voting games, the work on which was a
major inspiration for our work on dynamic programming techniques for computing the nucleolus.
An open problem which arose from this discussion relates to analyzing Kopelowitz Scheme on
weighted voting games. The question is: how many rounds does Kopelowitz Scheme need to find
the nucleolus of a weighted voting game? Can we prove it only needs a polynomial number of
rounds, or on the other hand can we exhibit an example that has a superpolynomial lower bound
on the number of rounds?
Open Question 5.0.5 Can the number of rounds needed by Kopelowitz Scheme to compute the
nucleolus of a weighted voting game be bounded by a polynomial?
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Much of the theoretical discussion around computing the nucleolus centres around techniques
based on hierarchies of linear programs, such as Kopelowitz Scheme, the MPS Scheme, or even
the relaxed MPS Scheme. This is not necessarily the only way forward though. For related
solution concepts there are other polynomial-time techniques. For instance Faigle, Kern, and
Kuipers [30] show how a sequence of local transfers can obtain an allocation in the leastcore
intersect prekernel of a cooperative game. The nucleolus is contained in this set, and hence when
this set is a singleton their algorithm computes the nucleolus.
In particular, the core intersect prekernel is unique for convex games [60]. Characterizing the
convexity of generalizations of matching games including hypergraph matching games [56] and
b-matching games [55] has been studied. What is interesting though is that convexity is only a
sufficient condition for core intersect prekernel being unique. It would be interesting to explore
other direct characterizations of matching games and their relatives which have a unique core
intersect prekernel.
Open Question 5.0.6 Is there a characterization of b-matching games which have a unique
leastcore intersect prekernel which can be verified in polynomial time?
An other open direction based on this line discussion is designing local transfer schemes for the
nucleolus directly. Is there a polynomial time, or even finite, algorithm in the vein of the Faigle,
Kern, Kuipers (FKK) algorithm which computes the nucleolus from some starting allocations by
a sequence of transfer of value between coalitions?
To conclude, allow us to discuss what we think is the major open question in this area: what
is the connection between separating the leastcore constraints and computing the nucleolus?
To the best of our knowledge, for every major class of cooperative combinatorial optimization
games where the leastcore constraints are efficiently separable, the nucleolus is also efficiently
computable. Further for every major class of cooperative combinatorial optimization games
where computing the nucleolus is NP-hard, separating the leastcore constraints also is NP-hard.
Open Question 5.0.7 Can one characterize the combinatorial optimization games for which
being able to efficiently compute the minimum excess coalition with respect to any given allocation
implies being able to compute the nucleolus efficiently?
For the leastcore intersect prekernel the FKK algorithm explicitly shows that efficient separa-
tion of the leastcore implies efficient computation of a point in the leastcore intersect prekernel. Is
this same relationship true for the nucleolus of a cooperative game? Our work in Chapter 4 shows
it is does in the special case where leastcore separation takes the form of a dynamic program,
and the FKK algorithm shows it does in the special case where the leastcore intersect prekernel
is unique.
Our work in the other chapters of this thesis can be thought of as unified by this belief
in a relationship between leastcore separation and nucleolus computation. We generalized the
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hardness result in [6] to bipartite graphs because of intuition derived from the core separation
problem being proven to be hard in that setting. Even deeper, the compact formulation for the
linear programs in the MPS Scheme we present in Chapter 2 centres around the excess assigned
to a universal allocation in first the linear program. Moreover the constraints in the compact
formulation are derived by using the way in which the dual to the leastcore separation problem
decomposes the underlying graph.
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[7] Péter Biró, Walter Kern, and Daniël Paulusma. Computing solutions for matching games.
Int J Game Theory, 41:75–90, 2012.
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[66] Ján Plesńık. A note on the complexity of finding regular subgraphs. Discrete mathematics,
49(2):161–167, 1984.
[67] Jos Potters, Hans Reijnierse, and Amit Biswas. The nucleolus of balanced simple flow
networks. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(1):205–225, 2006.
[68] Hans Reijnierse and Jos Potters. The B-nucleolus of TU-games. Games and Economic
Behavior, 1998.
109
[69] Neil Robertson and Paul D Seymour. Graph minors. III. Planar tree-width. Journal of
Combinatorial Theory, Series B, 36(1):49–64, 1984.
[70] Thomas Rothvoß. The matching polytope has exponential extension complexity. Journal of
the ACM (JACM), 64(6):41, 2017.
[71] David Schmeidler. The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on applied
mathematics, 17(6):1163–1170, 1969.
[72] David Schmeidler. The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game. SIAM Journal on
Applied Mathematics, 17(6):1163–1170, 1969.
[73] Alexander Schrijver. Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency, volume 24.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2002.
[74] Lloyd S Shapley. A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games,
2(28):307–317, 1953.
[75] Lloyd S Shapley and Martin Shubik. Quasi-cores in a monetary economy with nonconvex
preferences. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 805–827, 1966.
[76] Lloyd S Shapley and Martin Shubik. The assignment game i: The core. International Journal
of game theory, 1(1):111–130, 1971.
[77] Tamás Solymosi, T. E.S. Raghavan, and Stef Tijs. Computing the nucleolus of cyclic per-
mutation games. In European Journal of Operational Research, 2005.
[78] Tamás Solymosi and Tirukkannamangai ES Raghavan. An algorithm for finding the nucleolus
of assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory, 23(2):119–143, 1994.
[79] Tamás Solymosi and Balázs Sziklai. Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced
games. Operations Research Letters, 2016.
[80] Balázs Sziklai, Tamás Fleiner, and Tamás Solymosi. On the core and nucleolus of directed










































dual linear program, 11
dynamic programming formulation, 81
integral, 82
no common descendants condition, 81
reference subsets condition, 81
size, 81














































characterization set version, 65
laminar family, 33
leastcore, 16
linear subspace avoidance problem, 76
Maschler Peleg Shapley (MPS) Scheme, 26
Mashler Peleg Shapley (MPS) Scheme



















































Two Disjoint Directed Paths problem, 76








weighted voting game, 71
113
